

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
Sensitive Material~~

---



**The Inspector  
General  
of the Air Force**

---

# **Report of Investigation (S8666P)**

**Colonel Jennifer Grant**

October 2019

**DO NOT OPEN COVER WITHOUT A NEED TO KNOW--  
PROTECTED COMMUNICATION TO IG**

---

~~**Sensitive Material**  
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
I. Introduction.....	1
II. Scope and Authority .....	5
III. Background.....	6
IV Issues Examined That Did Not Result in a Formal Allegation .....	9
IV. Allegations, Findings, Standards, Analysis and Conclusions	
Allegation 1.....	10
Allegation 2 .....	89
Allegation 3 .....	112
V. Summary.....	115
List of Exhibits.....	117

---

*This is a protected document. It will not be released (in whole or in part), reproduced, or given additional dissemination (in whole or in part) outside of the inspector general channels without prior approval of The Inspector General (SAF/IG) or designee.*

# REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (Case S8666P<sup>1</sup>)

CONCERNING

**COLONEL JENNIFER GRANT**

PREPARED BY

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

October 2019

## I. INTRODUCTION

This investigation was directed in response to complaints collected by the Air Force Space Command Office of the Inspector General (AFSPC/IG) during a Unit Effectiveness Inspection (UEI) relating to the command climate established by Col Jennifer Grant, the 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing (SW) Commander at Schriever AFB, CO, and also a separate complaint filed by an (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). During the course of the investigation, two additional complaints were received--one from a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), on 30 Apr 19, and the other from the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), on 17 Jun 19. The complaint from (b) (6), (b) (7) included information relevant to this investigation. As such, he was interviewed as a witness on the topic of command climate. Likewise, the portions of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) complaint relating to the command climate were examined and are incorporated into this report.

### *AFSPC/IG Observations*

The 50 SW at Schriever AFB underwent a UEI, conducted by the AFSPC/IG from 24 Feb 18 to 4 Mar 18, earning an overall rating of “**Effective.**” The UEI validated and verified mission readiness and effectiveness of 50 SW organizational processes. This included Major Graded Area (MGA) elements of Managing Resources, Leading People, Improving the Unit and Executing the Mission. According to AFSPC/IG, over the course of the UEI cycle, 50 SW personnel “effectively evolved space and cyberspace warfighting superiority and continued to be a leading force in space and cyberspace.” (Ex 37:9) Although the UEI report itself, a releasable measurement of overall wing mission performance, did not contain specific references to the command climate Col Grant established and maintained, the report did point out that “...wing leaders must foster a culture of trust.” (Ex 37:11) Team members noted problematic trends with respect to climate and communication directly pertaining to Col Grant that were addressed to senior AFSPC leadership outside the written report.

---

<sup>1</sup> The Department of Defense Inspector General DCATS case # is 20190320-056939-CASE-01

*This is a protected document. It will not be released (in whole or in part), reproduced, or given additional dissemination (in whole or in part) outside of the inspector general channels without prior approval of The Inspector General (SAF/IG) or designee.*



Although the UEI report itself mentioned only that wing leadership should work on fostering a culture of trust, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified he and his team uncovered far more concerns on the topic of Col Grant's treatment of people and the culture and climate she created. He noted issues discovered with respect to Col Grant were conditions described as "the worst seen in 20 years." (Ex 12b:1)

During the short timeframe and nature of the UEI, the IG Inspection Team was understandably not able to fully explore or establish "hard evidence of willful immoral, unethical or illegal behavior..." (Ex 12c:1) However, the inspection team surveyed or interviewed more than 300 witnesses. During the course of the inspection, the IG team observed troubling indications concerning the wing's command climate to give them pause, concluding there was compelling circumstantial concern given the surprising number of Airmen and spouses who approached the team regarding Col Grant. (Ex 12c:1) The (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified:

Some of my most experienced inspectors say they have never seen such overt concerns, or Airmen afraid to face the Commander. For the most part, the same Airmen expressed dedication to their mission and units, although a few are leaving the service. I'm uncertain if we will receive more formal complaints, but I would not be surprised. The impact of the climate is stifled reporting and innovation, as directly stated by officers, enlisted, and civilians of all levels. (Ex 12c:1)

Additionally, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted personnel reported instances of: public humiliation, shaming, embarrassment, personal attacks, and fear, and came away from data gathering sessions with a significant amount of information that caused concern with respect to an unhealthy command climate at Schriever. (Ex 12b:3) During the course of the inspection, it became apparent to the IG that unit-level morale and resolve was strong, but there were clear indications at the Wing level, "things were in disarray." (Ex 12b:3)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified Col Grant was out briefed "multiple hours on multiple days" concerning climate issues discovered. (Ex 12b:3) Statements derived from Airmen to IG sessions formed the basis of the comment in the UEI report that "Wing leaders must foster a culture of trust." (Ex 37:11) This aspect was also specifically addressed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for this present investigation. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted the mission impact of the climate Col Grant fostered:

[Col Grant] was not getting information she needed because people were afraid of her. People were afraid to tell her the truth for fear of how she would react, and people in the Wing were reluctant to tell her bad news. (Ex 12b:4)

The (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) echoed this sentiment about Col Grant not getting information and tied those occasions to times when it could be observed she was not in a favorable mood. He related people could tell when Col Grant was having a "bad day" and even found himself withholding information at times because of her mood:



When [Col Grant] was not having a good [day], and you could see it on her face when she sat down at the end of the table after we all stood attention and she sat down and – if she was having a bad day, I would personally tailor the things that I would share in the meeting. I would be, like, ‘You know what? This is kind of a controversial thing. I’m going to table it until tomorrow or two days from now when we get together as (b) (6), or I’ll shoot her an e-mail tonight about it. I’ll make a phone call so we can have a private conversation about it and not do it publicly.’ Because if you did it publicly when there was not--when the good day wasn’t happening...it just would not go well. (Ex 27:44)

It was the opinion of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that in addition to the command climate being the worst seen in 20 years, based on personal observations and interviews by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the command climate was “decidedly unhealthy.” (Ex 12b:4)

Additionally, during Col Grant’s tenure as the Wing Commander, there were two Defense Organizational Climate Surveys (DEOCS) conducted to evaluate the organizational climate health of the 50 SW. The first was completed on 12 Apr 18 and the second on 15 May 19. These surveys, while not dispositive, offer useful data points and indicate areas of concern with respect to command climate including multiple entries on: a culture of fear, toxic leadership, low morale, poor communication, micromanagement, and lack of trust. (Ex 35; 36)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) *Complainant*

Additionally, an IG complaint was filed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), an Air Force (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), to the Air Force Space Command Inspector General (AFSPC/IG), who then forwarded it to the Air Force Inspector General for action. (Ex 23) The complainant is a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of an (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), Schriever AFB, CO. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) volunteered to serve as an Air Force (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for the 50 FSS and as such, was involved in wing programs designed to care for Airmen and their families. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) alleged improper conduct on the part of Col Grant, specifically, alleging Col Grant publicly humiliated her, scolded her, and showed disrespect towards her during a 9 Oct 18 Wing Community Action Board (CAB) meeting. (Ex 23:1-2) Adding to concerns about the overall command climate, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further stated in her complaint that Col Grant “reacts that way often with those who work for her....” (Ex 23:2)

The Investigating Officer (IO) prepared an Investigative Plan (IP) and presented the IP to the SAF/IGS Director on 2 Apr 19. The IO interviewed 64 witnesses between 1 Apr 19 and 25 Sep 19, traveled to Peterson AFB on 11 Jun 2019, and interviewed Col Grant on 12 Jun 19.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> The Subject interview, which covered 2 allegations, lasted over 13 hours. The full text of the transcript from that interview, which totals over 200 pages, is Exhibit 39. The Investigation Team interviewed 64 witnesses, including 26 of the 43 names provided by Col Grant.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED]

*Additional Complainant* – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

In June 2019, yet another IG complaint was filed against Col Grant. This complaint was filed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and alleged wrongful handling of an annual award and also mentioned elements of an unhealthy command climate. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) complaint was assigned a separate case number, S8747P. (b) (6), (b) (7) was interviewed on 27 Jun 19, and his testimony on the command climate established and maintained by Col Grant is included in this report. Among other issues in his complaint, (b) (6), (b) (7) described the command climate generally, with specific reference to the lack of effective, two way communication:

Categorically, the command climate of the 50th Space Wing has been described as "toxic" and "tyrannical" by both rank and file, and leadership alike. Morale went from a unit with pride in its mission and people, that was tangible during Wing gatherings to below; and has since turned into hushed masses afraid to speak up, speak out, or suggest meaningful innovation. Communications processes slowed to a standstill and were stifled both up and down the chain. The delivery of bad news or "active discovery" to the 50 SW/CC often is met with harsh criticism or passive aggressive response. These acts of intimidation combined with the established staffing process instituted by Col Grant, dissuades open communication and creates a culture where issues are suppressed to the lowest level despite requiring higher level attention. (Ex 40:2)

## II. SCOPE AND AUTHORITY

The Secretary of the Air Force has sole responsibility for the function of The Inspector General of the Air Force.<sup>3</sup> When directed by the Secretary of the Air Force or the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, The Inspector General has the authority to inquire into and report on the

---

<sup>3</sup> Title 10, United States Code, Section 8014

*This is a protected document. It will not be released (in whole or in part), reproduced, or given additional dissemination (in whole or in part) outside of the inspector general channels without prior approval of The Inspector General (SAF/IG) or designee.*



discipline, efficiency, and economy of the Air Force and perform any other duties prescribed by the Secretary or the Chief of Staff.<sup>4</sup> The Inspector General must cooperate fully with The Inspector General of the Department of Defense.<sup>5</sup> Pursuant to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 90-301, *Inspector General Complaints Resolution*, 28 Dec 18, paragraph 1.12.4, The Inspector General has oversight authority over all IG investigations conducted at the level of the Secretary of the Air Force. (Ex 1:16)

Pursuant to AFI 90-301, paragraph 1.12.3.1, the Director, Senior Official Inquiries Directorate (SAF/IGS), is responsible for performing special investigations directed by the Secretary, the Chief of Staff, or The Inspector General and all investigations of senior officials. AFI 90-301 defines senior official as any active or retired Regular Air Force, Air Force Reserve, or Air National Guard military officer in grades O-7 (brigadier general) select and above, and Air National Guard Colonels selected to receive a Certificate of Eligibility (COE). Current or former members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) or equivalent and current and former Air Force civilian Presidential appointees are also considered senior officials. (Ex 1:145)

One of several missions of The Inspector General of the Air Force is to maintain a credible inspector general system by ensuring the existence of responsive complaint investigations characterized by objectivity, integrity, and impartiality. The Inspector General ensures the concerns of all complainants and subjects, along with the best interests of the Air Force, are addressed through objective fact-finding.

On 19 Mar 19, The Inspector General approved a recommendation that SAF/IGS conduct an investigation into allegations of misconduct by Col Jennifer Grant, Commander, 50th Space Wing, located at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado. The case was assigned to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), who holds a SAF/IG appointment letter dated 8 Mar 19, and the investigation started on 27 Mar 19. (Ex 41) The additional complaint filed by (b) (6), (b) (7) was received on 30 Apr 19, and dismissed on 31 May 19. (Ex 42:1) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Ex 36:166) In a letter dated 23 May 19, Col Grant was notified of the specific allegations included in this investigation. (Ex 11b:1) The final complaint against Col Grant, from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was received by SAF/IGS on 17 Jun 19. During the course of the investigation, information surfaced from a witness with first-hand knowledge that Col Grant had allegedly accepted a gift from a lesser paid employee in the form of \$50.00 worth of Barnes and Noble gift cards, in possible violation of the *Joint Ethics Regulation* (JER). (Ex 80:2) Col Grant was advised of the nature of this issue on 6 Sep 19, and on 16 Sep 19, through her defense counsel, declined to provide a response. (Ex 113:1) On 30 Sep, this allegation became part of the formal investigation as Allegation 3. Col Grant was provided an updated allegations letter on 30 Sep 19, with the opportunity to

<sup>4</sup> These authorities are outlined in Title 10, United States Code, Section 9020

<sup>5</sup> Title 10, United States Code, Section 9020(d)


This is a protected document. It will not be released (in whole or in part), reproduced, or given additional dissemination (in whole or in part) outside of the inspector general channels without prior approval of The Inspector General (SAF/IG) or designee.



formally respond by 4 Oct 19. (Ex 120) On 4 Oct 19, through her defense counsel, Col Grant elected to exercise her rights and formally declined to comment. (Ex 126:1)

### III. BACKGROUND

The 50 SW is responsible for the operation and support of 185 Department of Defense (DoD) satellites and installation support to 20 mission partners with a workforce of more than 8,000 personnel. The basic mission of the 50 SW is to evolve space and cyberspace warfighting superiority. The 50 SW is organized into three groups: the Operations Group (OG), the Network Operations Group (NOG), and the Mission Support Group (MSG), and includes 16 geographically separated units. (Ex 3)



<u>WING STAFF AGENCIES</u>	
Command Section Assistants (CCA/CCCA)	Chaplain (HC)
Equal Opportunity (EO)	Historian (HO)
Community Support Coordinator (CVB)	Inspector General (IG)
Violence Prevention Intervention (SPPV) Protocol (CCP)	Information Protection (IP)
Drug Demand Reduction Prgm (CVD)	Judge Advocate (JA)
Sexual Assault Prevention (CVK)	Public Affairs (PA)
Command Post (CP)	Safety (SE)
Comptroller Squadron (CPTS)	Plans and Programs (XP)
	Program Management (PMD)

50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing Organizational Chart<sup>7</sup>

Col Grant took command of the 50 SW on 30 Jun 17, relinquished command on 24 Jun 19 and has been selected for promotion to brigadier general. (Ex 45:1; Ex 43:1) Prior to assuming command at Schriever, Col Grant served as the Operations Group Commander of the 30<sup>th</sup> Operations Group (30 OG) at Vandenberg AFB, CA. Her duty history includes various satellite space operations, launch, test, and acquisition program management assignments within the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and AFSPC. She has served in staff positions within both organizations, as well as the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Col Grant is also a former commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Space Operations Squadron (2 SOPS), at Schriever AFB. (Ex 2)

During this investigation, the IO interviewed or examined written materials from the following:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED], Schriever AFB, CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], Hurlburt Field, FL (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED], Schriever AFB, CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing, Schriever AFB, CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], Keesler AFB, MS (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED], Vandenberg AFB, CA)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], Peterson AFB, CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], Schriever AFB, CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing, Schriever AFB, CO  
CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED], Schriever AFB, CO)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED], 50<sup>th</sup> Operations Group, Schriever AFB, CO

<sup>7</sup> Based on 2017 organization chart. (Ex 110:1) Another version of this chart will be provided later in this report to provide a point of comparison.

*This is a protected document. It will not be released (in whole or in part), reproduced, or given additional dissemination (in whole or in part) outside of the inspector general channels without prior approval of The Inspector General (SAF/IG) or designee.*



(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Schriever AFB, CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted]  
[redacted], Schriever AFB, CO)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Schriever AFB,  
CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Schriever AFB, CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted],  
Colorado Springs, CO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Schriever AFB, CO)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Peterson AFB, CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing, Schriever AFB, CO)  
Lt Col Kevin Amsden, Commander, 3<sup>rd</sup> Space Experimentation Squadron, Schriever AFB,  
CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Peterson AFB, CO (b) (6),  
[redacted], Schriever AFB, CO (b) (7)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing, Schriever AFB, CO (C)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Schriever AFB, CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Schriever  
AFB, CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Schriever AFB,  
CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Schriever AFB,  
CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Schriever AFB, CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Ft. McNair, VA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
[redacted], Schriever AFB, CO)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Vandenberg AFB, CA (b) (6),  
[redacted], Schriever AFB, CO (b) (7)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (C)  
[redacted], Schriever AFB, CO)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], 50<sup>th</sup> Operations Group, Schriever AFB, CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted]  
Kirtland AFB, NM, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Schriever AFB, CO)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Peterson AFB, CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], 50<sup>th</sup> Operations Group,  
Schriever AFB, CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing, Schriever AFB, CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted]  
[redacted], Peterson AFB, CO)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Schriever AFB, CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted]



(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted]

, Fort Carson, CO

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted]

50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing, Schriever AFB, CO)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing, Schriever AFB, CO

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing, Schriever AFB, CO

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Peterson AFB, CO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Schriever AFB, CO)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing, Schriever AFB, CO

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing, Schriever AFB, CO

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing, Schriever AFB, CO

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing, Schriever AFB, CO

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing, Schriever AFB, CO)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], 50<sup>th</sup> Operations Support Squadron, Schriever AFB, CO

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing, Schriever AFB, CO

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Schriever AFB, CO

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Schriever AFB, CO

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] Center, 50<sup>th</sup> Force Support Squadron, Schriever AFB, CO

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Schriever AFB, CO

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, CO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Schriever AFB, CO)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] Schriever AFB, CO

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] 50<sup>th</sup> Force Support Squadron, Schriever AFB, CO

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing, Schriever AFB, CO

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] 50<sup>th</sup> Wing Plans, Schriever AFB, CO

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted]

Joint Base Andrews, MD

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], 21<sup>st</sup> Space Wing, Peterson AFB, CO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing, Schriever AFB, CO)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing, Schriever AFB, CO (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], Schriever AFB, CO

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing, Schriever AFB, CO

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [redacted], 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing, Schriever AFB, CO

(b) (6), (b) (7) (C), (b) (6), (b) (7) Peterson AFB, CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Schriever AFB, CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Peterson AFB, CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Schriever AFB, CO  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Peterson AFB, CO

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

**IV. ALLEGATIONS, FINDINGS, STANDARDS, ANALYSIS, AND CONCLUSIONS**

**ALLEGATION 1:** That between June 2017 and February 2019, Colonel Jennifer Grant failed to establish and maintain a healthy command climate, in violation of AFI 1-2, *Commander's Responsibilities*, 8 May 2014.

During the initial course of the investigation, after interviewing a variety of witnesses, the evidence revealed themes and topics that called for further investigation to help determine if, and to what extent, Col Grant failed to establish and maintain a healthy command climate within the 50 SW. Subsequently, the IO reviewed whether the climate created by Col Grant was unhealthy, as evidenced by failures to: attend to the welfare and morale of subordinates; foster teamwork, cohesion, and trust; and develop effective two way communication.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> AFI 1-2, *Commander's Responsibilities*, 8 May 14, para 3.2

*This is a protected document. It will not be released (in whole or in part), reproduced, or given additional dissemination (in whole or in part) outside of the inspector general channels without prior approval of The Inspector General (SAF/IG) or designee.*

## STANDARDS.

Air Force Instruction 1-2, *Commander's Responsibilities*, 8 May 2014 addresses a commander's duties and responsibilities.

3.2. Lead People. Effectively leading people is the art of command. Commanders must maintain **effective communication** processes and ensure unit members are well disciplined, trained and developed. At all times, commanders must lead by personal example and pay judicious attention to the **welfare and morale of their subordinates**. Commanders will enforce the Air Force cultural standards on conduct, performance, and discipline outlined in AFI 1-1, *Air Force Standards*. Further, **commanders will establish and maintain a healthy command climate which fosters good order and discipline, teamwork, cohesion and trust**. A healthy climate ensures members are treated with dignity, respect, and inclusion, and doesn't tolerate harassment, assault, or unlawful discrimination of any kind. (Ex 5:2-3) (emphasis added)

3.2.1. **Communication**. Commanders must develop a **two-way vertical and lateral communication** system which is agile enough to respond to changes in the environment in a timely manner. In order to develop understanding, intent, and trust, commanders must transmit goals, priorities, values, and expectations, while **encouraging feedback**. (Ex 5:3) (emphasis added)

Air Force Instruction 1-1, *Air Force Culture*, 7 Aug 12, incorporating change 1, 12 Nov 14 establishes the working environment expected, whether at home station or forward deployed, and encompasses the actions, values, and standards we live by each and every day. (Ex 4:4)

**1.3. Core Values.** The Air Force Core Values are *Integrity First*, *Service Before Self*, and *Excellence In All We Do*. *Integrity* is a character trait. It is the willingness to do what is right even when no one is looking. It is the "moral compass"—the inner voice; the voice of self-control; the basis for the trust that is essential in today's military. *Service Before Self* tells us that professional duties take precedence over personal desires. *Excellence In All We Do* directs us to develop a sustained passion for the continuous improvement and innovation that will propel the Air Force into a long-term, upward vector of accomplishment and performance. Our core values define our standards of conduct. Our standards of conduct define how Airmen should behave when interacting with others and when confronting challenges in the environment in which we live and work. (United States Air Force Core Values, 1 January 1997). (Ex 4:4)

## FINDINGS OF FACT.

In the course of the investigation, the IO found:

- On or about 30 Jun 17, Col Grant assumed command of the 50 SW. (Ex 45:1)
- On or about December 2017, the 50 SW did not undergo a climate assessment within 120 days after assumption of command as required by AFI 36-2706. (Ex 35:1; Ex 47:5)



- On or about December 2017, the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7) on Col Grant's staff collectively had a private, frank discussion with Col Grant and advised her there were problems with her approach to people and shared some of the negative effects it was having on the wing. The (b) (6), (b) (7), (b) (6), referred to it as a "come to Jesus meeting," where one at a time, each (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) clearly, without holding anything back, expressed their dissatisfaction to Col Grant. (Ex 27:11; Ex 39:26)
- On or about April 2018, the 50 SW underwent the first of two climate assessments/DEOCS surveys. (Ex 35)
- On or about May 2018, the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed for a 365-day deployment (to an undisclosed location). (Ex 51:6)
- On or about January 2019, the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) departed for a 365-day deployment (to an undisclosed location). (Ex 49:2)
- Between on or about 24 Feb 19 and on or about 4 Mar 19, AFSPC/IG conducted a UEI/CAPSTONE on the 50 SW. (Ex 37)
- On or about 14 Mar 19, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Ex 48:1)
- On or about May 2019, the 50 SW underwent the second climate assessment/DEOCS survey. (Ex 36)
- On or about 24 Jun 19, Col Grant relinquished command of the 50 SW. (Ex 50:1)

#### **ANALYSIS.**

The IO interviewed and collected sworn testimony from multiple complainants and more than 60 witnesses. The witnesses include past and present members of Col Grant's immediate staff, Group Commanders, Squadron Commanders, Wing Staff Agency leaders, Command Chiefs, support staff, civilians, and administrative assistants. The analysis that follows includes sworn testimony about the overall command climate at Schriever. During the investigation, some themes and examples were discovered that are also specifically addressed.

In addition to witness testimony about the health of the command climate at Schriever under Col Grant, the IO also examined key takeaways learned during the AFSPC/IG UEI, conducted by a team of functional experts and led by the AFSPC/IG as the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Ex 37) The inspection window evaluated by the AFSPC/IG team was from 13 Sep 16 to 4 Mar 19. The UEI itself was conducted at Schriever during the inspection CAPSTONE, which was 24 Feb 19 - 4 Mar 19 and provided a significant opportunity for observations by the

team of inspectors who received inputs and opinions from 343 witnesses (192 Airmen to Inspector interviews, 12 Sr. Leader to Inspector interviews, and 139 surveys). (Ex 119:1)

Other tools that provided data points in evaluating the health of the 50 SW climate were two DEOCS Reports, which are required by AFI 36-2706 and the National Defense Authorization Act. The first was completed on 12 Apr 18 (DEOCS #1803430) and the second on 15 May 19 (DEOCS#1903568). (Ex 35; Ex 36) As Col Grant's assignment spanned from June 2017 to June 2019, these two climate surveys, one ten months after Col Grant took command<sup>9</sup> and the other one month prior to the end of her second and final year in command, provide additional indicators and serve as useful bookends on the health of the command climate during her tenure. While DEOCS surveys alone are not necessarily dispositive on the topic of a healthy or unhealthy climate, when taken together with IG observations in a UEI and compared with comprehensive witness testimony, such tools can form a useful backdrop when discerning and illuminating trends or patterns and examining the overall health of the work environment. After careful review, observations gained by the AFSPC/IG team and both DEOCS survey reports align with witness testimony in pointing to an unhealthy command climate at the 50 SW during Col Grant's tenure.

Interestingly, a cursory review of the last Wing climate assessment done prior to Col Grant taking command revealed no significant complaints or areas of concern with respect to an unhealthy command climate. (Ex 54)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), who (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for the Air Force, has reviewed a wide variety of climate surveys since (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was asked for his opinion and general impression of the results of the Schriever DEOCS surveys for the 50 SW in 2018 and 2019. He testified the surveys indicate problems with the overall perception of leadership that are "very concerning," and the comments indicate "there's a problem." (Ex 55:1) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he has seen worse reports, but only in cases where there were equally negative portions in the front and back portions (high concentrations of red quantitative values with matching negative written quantitative portions) or where there was a removal of the commander. Overall, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted a "culture of fear warranting a deeper look." (Ex 55:2)

With respect to the 2018 survey, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted while the 50 SW appeared to be effective at executing mission when given clear and concise guidance, it was also apparent that there was:

---

<sup>9</sup> Air Force DEOCS Implementing Instruction, 21 Oct 15: "Commanders at all levels are held responsible and accountable for their climate and as such, must ensure a climate assessment is conducted within 120 days after assumption of command." As such, the first DEOCS climate survey was conducted 4 months later than required. See also AFI 36-2706 Equal Opportunity Program. (Ex 47)



- Lack of up and down communication from leadership.
- A disconnect between people executing the mission day to day and leadership.
- Lack of empowerment; micromanagement.
- A “fear factor.”
- A push to be innovative, but fear of being shot down.
- No cohesion, no trust, no accountability. (Ex 55:2)

By way of comparison, in a recent sworn statement given on 31 Jul 19, nearly 30 days after Col Grant relinquished command, when asked how things were at Schriever, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified:

It’s phenomenal. Night and day. I’m an (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) again and it’s awesome...It’s amazing the change in culture and climate with the lack of a toxic leader. (Ex 57:1)

In the words of one of Col Grant’s (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) summarizing the work environment under Col Grant:

The culture just ended up being kind of like...almost like a ‘reduce exposure to the Wing Commander...’ It just ended up being kind of like...a stressful and kind of toxic environment. I’ve had quite a few stressful kinds of jobs: high tempo, fast-paced staff jobs, command jobs, and so I don’t think it was that. It’s just...I guess individual-based, and in this particular case, it was Col Grant. (Ex 25:24)

On 16 Aug 19, nearly 50 days after Col Grant relinquished command, when asked how things were at Schriever, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified:

The change in wing leadership has had a positive impact on the wing, especially in terms of command climate. Commanders at all levels are empowered to lead—a big change from the last regime. The Wg/CC views and treats the Group Commanders as part of the command team, which has been a nice change for me personally. The new Wg/CC seeks input from commanders at all levels and makes decisions with their input in mind (versus in a vacuum). The new Wg/CC treats others with respect, greatly improving the climate in wing-level meetings. Meetings that used to be uncomfortable and tense are now what they should be—forums that foster discussion to solve the base’s biggest challenges. Additionally, I believe there is more trust up and down the chain. The Wg/CC trusts his leadership teams to execute his vision and priorities, which fosters trust in him. Col Grant was a micro-manager that belittled her people and appeared to have self-serving motives. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is the opposite. He trusts his people and treats them



with dignity and respect. His motivations seem to be mission and people-oriented, which is resonating with our Airmen. (Ex 58:1) (emphasis added)

As will be discussed in more detail later, though stated in a number of ways, sentiments about what things were like under Col Grant were expressed by many of Col Grant's immediate staff, from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), including the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), as well as (b) (6), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The volume of evidence gathered demonstrated Col Grant repeatedly, publicly and privately, belittled and berated her staff, leading to a climate consistently described as unhealthy. The majority of the witnesses interviewed, particularly Col Grant's (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), described an environment in which Col Grant failed in her responsibilities to pay attention to the welfare and morale of her subordinates and failed to cultivate a climate of teamwork, cohesion, and trust. These witnesses specifically discussed incidents large and small which exemplified the same. In the course of the investigation, the IO found:

- Col Grant repeatedly undermined and belittled her immediate commanders and subordinates in a way that stifled mission essential reporting, two-way communication, and trust.
- Col Grant's method of publicly questioning people, a briefer or commander presenting information, regularly and predictably began with more and more detailed questions. It then would devolve into accusatory language and perceived personal attacks as the questions would turn from the topic at hand to the person presenting the information. At the same time, her body language would noticeably change. She would "bristle up," speak in a lower and more deliberate tone, heavily emphasize certain words, clench her teeth, point her finger, and generally display an angry posture. This nuanced behavior was easily identifiable and readily understood by people, including the AFSPC/IG during the UEI inspection team.
- Col Grant would regularly rephrase what a briefer said, changing the content and restating it back to them in public, by saying "What I think you meant to say was..." leaving the person on the spot to either agree with her and sit down or face further public scrutiny and embarrassment. This was prevalent during her first year in command and also had a considerable impact on people's willingness to speak up or give candid feedback.
- At times, Col Grant lacked appropriate and professional judgment when interacting with subordinates and confronting challenges or mistakes. Such behaviors, in turn, undermined a sense of teamwork, cohesion, and trust as evidenced by engagements with witnesses who were: criticized, insulted or undermined, embarrassed, made to

feel stupid, verbally cut off, ignored, forced to move their offices, or had staff packages thrown at them.<sup>10</sup>

- 85% of the witnesses who recalled events and testified in this investigation reported negatively on Col Grant’s approach to engaging with people.
- Col Grant created an environment infused with fear and intimidation, which stifled communication and reporting, and undermined the welfare and morale of her subordinates. In so doing, the AFSPC/IG determined the conditions Col Grant created were the worst the IG team had seen in 20 years.

### *Overall Command Climate*

Before delving into specific incidents that contributed to the unhealthy climate and lack of morale, teamwork, cohesion, and trust, a general discussion of the unhealthy climate expressed by witnesses is warranted. The following witness statements provide a broad diversity of perspectives on the overall health of the work environment within the 50 SW and serve as indications of eroded morale, teamwork, cohesion, and trust. Fear and intimidation, when present, generally contravene these basic principles. When witnesses commented on a specific instance of Col Grant’s behavior that was of particular concern and corroborated by other witnesses, the issue is examined later in this report under the Specific Examples section.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

[I]t was a climate and a culture of...intimidation is such a strong word, but I don’t think there’s another word to use that would help articulate the oppressive nature that some of these individuals felt when they would have to brief or present information to the Wing leadership. (Ex 59:36)

So the climate...leadership just built this culture of: ‘You know, no matter what I say, I’m going to get shot down. No matter what I do, it’s going to be wrong.’ It’s, ‘I’m in a no-win situation.’ (Ex 59:39)

(b) (6), (b) (7) – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified about his experience with Col Grant and how the negative climate she created was so bad that over time, he began to have (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) :

While she doesn’t break into fits of shouting, Col Grant’s words, delivery, and demeanor are received and interpreted as career ending. Her leadership is like being in an abusive relationship or marriage. You’ll do whatever you can to not make her mad, not take another face shot. You’re constantly walking on eggshells. (Ex 60:1)

---

<sup>10</sup> The topic of throwing staff packages at members of the staff is explored in greater detail in the Specific Examples portion.



(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in the wake of his experience working for Col Grant are also examined in greater detail in the Specific Examples section.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), who cross trained into (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), related similar observations during her sworn testimony and shared such behavior from Col Grant, particularly the verbal and non-verbal communication, was not uncommon:

From the non-verbal cue standpoint, I interpreted that as anger and frustration maybe. I'm not sure. But that is a way that I have been delivered, I guess feedback before, and I consistently feel as though, once she's speaking to me in that way, she is upset, and angry and generally just not happy with me.... I'm familiar with her body language and facial expressions.... So, it was not really a 'one-off' thing. (Ex 22:10)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further described Col Grant's body language and non-verbals in such situations as "clenched teeth and narrowed eyes." (Ex 22:25) When asked how that made her feel, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) expressed a low sense of self-worth and hopelessness:

Pretty small.<sup>11</sup> Like I don't know how to do my job, and there's not, you know--it doesn't matter even if I think I know how to do my job, I still am going to get it wrong. (Ex 22:26)

Col Grant's treatment of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is also examined in greater detail in the Specific Examples section.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), on Conditions for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

My sense from the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) up there [(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)] and from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) being the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) up there is, there's not a whole lot of love between Col Grant and the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). They work hard to help her, and there's not a lot of 'thank you(s)'. There's not a lot of, 'Hey, I'm sorry. It's my fault.' There's a lot of, 'It's your fault.' (Ex 27:65)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[Col Grant] came back and just kind of like, threw it [staff package] on my desk, saying, you know, 'Why didn't this person sign it?' I explained it to her that they [had] reviewed and 'This is, you know, their concurrence is right here, lower...' (Ex 61:8)

When asked how Col Grant put the staff package back on her desk, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified: "Rudely. She like, forcefully just slammed it down so that, I guess, it got my attention...."

---

<sup>11</sup> (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), testified similarly that the atmosphere Col Grant created in meetings made people feel small and insignificant. (Ex 117:1)



(Ex 61:8)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

My first dealings with Jennifer Grant was when she was a major and she was the aide de camp to (b) (6), (b) (7). And in the beginning, she was very snippy.... So when I heard that she was coming up the ranks and I heard that she was selected for the Wing Commander...[I thought] Oh my God. Has she changed her attitude? But like I said, when the (b) (6), of the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said, [sarcastically] 'Oh, she's a gem,' I said, 'Oh, God, she hasn't changed.' And she hasn't. [It] got worse because she now had power. (Ex 62:38-40)

(b) (6), (b) (7) testified she did not decide to retire right away but tried to give Col Grant a chance. (Ex 62:43) After determining Col Grant had not changed, she retired. (Ex 62:43) Col Grant testified she and (b) (6), (b) (7) had a good relationship and that she asked if there was anything she could do to convince (b) (6), (b) (7) to stay. (Ex 39:119) Ultimately, (b) (6), (b) (7) testified it was the way Col Grant treated her that contributed to her decision to retire. (Ex 62:14)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Demonstrating this is not a new phenomenon with Col Grant, but rather a pattern, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the conditions under Col Grant when she was a Lt Col and squadron commander:

[Y]ou didn't want to get anything wrong with her.... That somebody could look at you, and not yell at you...[but] you could feel your soul being crushed.... She doesn't take bad news very well. (Ex 63:14)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony was consistent with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in that Col Grant has demonstrated this pattern of treatment over time and it now has broader reach with her expanded power and authority as a wing commander: "[Col Grant]'s the same person that she was when she was in 2 SOPS. She just has a lot more authority now in this position." (Ex 63:20) She continued:

That whole feeling of eggshells was felt kind of, you know, in 2 SOPS as well. (Ex 63:22)

When she left, it was as if the unit as a whole kind of took a deep breath or like a sigh, if you would. [T]he Commander that replaced her...everybody was like, 'Oh my God. This is such a breath of fresh air....' [I]t was kind of a nice, healthy balance.... (Ex 63:24)

Col Grant testified she was familiar with the commander responsibilities established by AFI 1-2. When asked to share her views on what a healthy command climate should look like, Col Grant responded: "Mm, a healthy command climate is one that institutes fairness in treatment of all of its members." (Ex 39:3) Col Grant was reminded that commanders are also

18

*This is a protected document. It will not be released (in whole or in part), reproduced, or given additional dissemination (in whole or in part) outside of the inspector general channels without prior approval of The Inspector General (SAF/IG) or designee.*

responsible for establishing and maintaining a healthy command climate and fostering teamwork, cohesion, and trust. (Ex 39:5) When asked what steps she took to make sure that was the case among her Group and Squadron Commanders, Col Grant responded that good order and discipline meant commanders understood their responsibilities, which included knowing instructions and the law so they could adjudicate cases to take care of the Air Force, good order and discipline, and Airmen. (Ex 39:5) She described a “three legged stool” that included holding people accountable, understanding individuals, and the needs of the Air Force. (Ex 39:5)

She then shared her views on teamwork, cohesion, trust, and respect, emphasizing the importance of the frequency of “touchpoints” and “communication:”

Um, the teamwork, cohesion and, and trust aspect. I, I truly believe that, that the frequency of touchpoints and communication is integral to maintaining an understanding of where people are at and what they need in order to, um, be successful, whether that is in executing their mission or managing their resources, um, or you know, in any aspect of those four major graded areas they’re responsible for, risk mitigation, risk identification, those types of things. (Ex 39:5)

Col Grant then went on to describe at length the weekly battle rhythm of meetings and the quantity of regularly scheduled events, as well as some infrequent social events. Notably, Col Grant repeatedly referred to opportunities for communication or interaction with people as “touch points.” In fact, it became apparent she viewed the number or frequency of “touch points” to be the key to establishing teamwork, cohesion, and trust. (Ex 39:5) What was noticeably absent was any reference to the quality of human interactions or the value of connecting with people.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]

In contrast to Col Grant’s response, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified more directly on effects of these interactions:

Given the first six to eight months of [Col Grant’s] command I would say were not very healthy... and it was--it had nothing to do with, I think the type of question that she was asking or her intelligence or the need for the information. It was more along the lines of the way she was approaching the leadership style that she was using. Which, the leadership style definitely limited people's willingness to speak up and talk and present information....The atmosphere was tense in the meetings. I think people had information that probably should have been shared with her on the, from the operation side of the house, and it wasn't being shared because they were afraid to share it. (Ex 27:10) (emphasis added)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained: “Anybody briefing was scared of taking a ‘face shot’ in public or her playing ‘stump the dummy’ in front of everyone.” (Ex 60:3)



When asked about this apparent reluctance by people to speak up at meetings and this fear to share information, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained:

People were reluctant and fearful because they would be corrected on the spot, in front of everyone else in the room, if they said something or had taken an action that was not in sync with how Col Grant thought the issue/situation should be handled. On the Ops side of the house, it seemed like they were always out of sync so they were publically corrected a lot. She also did not like having 'discussions' in front of everyone during a meeting. Commanders/Directors were required to work all concerns/issues before the meeting; she did not like first-heard or new information to be brought up during a meeting she was chairing. When someone brought up new information it usually did not go well which caused people to stop brining up their concerns and not share information that was just learned prior to the meeting. (Ex 96:1)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued, relating especially during her first year in command, Col Grant's foul moods often dictated people's willingness to communicate with her:

[I]n the first six to twelve months of her command she would bring her 'Bad Days' into meetings. It was my experience that if she was having a bad day and someone in the meeting was not prepared or did not have the right sight picture in their response to a question, her facial expressions (clenched teeth/forced smile) would come out and she would be harsher in her conversation with the individual than if she was having a good day. This happened enough that people tended to only engage with her during a meeting if they thought she was having a good day. The bad days seemed to happen a couple of times a week on average during the first six to twelve months. (Ex 96:1)

(b) (6), (b) (7) - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - 2 SOPS

One of the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7) shared what it was like from his perspective:

It was, far and away it was the worst year of my life. It's difficult to point to any one specific instance. I hate to use a colloquialism, but I would say 'death by a thousand cuts.' It got to the point where anytime I saw an e-mail from her, or, um, heard from my front office that the Wing was calling, you get a pit in your stomach. There's no such thing as a good interaction. It felt constantly like we were under scrutiny and that we could not do right by her as Wing Commander. (Ex 30:10)

He continued:

I drank [alcohol] fairly heavily my second year of command. It was how I coped with how miserable I became. It was always in the evenings, I never came to work drinking, but, I know I wasn't the only one.... I drank as a coping mechanism. I was miserable.... I didn't spend a lot of time with [my family]. And I would tell you I probably, I probably cried weekly. Usually in private, usually in my home, uh once or twice in my office with the door closed. (Ex 30:36-37)



\*\*\*\*

...I could have filed an IG complaint somewhere along the line. And to be honest with you, I was afraid. And I still, to some degree, am.... (Ex 30:40)

*Others Witnesses Also Reported Crying at Work*

After talking to a number of witnesses, the IO noted a pattern where the stress of dealing with Col Grant brought a number of otherwise seemingly well-adjusted people to tears, including: the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), just to name a few.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled crying at work multiple times. One particular time having to do with an unexpected Promotion Recommendation Form (PRF) and the associated timeline for it to be submitted, is addressed in more detail in the Specific Examples section. Testifying more generally about being reduced to tears at work, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified about her experiences engaging with Col Grant:

I think, three times during the duty day and one time, um, where I left work in tears at the end of the day. (Ex 22:22)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

After an incident where Col Grant was overlooked in the signing of a get well card for the Command Chief who was recovering from a medical procedure, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described her experience:

I walked out--I actually walked to the bathroom, I was crying. Came back, like, pulled myself together and just--kind of tried to let it go. The next day, I came in and they were like, 'What about your appointment with Col Grant?' I'm, like, 'What appointment?' And, the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [said] 'Yeah, she wanted you on her calendar.' [Col Grant] later pulled me in. We sat down on--there's couches in her office. She basically told me, 'Hey, um, I think it would be a better idea if you moved back to the other side of the office' ....<sup>12</sup> (Ex 92:7)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the time, testified she was present after this incident and confirmed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was emotionally upset after leaving Col Grant's office:

---

<sup>12</sup> Col Grant's (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified about similar treatment with Col Grant telling him she wanted him to move his office away from hers, before flatly telling him she thought he should look to be assigned somewhere else. (Ex 91:1)

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)**

We talked about it after she left her office initially. And she was really upset. She couldn't really talk much because she was upset and she was crying. She just said like, you know, 'How dare you not...bring the card to me,' you know, 'That's my (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),' like, um, along those lines. She was just really upset and--yelling her at her about [it]. (Ex 20:15-16)

The "get well card" incident is examined in greater detail in the Specific Examples section.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified about her own experience, sharing that she too cried after an encounter with Col Grant in Col Grant's office, and began to blame herself:

I didn't come out of her office crying, but it did eat me up a little, and then, yes, I did cry. I, at one point....there was short notice tasker from Air Force Space Command. Basically, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wanted to allocate 369 billets...we had about a two day deadline.... Then Col Grant heard about [she short notice tasker] and she pulled us into the office--me and the exec, into the office, and asked why this was sent to 14<sup>th</sup> Air Force without her approval....She was very angry and you can just tell by her face. It was...she was very angry. (Ex 20:17-18)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Col Grant's (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), testified consistently that she witnessed people in tears after dealing with Col Grant, to include (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who she described as "worried" and "stressed," and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) after the "get well card incident." (Ex 73:1)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Similar to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) experience, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified that at times, she too had difficulties dealing with Col Grant:

I will tell you I personally did have one day where I cried in my office, in front of my (b) (6). I, like, never cry...but it was, it was just sort of over frustration of that I felt like I couldn't do my job and help my people the way I wanted to. I think -- because of the way she feels about me.... More frustration in the moment. Yeah. I was just...bad that I can't do more for my group. Because she kind of undercuts me,<sup>13</sup> and I can't protect them the way that I want to. (Ex 26:27)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) - (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Col Grant asked the IO to contact (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as a character witness to vouch for her leadership style and climate. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she had a good working relationship with Col Grant and she treated her professionally and with respect, but when asked if she had

---

<sup>13</sup> AFSPC/IG observed Col Grant publicly undercutting (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) during the UEI and noted she appeared to undermine (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ability to lead. (Ex 12b:3)



**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)**

ever experienced Col Grant talking to her in a manner that would cause her to tear up or have an emotional response, she replied “No, but people have come to me that have.” (Ex 74:1)

(b) (6), (b) (7) first described multiple conversations with (b) (6), (b) (7) the (b) (6), (b) (7) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . (b) (6), (b) (7) testified that before her (b) (6), (b) (7) shared with her that she was regularly counseled by Col Grant and related Col Grant often reminded (b) (6), (b) (7) that she, Col Grant, “was the boss.”<sup>14</sup> (Ex 74:1) According to (b) (6), (b) (7) due to the stress of these instances, the (b) (6), (b) (7) would seek wingman-type counsel from her afterward. (Ex 74:1) She shared that (b) (6), (b) (7) thought Col Grant was unwilling to allow her to make any decisions and that offering options was usually taken as a direct challenge to Col Grant’s authority. (Ex 74:1) Additional issues regarding Col Grant’s treatment of (b) (6), (b) (7) are addressed in greater detail in the Specific Examples section.

(b) (6), (b) (7) shared that the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) , (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also confided in her she too did not like the way Col Grant treated her. (b) (6), (b) (7) described (b) (6), (b) (7) as a confident and competent SARC, who often clashed with Col Grant’s “controlling leadership style.” (Ex 74:1)

(b) (6), (b) (7) explained that she figured out how to “shape each conversation in a way to allow Col Grant to decide on the issue alone, without advice.” (Ex 74:2) In her opinion, this kept Col Grant from challenging the facts or the person presenting the information and has allowed her to get along with Col Grant. (Ex 74:2)

*Culture and Climate – More from Commanders, Agency Heads, IG*

(b) (6), (b) (7) – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

[W]hen [Col Grant] talked or engaged with people, it came across kind of in a very sort of condescending kind of way.... As senior leaders, Group Commanders or, you know, [the] Vice Commander, we’re kind of cross-checking with each other. ‘Is this just me? This is out of whack.’ (Ex 25:23)

\*\*\*\*

I feel like it was sort of a toxic environment, and so really my second year of command was not enjoyable for me at all.... I will tell you that here at (b) (6), in (b) (6), I’m probably just as busy. I worked today from 7:30 to about 7:30, 8:00 o’clock at night. Minimal breaks, heavy workload, all that kind of stuff. But the climate here is good. Now, my four-

---

<sup>14</sup> (b) (6), (b) (7) testified similarly: “I would hear from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) you know, [Col Grant] would remind [her], ‘Hey, I’m the wing commander. I’m the Colonel. You need to do it this way.’” (Ex 27:78)

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)**

star boss, he's tough. He's a tough war fighter. I still don't feel the same amount of stress that I felt in my second year at Schriever. (Ex 25:35)

*Lt Col Amsden – Commander, 3<sup>rd</sup> Space Experimentation Squadron*

Lt Col Amsden candidly voiced concern about a lack of healthy communication and trust at these meetings or “touch points”:

You do not speak in meetings with Col Grant. You do not bring stuff up. You do not surprise her. You do not ask questions. And so, most people now look at the floor, avoid eye contact, don't bring things up. (Ex 85:30)

\*\*\*\*

[T]here's no doubt that this Wing is suffering from rampant toxic leadership that has caused everyone to disengage. Morale is horrendous. We are staring at the ground, avoiding eye contact, not speaking. It's just insane. General Powell talks about: 'The day soldiers stop bringing you problems, is the day you stop leading them.'<sup>15</sup> They are afraid to speak, afraid to mention anything, afraid to ask a question, to let Col Grant know that there's a better way, or that there's a bigger problem. (Ex 85:53)

(b) (6), (b) (7) – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

The (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was privy to Col Grant's public treatment of people that would appear to fall short of Air Force expectations when interacting with others:

So... it's a public down dressing to make sure everybody else gets in line....I've been at this for thirty years now. And I'll tell you, if you're criticized behind closed doors, right? But these were very public. And I got it, you know, if you're looking to pull the thread and try to get a little bit more details so we can kind of, 'Hey, how as your leader, can I help you?' That's not the conversation. It's...basically, you know, 'I want to make sure everybody in this room knows that I think you're 'f-ing' up, you're messing up. I want them to know that I'm not going to tolerate it.' And that was the tenor and tone....I can just tell you that it happened fairly regularly. Even up until the January, February timeframe of [2019]. It was fairly regular. (Ex 21:11-12)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also observed times when Col Grant failed to appreciate the impact of her words and treated subordinates unfairly:

---

<sup>15</sup> The full quote from former Secretary Powell is: “Leadership is solving problems. The day soldiers stop bringing you their problems is the day you have stopped leading them. They have either lost confidence that you can help or concluded you do not care. Either case is a failure of leadership.” Colin L. Powell, Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey*, Ballantine Books, 2010.



**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)**

Col Grant starts asking questions, it kind of becomes this leadership approach of, you know, if there's information I have, I need more. I need the information. Or instead of us collectively trying to understand an issue...it's, 'I'm kind of the smartest person in the room....' And some of that's all good and at times, appropriate. It's the approach and the style that I feel uncomfortable with because at times it makes people, I think, feel it's demeaning. Or belittles them in a way. That it feels like it's a bit of a power posture or power trip, in that regard. (Ex 28:11)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

During the UEI, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) personally observed Col Grant publicly humiliate a briefer by leaning over to members seated at the table, and say in a voice loud enough for others, including IG observers to hear, "He doesn't know what he's talking about." (Ex 12b:2) In his words, the IG had "never seen anything like it." (Ex 12b:2) The IO contacted Col Grant on 6 Sept 19 with respect to this matter to afford her the opportunity to respond to this issue. On advice on counsel, Col Grant invoked her right to remain silent and elected not to comment. (Ex 112:3; Ex 113:1)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also commented on Col Grant's approach and how it hampered vertical communication flow:

I think it limits communications. So I think that's the biggest thing. Again, [Col Grant] is really good at management. She's really smart, but because of the sort of climate, I do think people don't speak up as much as they should. I think sometimes there are maybe issues that should already come up to her that haven't because people are afraid. I know my squadron commanders are excited about leaving command. I have four of them leaving command this summer. They sort of can't wait to be done with the job. (Ex 26:22)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted at times she too could relate to this reaction:

I don't like to interact with [Col Grant] much because of, sort of the treatment. I don't like the condescending attitude. It's just tough. So, honestly, I do try to avoid interaction with her. Which is, I think to myself sometimes, 'This is ridiculous. I am an (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)'. ...I want to be able to better manage this as well, but it's just so painful sometimes to engage with her. (Ex 26:38)

When asked about the state of the command climate within the wing, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded: "I don't think that the Wing Commander sets a very healthy climate here...." (Ex 26:46) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued, touching on the second and third order effects of working in a climate like that, stating many people faced with working for Col Grant again would choose to get out of the Air Force. She shared she even had the same thoughts:

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)**

I hear a lot of folks that have said, 'Hey, if I have to work for [Col Grant] again, I think I'm going to get out.' And I'm in that camp, too. In a time where (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is kind of messaging, 'Hey, I need folks to stay.' And especially, 'We kind of need (b) (6) to stay,' it's, I feel like that's sort of another area where her style has a negative impact on the Air Force in terms of retention. (Ex 26:58)

Col Grant's treatment of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is also explored in greater detail in the Specific Examples portion of the report.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

On the topic of poor communication, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Col Grant's (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified that in his short time with Col Grant, he observed Col Grant was a "smart and a hard worker, but there was something about the way she communicated." (Ex 91:1) He continued:

She expects perfection and has a way of thinking about things. If you don't think the same as she does, you're wrong. She questions why you did that, or think that, or took that action. (Ex 91:1)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also related a time while Col Grant was off the installation with her (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (a triple leadership absence, leaving (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the base at the time). He was leaving the base for the day and noticed an ambulance, with lights flashing and sirens activated, speeding onto the base. (Ex 91:1) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified he called Col Grant simply to let her know and asked if she wanted him to find out more details about what was going on. According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) she quickly said "No" and ended the call. He thought this was strange. He testified she later called him an "ambulance chaser," said she would have handled the situation differently, adding she wanted him to move his office away from hers. She then reportedly flatly told him she thought he should look to be assigned somewhere else. (Ex 91:1) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has since been reassigned.

The IO contacted Col Grant on 6 Sept 19 with respect to the above matter involving (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to afford her the opportunity to respond to this issue. On advice on counsel, Col Grant invoked her right to remain silent on 16 Sep 19 and elected not to comment. (Ex 112:3; Ex 113:1)

*People Leaving Their Jobs, Retiring, or Deploying to Get Away from Col Grant*

During the course of the investigation, the SAF/IG Investigation Team detected a trend of people who regularly interacted with Col Grant making life decisions based on their negative interaction with Col Grant, such as deciding to retire, to retire before making time in grade, to change jobs, or to deploy on a 365 day deployment. Also noted was significant turnover in protocol, and with secretaries. When asked about this, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified: "I would not work for her again." (Ex 27:57-58)



When asked if people were choosing to leave as a result of their unhappiness, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed:

Yes, I believe so. It goes back to the leadership style and the climate that was set. That's Col Grant's Achilles heel, in my opinion. I don't challenge her intelligence. I don't challenge her vision and her direction she wants to take the wing. I told the AFSPC/IG in my interview in February or March time frame....Col Grant has definitely made this wing a better place in terms of its war fighting capability for the, for the joint commander down range. However, [her] leadership style has limited her ability to take the wing to where it could have been, and it's mostly in the things you just described in terms of the, the personnel challenges are significant because people don't enjoy working for her. (Ex 27:58)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued on the topic of not wanting to work for Col Grant again:

I don't need that in my life, but the last year has been, pleasant. I have not had any significant challenges in the last year where I felt like I didn't want to go to work like I did back in November of '17 when I was, like, 'Hey, I think I'm done.' (Ex 27:59)

\*\*\*\*

There's been a lot of people that have left, and they would, most of them, some of them have retired, some have gotten promotions, but I think every one of them if they were being honest would tell you that Col Grant was a contributing factor in why they decided to move on. I mean, it might have been the right time too, but she would have put them over the edge. (Ex 27:61)

A review of key staff positions reveals approximately 10 staff members either retired, quit, or deployed citing Col Grant as at least part of the rationale for leaving Schriever.<sup>16</sup>

In support of his thoughts of not wanting to work for Col Grant again, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) shared an example when he was called to Col Grant's office. He assumed it was to receive positive feedback for all he had been doing right. (Ex 27:20-21) However, once there, she appeared frustrated and upset at him. He testified she then specifically asked if he "want[ed] to be the wing commander?" (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described being totally shocked and did not understand what she was talking about. He responded he did not want to be the wing/CC and was enjoying being a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Col Grant then asked "Well why are you trying to act like the Wing Commander?" (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could not understand this approach. (Ex 27:21) When asked directly if she ever confronted anyone about or asked if they wanted to be the wing commander, Col Grant denied doing so. (Ex 39:176)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained Col Grant believed he was acting outside his authority on a

<sup>16</sup> Positions include: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the Commander, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)**

temporary bathroom/shower initiative for the fitness center:

She had agreed with it. Having a comptroller background, I had seen the comptroller in the hallway the day before and had said, 'Hey, just a heads up.' It was right before end of year.... Greasing it. That went over like a ton of bricks. (Ex 27:22)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) related that Col Grant accused him of going to the comptroller and directing him. She reportedly told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) "I'm the Wing Commander. If it's going to happen, it's going to come from me." (Ex 27:21) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reported he respectfully told her he was lost and didn't understand what she was talking about. (Ex 27:21)

During the subject interview, when asked an open-ended question about members of her leadership team, Col Grant commented on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Although she complimented him at first, she also mentioned her belief that she suspected (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) somehow wanted to be the Wing Commander:

And, um, my (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had just arrived maybe a week ahead of me. A lot of experience on the MSG side as a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) by trade, uh, very-- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), very eager, very interested in making sure that he was doing his job. Sometimes I think he, he struggled with wanting, you know, to be running the Wing. He would tell people in his office that, uh, he could easily do the job of a Wing Commander. (Ex 39:17)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Schriever from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) until (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). He worked for Col Grant for over a year. His move to the Air Force Academy was a lateral move, but he testified Col Grant was a "partial factor" in his decision to leave. (Ex 69:1) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) related Col Grant is not the kind of person he ever wanted to work for again, because even though the mission may get done, "it's not healthy." (Ex 69:1) He added, "We're better than that in the Air Force." (Ex 69:1)

When asked directly if the command climate Col Grant established and maintained was healthy, he responded: "Not at all. Until she made General. Then she changed—became very nice." (Ex 69:1)<sup>17</sup>

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted Col Grant displayed a "Jekyll & Hyde" personality/attitude. (Ex 69:1) Trained in the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), he compared the atmosphere created by

---

<sup>17</sup> (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also detected some uncharacteristic changes in Col Grant's demeanor: "There has been a noticeable change in her attitude since the UEI, and I wasn't sure if it was because maybe the stress was off because we had gotten through the inspection. The other theory was that there was something going on and that she might be under investigation for climate because her attitude did change significantly." (Ex 26:27) The UEI concluded 4 Mar 19. (Ex 37:5) Col Grant was notified of this investigation on 19 Mar 19. (Ex 11a:1)



**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)**

Col Grant as a feeling where people were “walking on eggshells, similar to a domestic violence situation where a spouse or partner may unexpectedly turn on you.” (Ex 69:1)<sup>18</sup>

(b) (6), (b) (7) continued, in his observations of Col Grant, that she was data driven, and not relational: “Her struggle seemed to be she was not empathetic on a deeper emotional intelligence level.” (Ex 69:2) He observed meetings where there was “anxiety in the room.” (Ex 69:2) (b) (6), (b) (7) continued, “We all felt it” and called it “systemic anxiety,” where members of the staff felt stress from her. He noted it may just be her personality, and openly wondered if she was self-aware of this or not. (b) (6), (b) (7) said he knows she really wants to be a General, but noted this personality “may not be best to be in leadership.” (Ex 69:2)

(b) (6), (b) (7) – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

The (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), testified that 99% of the reason for her leaving was because of Col Grant. (Ex 73:1) When she heard Col Grant may be coming to (b) (6), (b) (7), at Peterson AFB (b) (6), (b) (7) where (b) (6), (b) (7) now works) and that she might have to work for Col Grant again, she was prepared to leave her job again, to get away from Col Grant a second time. (Ex 73:1)

When asked if the Wing climate under Col Grant could be described as healthy, (b) (6), (b) (7) replied: “No. Not under Col Grant.”<sup>19</sup> (Ex 73:2) When asked about the overall climate working for Col Grant, she responded: “You felt you could never do anything right. It was wrong, no matter what.” (Ex 73:2)

(b) (6), (b) (7) also described Col Grant’s approach at times as: “condescending tones, clenched teeth, accusatory tone, disrespectful.” (Ex 73:1) She highlighted Col Grant’s tone changes, and how she spoke in a way that is “condescending, like talking to a child.” (Ex 73:1) She stated she did not like that and felt it was disrespectful. (Ex 73:1)

(b) (6), (b) (7) described work conditions in the front office as: “people on eggshells, tense, not relaxed.” (Ex 73:2) She could not recall ever seeing Col Grant express appreciation. (Ex 73:2) When offered her current position, in Building 1, at Peterson AFB, Col Grant asked (b) (6), (b) (7) if there was anything she could do to keep her at Schriever. Instead of having a confrontation with Col Grant, (b) (6), (b) (7) testified she simply pointed to the Top Secret clearance working in (b) (6), (b) (7) would afford her, which she knew was not available at the Wing level. (b) (6), (b) (7) acknowledged that was not her real reason for leaving. The primary reason, (“99%”) was to get away from Col Grant. (Ex 73:1-2)

<sup>18</sup>This observation was also mentioned by (b) (6), (b) (7) who compared the conditions he faced as a squadron commander under Col Grant to an “abusive relationship.” (Ex 60:1)

<sup>19</sup> A review of the 2017 DEOCS climate survey conducted while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Schriever AFB (2015-2017) revealed no areas of concern with respect to unhealthy command climate. (Ex 54)

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)**

Not surprisingly, Col Grant testified consistently as to her understanding about why (b) (6), (b) (7) left her job working for her, that it would afford her the opportunity to get a higher security clearance and in turn, the opportunity for upward mobility. (Ex 39:57)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Col Grant asked the IO to contact (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as a character witness. When asked to describe the work environment under Col Grant, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) openly stated Col Grant is a tough person to work for: she’s a tough boss, very demanding, very much on point, and “everything must be perfect.” (Ex 80:1) When asked what happens if things are not perfect, she replied: “She tends to get a little cranky.” (Ex 80:1)

It was clear (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was uncomfortable testifying about Col Grant personally. When asked about what she may have observed from others working in that environment, she shared more readily: “The front office was all frustrated with her. People come out of her office frustrated. She’s tough, doesn’t take no for an answer, or wrong work, or mistakes.” (Ex 80:1-2)

When (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was asked if she ever made any errors, she stated she did. (Ex 80:2) When asked how Col Grant reacts when people make mistakes, she stated:

Her emotions are displayed on her sleeve sometimes and I don’t think she realizes that. You get a look, you know, for lack of a better way to say it, an evil look. (Ex 80:2)

When asked if she observed disapproving looks, body language, tone, she responded: “Yeah, she had what I called, the ‘mom tone,’ like, ‘You screwed up again.’” (Ex 80:2) I’d see people walk out of her office, I’d see everybody and their frustration.” (Ex 80:2)

When asked if she ever experienced or observed the feeling of “walking on eggshells” around Col Grant, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded: “Yes. Because her expectations are so high. It’s stressful to deal with that on a day to day basis.” (Ex 80:3) When asked if that was a comfortable climate that people wanted to work in, she testified:

Oh no, no, no. That makes it very difficult, and makes for long hours because you’re doubting yourself, and double checking yourself.<sup>20</sup> (Ex 80:3)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7) testified Col Grant was a “big part” of her decision to leave her job at Schriever as the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (Ex 33:1) She took a lateral position,

---

<sup>20</sup> See also: Allegation 3 for a discussion of Col Grant accepting \$50 worth of gift cards from (b) (6), (b) (7) who testified she did so because she felt bad about making a mistake while trying to get Col Grant a passport. (Ex 80:2; Ex 108:1-3; Ex 111:1; Ex 113:1)



**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)**

as (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), at Peterson AFB, CO. She described her new job at Peterson as “refreshing” because now, she’s not worried about getting in trouble if she didn’t frame an issue right. (Ex 33:1) According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) it’s not the same at Peterson as it was at Schriever under Col Grant, where Col Grant would make briefings feel like graded events and drill briefers down to the level of detail where “she would make people feel stupid.” (Ex 33:1)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Schriever, under Col Grant, but is now the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), at Peterson AFB. Likewise, her experience with Col Grant influenced her decision to leave her job.

The morale was very low when I left. It kind of felt like people were jumping ship. In my personal situation, I took a promotion, so, I would’ve taken a promotion no matter which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) I worked for. It made it easier to take the promotion, let’s put it that way. Because I had a run in with her, um, thankfully mine was in private, but I had a run in with her that left me no doubt [about leaving].... (Ex 88:13)

In describing the way Col Grant talked to her during that “run in,” (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described a disrespectful interaction:

It was just kind of condescending I guess, kind of like a teacher would talk to a 2, 3 or 4 year old, like ‘This is not the way and if you need, you know, some assistance with that, you know, we can work on that.’ And you know, telling other Colonels, ‘Well, take that as a task’ and, you know, just very much, um, I felt like she was trying to really work hard to assert her authority. Which I thought was weird, I’m like, ‘You’re the Wing Commander, we got it.’ (Ex 88:7)

When asked if Col Grant generally treated people with dignity and respect, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded that although Col Grant never raised her voice, the biggest thing she noticed was Col Grant being condescending and disrespectful.<sup>21</sup>

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Schriever for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), first at the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and then at the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) starting in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). She testified her experience with Col Grant was the final straw that made her decide to retire. (Ex 62:14) She described she did not come to this decision right away and there were three “strikes” that prompted her to finally retire, two of which were directly related to how she was treated by

<sup>21</sup> (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified: “[S]he never raised her voice. But [was] very condescending, I would say the respect thing is part of the biggest thing that I noticed was, you know, it didn’t matter if you were an (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or an (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), if you said or did something...condescending to me, is the exact opposite of respect, and so I felt it was very disrespectful.” (Ex 88:37)

**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)**

Col Grant. (Ex 62:14) She also pointed out, unlike others who took jobs elsewhere, she didn't have anything else to turn to and remains permanently retired. (Ex 62:43) (b) (6), (b) (7) testified:

Col Grant was not an easy person to work for. She just--her arrogance. The way I look at it is, she'll smile in your face and stab you in the back attitude.... I can honestly say to you, I never felt that she had my back. Never. (Ex 62:38)

(b) (6), (b) (7) testified she noticed an attitude and arrogance from Col Grant when she stopped by the protocol office early in her tenure and felt Col Grant didn't really care that she was contemplating retirement. (Ex 62:12) She also related a time when she was recuperating at home from (b) (6), (b) (7) and was contacted by AFSPC Protocol to coordinate a SECAF visit, feeling disbelief and disappointment that Col Grant didn't reach out to her to see how she was doing. (Ex 62:13-14)

[N]o answering the e-mail to say, 'Hey, how are you feeling? Thanks for doing this.' No. And I thought to myself, I'm done. I'm done. Because nobody should be treated like that. So, for two weeks I laid on the couch with my foot raised up, working the SECAF's visits. Then I came in the door and I went to CPO when I got back and I said, 'Process my paperwork.' (Ex 62:14)

During her subject interview, Col Grant was asked if she knew the Protocol shop was understaffed and overworked. She responded: "I did. They were understaffed. That's why we detailed lieutenants to help offset that...." (Ex 39:116) Col Grant acknowledged the manpower professionals were telling her the two employees in her Protocol shop were doing the work of four people. (Ex 39:117)

Col Grant testified she was not the reason (b) (6), (b) (7) or her (b) (6), (b) (7) retired and was of the belief the only reason (b) (6), (b) (7) retired was because of the change to the retirement system.

Both of them reassured me it had nothing to do with, you know, anything other than, just the family constraints and the time, you know, based on the retirement pay system that they were going through. And it was just time that--um, (b) (6), (b) (7) actually had wanted to retire earlier but she had stayed on a little bit longer. And (b) (6), (b) (7) said she stayed on a little bit longer because (b) (6), (b) (7) was still there. (Ex 39:118)

A written comment in the 2018 DEOCS survey expresses a similar sentiment to many of those expressed by the members above.<sup>22</sup>

I used to enjoy coming to work but the current environment is horrible. I am wondering if things will get better after current leadership leaves or if the Air Force just doesn't

<sup>22</sup> It is noted that DEOCS survey entries are anonymous and it is within the realm of possibility that one of the witnesses interviewed could have written the same or similar DEOCS survey answer.



**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO)**

understand how busy and important Schriever is becoming. I used to like Schriever, but now I'm looking for jobs at USAFA or [Peterson AFB]. (Ex 35:69)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified he volunteered for a one-year deployment, his second in recent years, while he was the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for Col Grant because he “did not have the appropriate relationship with Col Grant” and did not feel “it was healthy for [him] to stay there.” (Ex 51:3, 27)

This incident, which is based on how (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was treated by Col Grant in public and private, is explored in greater detail in the Specific Examples section.

*Credibility of Witnesses*

The IO was on guard to ensure the witnesses who provided negative information about the command climate created by Col Grant generally (discussed above) and specifically (discussed below) were not “disgruntled” employees whose credibility could reasonably be questioned. AFI 90-301, para 4.19.2 directs assessment of the credibility of witness testimony considering factors such as demeanor, bias, motive to lie, knowledge, ability to observe, recency of observations, corroborating evidence, and prior inconsistent statements. (Ex 1:79) Additionally, the IO consulted the Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 27-9, *Military Judges’ Benchbook*, 10 Sep 14, to assist with the witness credibility determinations in this case. Chapter 7, 7-7-1, “Credibility of Witnesses” states, in relevant part:

[Y]ou have the duty to determine the believability of the witnesses. In performing this duty you must consider each witness’s intelligence, ability to observe and accurately remember, sincerity, and conduct in court, (friendships) (and) (prejudices) (and) (character for truthfulness). Consider also the extent to which each witness is either supported or contradicted by other evidence; the relationship each witness may have with either side; and how each witness might be affected by the verdict. (In weighing (a discrepancy) (discrepancies) (by a witness) (or) (between witnesses), you should consider whether (it) (they) resulted from an innocent mistake or a deliberate lie.) Taking all these matters into account, you should then consider the probability of each witness’s testimony and the inclination of the witness to tell the truth. (The believability of each witness’s testimony should be your guide in evaluating testimony, not the number of witnesses called.) (These rules apply equally to the testimony given by the accused.) (Ex 7:2)

The IO noted while not all of the factors discussed above necessarily applied to the witness testimony gathered in support of the allegations in this investigation, the IO found AFI 90-301 and the additional framework presented by the *Military Judges’ Benchbook* instructive.

The IO found the witnesses who provided evidence of an unhealthy command climate within the 50 SW highly credible. None of these witnesses appeared motivated to have a negative opinion of Col Grant just because she made them work hard. Almost every witness described Col Grant as being highly intelligent and demanding but did not object to high standards. Rather, their objection was the treatment people had to endure and the negative climate that she created. The comments in this area were broad-based and rather consistent, which enhanced the credibility of the witness accounts.

Col Grant testified that with the exception of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) she did not have any concerns about the diligence, honesty, or trustworthiness of senior officers on her team. (Ex 39:19) Similarly, she held junior members in high regard. For example, Col Grant testified (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had a good reputation in the wing and she considered her to be dependable, reliable, and trustworthy. (Ex 39:69) She described (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as “great, one of the most conscientious, hardest working people in the front office.” (Ex 39:54)

She also described (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as having a lot of experience, noted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and was very diligent. (Ex 39:17) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) especially gave well-balanced responses during his testimony and took time to give fair assessments. Likewise, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) resisted any bias or motive to paint Col Grant in an unnecessarily negative light. Nearly all witnesses, when given the opportunity to talk about Col Grant’s best qualities, took the opportunity to do so, most commonly commenting on her extraordinary intelligence.

On numerous occasions, as noted below, multiple witnesses corroborated accounts of specific incidents that exemplified the unhealthy climate created by Col Grant as evidenced by lack of attention to people’s welfare and morale, and the resulting negative effects on teamwork, cohesion, and trust. There are also several similar experiences from different people, at different times and circumstances. Further, with the exceptions of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) none of the other 60+ witnesses interviewed contacted the IG to testify or filed a complaint. In fact, most witnesses appeared apprehensive or in some cases fearful to testify, acknowledging Col Grant may be in a position to influence their future careers. Witnesses testifying about specific instances had first-hand knowledge of the facts and circumstances they described and were able to recall specific details with particularity.

With very few exceptions, the vast majority of witnesses interviewed presented as intelligent witnesses with the ability to observe and accurately remember what happened to them or others. They appeared sincere in their answers and opinions were well reasoned. They were honest about friendships or relationships with other witnesses but did not appear to color their testimony one way or the other. Perhaps most considerable on the issues presented under Allegation 1, is the degree to which multiple layers of testimony were supported by other testimony.

The credibility of these witnesses was weighed against the credibility of Col Grant, where Col Grant’s testimony is in direct conflict with the testimony of a witness or multiple witnesses



on the same subject. It was not necessary to weigh the credibility of testimony about incidents where Col Grant testified she did not recall the specific incidents, or invoked her right to remain silent on a given issue. (Ex 113:1)

Col Grant on the other hand, during her interview, at times displayed the very demeanor witnesses described. The Investigation Team noted she pointed her finger despite claiming she never points because it is not polite. (Ex 39:189) She pursed her lips, narrowed her eyes, and seemed agitated at times. At one point she accused her Group Commanders of turning people against her. (Ex 39:16) Later in her testimony, she remarked that people wanted to “weaponize” the DEOCS survey and may “try weaponizing” the IG system. (Ex 39:132) With respect to certain details that should have stood out in her memory, she professed a lack of recollection-- for example, the significant topic of her interaction with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was in a mental health treatment facility. Similarly, Col Grant was unable to recall the content of an apparently heated verbal exchange with her Command Chief, (b) (6), (b) (7) (Ex 56:1; Ex 51:9) Col Grant provided approximately 13 hours of testimony. Often, a single question would result in a deluge of extraneous information. While every attempt was made to present Col Grant’s full replies, many of her responses had to be trimmed or summarized. Recognizing that any attempt to summarize the Subject’s sworn testimony would likely lack some modicum of detail, the full transcript of Col Grant’s testimony (207 pages) is at Exhibit 39.

*Specific Examples*

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Col Grant’s treatment of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is informative of the command climate she created within the 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing and illustrates how she tended to the welfare and morale of her subordinates. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified there have been a number of suicides at Schriever during Col Grant’s tenure. (Ex 27:26-27) Of those, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was having a particularly difficult time with Col Grant. He noted she was a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and filled the role of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) after the two Protocol civilians retired. (Ex 27:76) He continued:

She and Col Grant struggled--clashed a lot. Did not get along. I've had this conversation with many people.... Do I think (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a result of Colonel Grant? No. I don't. I truly believe Col Grant did not cause her to (b) (6), (b) (7) . Do I think Colonel Grant caused additional stress in her life and challenges? Yes. I do. (Ex 27:77)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) later commented (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was extremely sharp, but had expressed to him dismay because “she didn’t feel she was ever good enough for Col Grant.” (Ex 56:2) He continued:

It's a lot of visits. So it was tough on the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) . She would reach back and share with me, you know, ‘I'm struggling with Colonel Grant.’ And I'd give her advice and guidance on how to meet Col Grant's expectations. (Ex 27:78)



(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mentioned he would hear from (b) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that Col Grant would remind her at times that she was the Wing Commander, the Colonel, and would tell her how to do things. (Ex 27:78) He opined Col Grant's demanding nature likely contributed to the troubled relationship. (Ex 27:79)

*Three Issues, Col Grant and (b) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)*

With respect to (b) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) three separate incidents involving Col Grant warrant closer examination. The first had to do with Col Grant's late approval of (b) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) leave request for international travel to visit her fiancé, (b) (6), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was to be on "R&R" (Rest and Relaxation/mid-tour break) from a deployment as a (b) (6), (b) (7) in Afghanistan. (Ex 61:44)

The second was (b) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) being confronted by Col Grant after Col Grant saw her at the airport during duty hours. Colonel Grant was under the impression (b) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left work without permission or letting anyone know. (Ex 61:50)

The third was an incident while (b) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was receiving (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Col Grant called (b) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and according to witnesses, confronted (b) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for having listed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) an (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), on her "safety plan."<sup>23</sup> Col Grant denied that she counseled, admonished, or reprimanded (b) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for having an (b) (6), (b) (7) listed on her safety plan. (Ex 39:127) (b) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was (b) (b) (6), (b) (7) and (b) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a co-worker in the same building with whom she regularly talked to. (Ex 92:21; Ex 125:1)

*International Leave Request*

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified (b) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had difficulty getting Col Grant to officially approve her leave for international travel. (b) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also testified generally about the quality of Col Grant's relationship with (b) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

I'm comfortable saying (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) felt like Colonel Grant just hated her. And I can say that confidently because I still have a stream of text messages from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to myself about how she felt with her relationship with Colonel Grant. (Ex 61:43)

\*\*\*\*

(b) (6), (b) (7) was] talking about how she's super stressed out and very anxious. And I ask her, you know, why, and just trying to calm her down a little bit. And she feels like she's in a different boat. She says she has (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in. She can really--she feels like Col Grant can break her at this point. She's like, 'I have too much time to not make it to

<sup>23</sup> A "safety plan" or "crisis response plan" is an individualized, hierarchically arranged, written list of coping strategies to implement in distressing circumstances. The plan is evaluated for its effectiveness and is further expanded throughout the course of treatment as the patient learns new coping skills. (Ex 121:59)



20 [years of service]. And my short time here, my career has taken a huge dive. I just can't seem to make the cut to be good enough. I've done amazing things in my career, amazing, but here, I'm the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that Col G hates and I'm sick of her coming after me for one thing after another...It's just been the worst year of my life, personally and professionally. I'm just feeling defeated.' (Ex 61:46-47)

When confronted about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sentiments, Col Grant stated she had never heard that and had no idea why people would say she said those things. (Ex 39:131) She went on to express her outrage that people would make things up and "put words in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) mouth." (Ex 39:132)


Col Grant stated the sentiments expressed by witnesses were lies:

And you know, there appears to be a fabric of a narrative that is coming through in some of these hearsay comments that I find particularly disturbing and offensive as an individual and as an officer. Because in cases like this, they are very personalized and in a way that you cannot go to the primary source to even get validation or verification. And I don't know who you interviewed that provided those statements claiming that they're her friends and that she said these things, but that couldn't be farther from the truth. And that to me is troublesome. (Ex 39:132)

Col Grant also stated people had falsely used climate surveys and the Inspector General system against her:


(b) (6), (b) (7) was one of my Airmen and she was somebody that I cared about a lot. And it just really, really hurts my head and it bothers me. It's one thing if people want to weaponize the DEOCS survey. It's another thing if they want to try weaponizing the IG system. But when you take somebody who is an Airman, who's not here anymore, and you put words in their mouth, that I know she didn't say, just to make a point, there's something very wrong about that. And I don't know what it's going to take for me to tell you that there's absolutely no truth to that to convince you. (Ex 39:132) (emphasis added)

(b) (6), (b) (7) provided the following 21 Dec 19 text messages received from (b) (6), (b) (7) referenced during her sworn testimony:



(Ex 95:3) (emphasis added)





(Ex 95:5) (emphasis added)

In addition to these text messages, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony corroborated the late leave approval was stressful on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and opined further about the impact the added stress Col Grant's interaction had on her:

When (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) came back to me and came back to my (b) (6), she was detailed back. So, she was still--Col Grant was still her supervisor, still approved her leave. There were challenges sometimes getting the leave approved in a timely manner. There was one instance where the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was going overseas to meet up with her (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), who was deployed with the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). And the OCONUS leave was signed like at 10:00 at night before the 8:00 in the morning flight the next morning. That was stressing her out.<sup>24</sup> (Ex 27:80)

\*\*\*\*

I don't disagree that Col Grant's interaction with her caused her additional stress on top of all that. That's why I say I don't think that was the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). It was other things, but she was definitely under stress because of that--or added stress because of their relationship. (Ex 27:81)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), corroborated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony that Col Grant's failure to approve her leave for international travel until the last minute weighed heavily on her:

[S]he stood outside of Col Grant's door; she had sent several messages to her, tried to get on her calendar. She was denied to see her. I told her use an open door policy, just walk in there. Her approach and my approach are completely different. I have no problem walking into my O-6's office and saying 'Hey, Sir, I have an issue.' She

<sup>24</sup> (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified similarly that she had difficulty getting leave approved by Col Grant. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked for leave for 2 days with an adjoining weekend (4 days total) to visit her (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), who was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). She reported having difficulty getting it approved because of the UEI and was criticized for mentioning her (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and making the "connotation it was an urgent matter." (Ex 61:22)

would never do that. She tried to do things the right way, go through the channels that she was supposed to. (Ex 18:13)

He added:

She was terrified of Colonel Grant. I get the impression that everyone is terrified of Col Grant out at that base, even other O-6s, which I don't understand. (Ex 18:14)

\*\*\*\*

I think that the leave thing to come out and see me in December was a huge blow to her and that was when she told me [she didn't] want to be in the Air Force anymore, that was a lot of stress, a lot of burden on her.... (Ex 18:21)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reflecting on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) experience with Col Grant, continued:

To have a girl that's done (b) (6), and a pretty phenomenal career over those (b) (6), years, to say that she wants to get out of the military and not deal with it anymore because of one leader, it's telling to me. And I've been in those situations where you have...a leader, and you're like, 'I don't want to do this anymore,' then, you know, you get moved to a new job and then you're fine. So, you move to a new job. But it's my understanding her supervisor was (b) (6), but she was still under Col Grant, and Col Grant was still writing her evaluations. (Ex 18:24)

*Confrontation Over Picking Up (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the Airport*

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also recalled a time he needed a ride home from the airport one afternoon and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arranged to be there to pick him up. He testified: "She had taken off work for an hour to pick me up and I think that Col Grant saw her there." (Ex 18:4)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added:

Col Grant confronted her about that at a later date.... I do know that she was confronted about it and (b) (6), uh, was talked to about it. And it did upset her. I do remember that.... (b) (6), would never dip out of work without anybody knowing. That was not her style. She was professional. When I first met (b) (6), she said that her job was the most important thing to her. (Ex 18:9)

\*\*\*\*

I know that she would have asked to leave work. She wouldn't have just left work. And being reprimanded for going to pick me up after she had gotten the okay, you know, made her feel like she had done something wrong when she was--I can almost say with one hundred percent certainty she received permission to leave work that day. (Ex 18:10)



(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), corroborated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had permission to depart to go to the airport. (Ex 60:4)

When asked about this incident during the subject interview, Col Grant confirmed she saw (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the airport, and confirmed she confronted her about it, but was emphatic it did not happen while at the airport:

And I was coming out and she, she was walking in. She walked into the ladies' room and I thought, 'Oh gosh, that's odd.' Like, 'I didn't, I didn't realize that we were leaving.' And I think when I came back, I just asked the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) you know, 'Hey, I didn't realize (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was, was--is she traveling or is she,' you know, um, and he didn't know. He didn't know either. And so I asked her about it. I just asked her, and she said...she was meeting her (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). And I said, 'Okay...it would just be, it would just be helpful if you just let somebody know, right, where you're going to be just as a courtesy because you know, we, we have things um, like that and uh, that happen.' And so more of a communication crosstalk but no, there was no--there was zero confrontation at the airport. None. (Ex 39:125)

Listing an (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Safety Plan

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from the end of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) until the time that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). She was in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), 8 hours a day minimum, for 10 weeks. (Ex 27:80) Before being (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), she and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) regularly crossed paths, as they worked in the same building. (Ex 125:1)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified Col Grant contacted and counselled (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for having an (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) listed on her safety plan, while (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C):

The fact that I was her safety plan and I was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), raised red flags. From what the Lieutenant had told me at the time is like, basically she [Col Grant] yelled at her (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on the phone. Told her, like, she needs to find someone who's an officer to talk to, that she shouldn't be friends with me, it was unprofessional. Keep in mind, we weren't, like, going downtown to bars, going to each other's house, she wasn't in my command chain. Like, none of that. And basically that she shouldn't be talking to me about her issues. She needs to vent lateral, not down to enlisted. (Ex 92:21)

IO: This is when she's at the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ?

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C): Yes...briefly, she (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called me [that] afternoon just to tell me, like, I was her safety plan. That she was okay, not to worry. That type of stuff and just kind of give me a heads-up. And then she (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ask[ed] me, 'Hey, here's my address, can you run by and check my mail, and just put it under my mat, so that it's not sitting on my front porch?' And I said, 'Sure.' And I did that, later--so she probably called me on a Thursday or Friday, and had told me that. On Sunday night, I got a phone call from the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and [he] was like, '...I don't know what's going on.' And so we talked and he



was, like, 'Okay, well, it sounds like you're just being a good wingman,' this, that. He [said] 'Just remember your professionalism and making sure it's...you know how to be a (b) (6), (b) (7).' Like, just make sure you're not doing anything wrong, like, this whole thing. But what I got from it is, when I was able to put her story together and his phone call, was that obviously she [Col Grant] was notified of it, and wasn't okay with the fact that I was (b) (6), and she was an (b) (6), regardless of if it was professional or not.

So from there, (b) (6), (b) (7) got out of Fort Carson (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) started doing (b) (6), over at an off-base provider. She wasn't back at work... (b) (6) would kind of ask me, like, 'Hey, how's your wingman doing?' We'd talk a little bit. I kind of knew that I could trust (b) (6) and, like, give him unfiltered, like, 'Hey, she's doing better, she's not doing better, or she's struggling with this.' You know, just doing the wingman thing...and talking through it. And then on the 14th of March, yeah, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (Ex 92:39)

When asked about the issue of Col Grant allegedly yelling at (b) (6), (b) (7) on the phone, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated:

Yeah, so she basically said, she told me that, she was sitting there in (b) (6), and obviously Col Grant, the Wing Commander, is one of the people who can call in. She called to check on her and talked to her for a little bit, and then that turned into that, and she was like, just couldn't understand how she's (b) (6), and someone's treating her that way. Like, that's not the vibe she should have got. (Ex 92:44)

(b) (6), confirmed Col Grant called (b) (6), (b) (7) during (b) (6), (b) (7) and discussed having (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on her safety plan. (Ex 56:1) According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7) was "upset Col Grant was on her for another thing."<sup>25</sup> (Ex 56:1) (b) (6), related that Col Grant spoke to him about her concerns with (b) (6), (b) (7) having an (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) listed on her safety plan, concerned about fraternization. (Ex 56:1) He stated he told Col Grant the safety of the individual should come first, but Col Grant didn't care. (Ex 56:1) In his words, "It was just a bad judgment call" on Col Grant's part and "it was hard for her to see the human element." (Ex 56:1)

(b) (6), further testified he did not share the same view as Col Grant and he told (b) (6), (b) (7) to use (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as a wingman when she needed to, but to "just avoid going skiing, socializing, or something like that." (Ex 56:1) He did not share the view that (b) (6), (b) (7) should completely cut off talking with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and testified, "Col Grant wanted it to be a 100% cut off." (Ex 56:1) (b) (6), further shared that (b) (6), (b) (7) expressed frustration about Col Grant's concern with this issue, and that at times, she said she just needed to be able to speak to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Ex 56:1)

<sup>25</sup> This sentiment of Col Grant being "on her for another thing" is similar to (b) (6), (b) (7) text to (b) (6), (b) (7) where she expressed frustration with Col Grant coming after her for "one thing after another." (Ex 95:3)



According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7) was extremely sharp, but expressed to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) dismay because “she didn’t feel she was ever good enough for Col Grant.”<sup>26</sup> (Ex 56:2) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was also aware there were times when Col Grant was hard on (b) (6), (b) (7) in public during meetings where she was “pitching” an upcoming planned event or DV visit, adding this was not uncommon for Col Grant to do to people in public, regardless of rank. (Ex 56:2)

Col Grant’s account of the phone call to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) while she was receiving mental health treatment was inconsistent with other witness testimony on the subject. During her first response to the IO’s question about whether she was concerned about the relationship between (b) (6), (b) (7) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Col Grant responded:

I was a little bit concerned about it when (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) um, was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when I asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) how she was doing because I called her to, to see how things were going there and to check up on her when she said that --I asked her who, who is your wingman to call if, if you need somebody to talk to? And she said (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is my person. And I had a conversation with the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7) (b) (6), (b) (7) to let him know, ‘I don’t know if you’re tracking but I, I just think that um, I just think that we probably should see maybe if there is a more appropriate person.’ Because (b) (6), (b) (7) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). She had things that she was dealing with too and then on top of that now she’s got an officer who is leaning on her significantly for emotional support. And my concern was that (b) (6), (b) (7) was, was carrying a lot of things on her shoulders that might be a bit more than is reasonable to expect somebody to handle and to process through. (Ex 39:126)

Col Grant continued:

And the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7) at the time was unaware of the content and the structure of that safety plan per se, specifically identifying (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as her person to call, which is why I reached out to him. Because at the time that (b) (6), (b) (7) was admitted um, she was over in the MSG. She was back over there, working for (b) (6), (b) (7) and um, I just, by way of professional courtesy and cross-check wanted him to know, ‘Hey I, I talked with (b) (6), (b) (7) and I just want to compare notes with you to make sure that you know, we’re tracking.’ And he said, ‘Nope, I wasn’t aware of that and I appreciate you letting me know’ and um, and, and, and you know, ‘I’ll chat with her about that. But I think, you know, for the purposes here, we probably just let it ride.’ And I said, ‘That’s fine. But I just want to make sure that, that as the leadership team, we were both aware and tracking that--what that meant.’ (Ex 39:127)

Having heard Col Grant’s sworn statement that after she heard (b) (6), (b) (7) say, “(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is my person,” that she “had a conversation with the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to let him know,” and her subsequent statement that she appeared to agree with (b) (6), (b) (7) that they should let that issue “ride,” the IO asked Col Grant if she raised the issue with (b) (6), (b) (7)

<sup>26</sup> This sentiment of not feeling good enough for Col Grant is consistent with (b) (6), (b) (7) text messages to (b) (6), (b) (7) where she expresses not being able to “make the cut to be good enough.” (Ex 95:3)

during that call, and if she counselled, or reprimanded, or admonished her for having an (b) (6), (b) (7) listed on her safety plan:

Grant: No.

IO: Did you talk about it?

Grant: All I talked about was who she had on her plan. But no, there was no admonishment. There was, there was nothing. I just, I just was surprised, because I didn't realize that they were that close, but there was no--the person that I talked to about that was the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

IO: But not to her directly? When you called and talked to her while she was--

Grant: No. I called and talked to her to find out how she was doing.

\*\*\*\*

Grant: And to let her know that I was aware that she was in there.

At that point in her testimony, after a pause, Col Grant then added the following statement:

And then she was the one who was talking to me about who she would call and, and I just asked her, you know, 'Is that, is that, is that your primary person? Is that the only person you have? Is there, you know, another, another CGO also that you could put on your list?' And she said 'No, that's the person that, that I would like to contact.' And I said, 'Okay.' But I didn't--there was, there was no admonishment or reprimand or, 'Hey, you shouldn't be doing this,' or anything like that. It was just, it was just me asking the question as to why (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and why not somebody else? (Ex 39:128)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided testimony consistent with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), all of which were inconsistent with Col Grant's on the topic of the manner in which Col Grant made known her displeasure about the enlisted member being listed on the safety plan. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told him on the phone, within 24 hours of it happening, that Col Grant had called her while she was in the hospital, in (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and Col Grant did engage her on the topic of having an (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on her safety plan, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified:

Col Grant told her (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that was not professional to have an (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on her safety plan, and she needs to really re-evaluate her safety plan. (Ex 18:25)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added he felt strongly "that was not the time for Col Grant to be telling (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that her choice of trusted people was inappropriate." (Ex 18:26)



According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Col Grant was concerned about fraternization. He stated Col Grant was not thinking about the safety aspects of interfering with a person's choice of who she trusted as a wingman/safety plan person while that person had self-identified for and was receiving mental health treatment. (Ex 56:1)

Col Grant's troubling treatment of (b) (6), (b) (7) illustrates both the overall command climate she created within the 50 SW and her failure to pay judicious attention to the welfare and morale of a subordinate. The witness testimony highlights the importance of being able to take leave and the importance of personal, supporting relationships. Witness testimony supports that waiting until the last minute to approve leave or making an issue of picking a loved one up at the airport detracted from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) morale, whether Col Grant realized it or not. Text messages, written by (b) (6), (b) (7) indicate she was troubled by Col Grant's treatment of her. She wrote Col Grant could "break" her, that she didn't feel "good enough," that Col Grant hated her, and that she was sick of Col Grant "coming after her for one thing after another." (Ex 95:3) Finally, we know she felt her last year was in her view, the worst year of her life, feeling personally and professionally defeated. (Ex 95:5) These texts speak in a very powerful way to a lack of morale and to an unhealthy climate.

Far more concerning is that Col Grant would call someone receiving (b) (6), (b) (7) after (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and fail to resist the impulse to question them on their choice of military members on their safety plan. While answering questions on this topic, Col Grant minimized her expression of criticism to (b) (6), (b) (7) on this point. Only after being pressed did she concede the topic was discussed at all. While claiming not to have given (b) (6), (b) (7) grief about it, Col Grant went on to question her three times on the matter:

I just asked her, you know: 'Is that, is that, is that your primary person? Is that the only person you have? Is there, you know, another, another CGO also that you could put on your list?' And she said, 'No, that's the person that, that I would like to contact.' (Ex 39:128)

It appears that at times like this, Col Grant lacked an appreciation for the impact of her words or the weight of the office she held as Wing Commander. The testimony of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7) all support the conclusion that (b) (6), (b) (7) was upset about her conversation with Col Grant about her safety plan while she was receiving (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Such lack of self-awareness resulted in her failing to pay judicious attention to the welfare and morale of a subordinate in violation of AFI 1-2.

Disparaging the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

As noted earlier, the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified she did not think the Wing commander set a very healthy climate at the wing. (Ex 26:46) She further elaborated:

---

45

*This is a protected document. It will not be released (in whole or in part), reproduced, or given additional dissemination (in whole or in part) outside of the inspector general channels without prior approval of The Inspector General (SAF/IG) or designee.*

I had a conversation with her where I said, 'Hey, I feel like I'm ping-ponging here because when I insert myself, it's: 'Hey, we need to hear from the squadron commanders.' And I do agree with that, but when I'm sort of doing the, 'Hey, I've completely coached them through...' whatever briefing they're going to give to her. 'I've worked with them on whatever they were sending, and I'm in the background...' Then it's, 'You're not engaged enough.' And there's been a--sort of a ping pong back there, and it's also very confusing for my squadron commanders, too. (Ex 26:51)

IO2: So how did she respond when you mentioned that to her?

(b) (6). She told me that, that I was 'the worst (b) (6) she ever worked with,' and this was, like, in a phone call on a weekend, um, because she was sending me, you know, e-mails or texts. I can't remember what it was, and I just wanted to pick up the phone and like, clear the air. Like, 'Hey, ma'am. I'm having a hard time here trying to meet your intent, but I'm kind of getting conflicting information. Sometimes you say this, and I feel like I'm going back and forth. I just wanted to clear the air about this recent issue.' And I can't remember exactly what it was, um, but it was in some bit of communication and how involved I was, or not involved in it. And she said, yeah. 'Worst (b) (6) that she's worked with, and that she's never had to give somebody so much direction.' (Ex 26:51)

During her interview, Col Grant flatly denied making the first part of the statement to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that she told her she was the worst (b) (6) she's ever worked with. (Ex 39:98) Col Grant testified at length in her response to this question, explaining how incapable an (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was in her view—describing the very things that would support such a statement. (Ex 39:98-100) In denying the technical diction of the latter portion of the statement (about having to give more direction to her than to others) she conceded saying something very similar. A portion of Col Grant's testimony includes:

IO: Did you later tell her on the phone, she was the worst (b) (6) you've ever worked with?

Grant: No, I did not say that.

IO: You've never had to give someone so much direction?

Grant: No, I didn't tell her she was the worst (b) (6) I had ever worked for [sic] and I did not say that you know, I've never had to give somebody so much direction. What I said was, I have not had to give as much feedback to either of the other two group commanders as I have to give to her. (Ex 39:98)

This explanation of the second part of the statement is at best a minor distinction. Col Grant then went on to describe at length how disappointing (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) performance has been:

You have to have conversations with her. The same conversations and the same feedback and the same guidance several times. She tends to push back. She gets very defensive.



And it's difficult to, to try to get through in a way that is constructive and productive.  
(Ex 39:98)

Col Grant's sentiments about the repetitive nature of giving direction to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) make it more likely she would have communicated the statement in question to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Aside from how accurate or inaccurate Col Grant's description of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) may be, it is especially telling, as Col Grant readily concedes above, that she found it difficult to give her constructive feedback.

Col Grant opined (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) may have struggled because she was promoted three times below the zone, and was out of her element having previously held jobs where there was pre-existing structure. Whether there is any merit to those assertions, none of those things adequately justify the manner in which Col Grant communicated to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Ex 39:99)

Some of the challenges (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) faces in her current role, according to Col Grant, is that she has to "create order out of chaos...in an environment that is unpredictable." (Ex 39:99) Col Grant also expressed repeated frustration that after returning from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),<sup>27</sup> (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) regularly appeared unprepared at meetings and she expressed the same in private feedback. (Ex 39:98) As AFSPC/IG noted, part of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) challenges appear to include being publicly undermined by Col Grant. (Ex 12b:3)

During the UEI, the AFSPC/IG noticed Col Grant publicly dressing down (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) during a briefing. (Ex 12b:2) The IG observed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) step in and try to give top cover for a briefer within the Ops Group by diplomatically trying to off ramp an issue, telling Col Grant, "Ma'am, we will dig into that and get back to you." (Ex 12b:2) Col Grant, however, persisted in picking at the issue and in front of the audience, including IG team observers, and undermined (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) publicly stating: "What you're saying is, you don't know."<sup>28</sup> (Ex 12b:2)

After witnessing this exchange from Col Grant, AFSPC/IG spoke to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). The IG described (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as:

[V]ery professional and diplomatic, but it was clear she was operating under difficult circumstances under Col Grant, and that such public undermining hurt her ability to lead as a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (Ex 12b:3)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), testified about a similar incident he experienced, where he was trying to intervene while Col Grant was berating his (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who were trying to brief her:

<sup>27</sup> (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) arrived on station (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and very shortly thereafter went on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for approximately 3 months (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), returning at the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (Ex 26:6)

<sup>28</sup> Contrary to Col Grant's views, AFSPC/IG viewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as a very professional, capable officer, with a highly motivated group, stating "People would walk through walls for her," adding she was a "shock absorber" and served as a buffer between her people and Col Grant. (Ex 12b:2)



[I]nstead of taking that as ‘Hey, okay, let’s see now. Let’s get the, the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) involved, maybe this is how I’ll get involved,’ it became more of berating them for not getting the information to her and not effectively supporting her position and the Wing equities, which I thought was exactly what they were doing. So I felt I needed to, and it, so it became very direct. Again, kind of berating in nature as I recall. And it felt I needed to step in there and say: ‘Ma’am, this is, the fault is on me.’ (Ex 28:21)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified the conversation in question was one she initiated to seek clarification, to meet Col Grant’s intent. The sentiments in the statements in question are consistent with Col Grant’s own descriptions of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). After denying making these exact statements, Col Grant went to great lengths in her testimony to justify the very thing she denied saying, and then conceded she did say something very similar to the second half of the statement. Given the weight of other testimony provided demonstrating Col Grant’s proclivity for berating, belittling, or undermining people in public, it is not unforeseeable she would do so privately. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Col Grant’s (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), expressed surprise Col Grant would let her agitation or frustration get the best of her at times. (Ex 87:46)

In weighing the credibility of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Col Grant, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) appeared to be sincere and had the ability to accurately remember what she heard. While some of the other details of the underlying issue that gave rise to the comment may be less memorable, it is not surprising that someone would more vividly remember an exchange where one’s commanding officer assesses and expresses they are “the worst.” (Ex 26:51) Such a statement would likely stand out in one’s memory. Moreover, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is not a complainant in this case. She did not seek the IG to testify about such matters. SAF/IGS contacted her, along with many other witnesses, to investigate multiple complaints of an unhealthy command climate. The testimony she gave on this topic was in response to questions from investigators about stress within the wing. Further, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was balanced in her testimony and was notably honest about times when Col Grant’s attitude was “better, more positive, and times when she asked tough but fair questions. (Ex 26:28) In contrast, Col Grant, as a Brig Gen select, facing a significant investigation for failing to establish and maintain a healthy command climate as a commander, has much at stake.

Taking all these matters into account, including the believability of the witnesses, the greater weight of the evidence supports a finding that Col Grant did have a conversation with her (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) during which Col Grant expressed to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that she was the worst (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that she’s worked with, or words similar, and that she had either never had to give somebody so much direction, or that she did not have to give as much feedback to either of the other two Group Commanders as she had to give to her. (Ex 39:98)

Calling a person and key member of the leadership team “the worst” is not constructive. Such moments, likely born out of frustration, do little to foster a healthy relationship based on effective communication. Compared to constructive feedback, personal attacks added to public



shaming, especially of such a key leader of the operational mission, detract from a healthy climate that should work to foster teamwork, cohesion, and trust.

Another Officer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

As referenced earlier, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), testified about his experience working for Col Grant and how the general climate she created was so bad that he had (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Expanding on his own experience, (b) (6), (b) (7) testified he finally decided to come forward and file a complaint after reading about a different Air Force general officer's removal from their position and felt the climate under Col Grant was "so much worse..." (Ex 60:1) He stated Col Grant's words feel career ending. (Ex 60:1) He testified Col Grant's leadership was like being in an "abusive relationship or marriage -- you'll do anything to not make her mad, not take another face shot," and stated he felt he was constantly "walking on eggshells" with her. (Ex 60:1)

Adding perspective, (b) (6), (b) (7) testified he spent (b) difficult years at (b) (6), (b) under some "pretty bad leadership during the nuclear enterprise problems," but assessed the work environment under Col Grant was worse. (Ex 60:1) (b) (6), (b) (7) was asked if there was a specific incident he could point to that put him over the edge emotionally. He testified there was not, but it was the culmination of being in that environment, which started with his very first interaction with Col Grant and continued the entire time. (Ex 60:1) In describing his experience working for Col Grant, he noted the subtle cues that had cumulatively impacted him, "there was nothing by itself over the top...it was more subdued, sarcastic...demeaning, feelings of being judged negatively." (Ex 60:1)

(b) (6), (b) (7) was asked if his (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) resulted from of his interactions with Col Grant and the command climate at Schriever. He responded: "absolutely" and said he was suffering from feelings of helplessness to perform his job. (Ex 60:2) He told the IO day-to-day he was being "handled" by the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instead of Col Grant, his direct supervisor. He explained that in his leadership position he had national-level attention projects and needed commander intent, direction, and coordination and that access was denied. (Ex 60:2) For example, one of the most important products from XP to establish was the Wing Strategic Plan. It was the number one thing he wanted to produce early after Col Grant took command and he stated he tried to be proactive and even "begged" to get her intent. (Ex 60:3) Instead, he stated he was left to deal with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who was stating Col Grant's intent to him. (b) (6), (b) (7) wrote the plan that way, based on what (b) (6), (b) (7) said, but never got Col Grant's vector directly. By Nov 17, Col Grant questioned him about the status of the plan in public, at a Wing Staff meeting in front of everyone in attendance and stated she didn't understand why it was taking so long. (Ex 60:3) He testified: "The way she said it: clenched jaw, low tone, the message received was: What are you, an idiot?" (Ex 60:3) He felt on the spot and tried to say something diplomatic that he was engaging with the (b) (6) on a way forward, when according to him, she was the real reason it wasn't done yet. The plan was not published until August 2018, more than a year after Col Grant took command. (Ex 60:3)



Finally, (b) (6), (b) (7) testified there were many others in the same boat, with fear of reprisal, public shaming, and excessive requirements for staff work that caused more inefficiency. (Ex 60:3-4) He noted there may not have been any “over the tops,” but “once you’ve fallen from grace with her, that’s it.” (Ex 60:4)

(b) (6), (b) (7) shared he had gotten (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) since leaving Schriever, and is now in a “much better place.” (Ex 60:1) Looking back, he put things into perspective this way:

Stress at work doesn’t stay at work. It comes home and starts to get in the way of interpersonal relationships, like with your spouse.... That’s how cumulative work stress can have a real impact. It doesn’t always fit neatly into little boxes like that, but it is felt, and it is easy to recognize when it is happening to you. (Ex 60:5)

The IO contacted Col Grant on 6 Sept 19 with respect to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) access to Col Grant, wing plans, reporting to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and her comments during a Wing Staff meeting to afford her the opportunity to comment on these issues. (Ex 112:5) On advice on counsel, Col Grant invoked her right to remain silent on 16 Sep 19 and elected not to respond. (Ex 112:3; Ex 113:1)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) perspective is enlightening on the topic of command climate, illustrating what can result when an unhealthy command climate is present. (b) (6), (b) (7) commented on the second and third order effects of an unhealthy work climate contributing to an unhealthy home and family environment. While Col Grant may not have realized the extent of this witness’ distress at work, he was very clear that his (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were a direct result of his interactions with Col Grant. He described it was the culmination of being in that environment and experiencing the subdued, sarcastic tone, facial expressions, demeaning words, and feelings of being judged negatively that started him down that unhealthy path. Such behaviors and their impact on junior members can be magnified when they come from a Wing Commander. Col Grant’s failure to engage in effective two way vertical communication appeared to be, at least in part, a contributing factor to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) feelings of hopelessness, which is inconsistent with a healthy command climate.

*Berated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Crawls Under Desk*

(b) (6), (b) (7) was Col Grant’s (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), a cross trainee into the career field from the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Witnesses consistently testified she was an effective (b) (6), (b) (7). (Ex 87:5; Ex 27:71; Ex 49:27) (b) (6), (b) (7) perspective is helpful on the topic of the command climate established and maintained by Col Grant as she, perhaps more than anyone else in the Wing, had the most daily interaction with her. Personal staffs often have a vantage point most others do not. In this instance, (b) (6), (b) (7) describes being chastised for a correctable oversight with a PRF, and being so upset afterwards that she cried and crawled under her desk to mentally collect



herself. (Ex 84:1)

During the subject interview, Col Grant spoke favorably about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

She was highly recommended by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). She was coming out of 4 SOPS and her reputation in the Wing, I think was a good one. Very sharp, coming up, interested in being the (b) (6). And she was within the top ten percent of the officers down the Operations Group, so she seemed like she'd be a good fit, so I hired her. (Ex 39:69)

Col Grant further testified (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was dependable, reliable, and trustworthy. (Ex 39:69) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified, based on her time as Col Grant's (b) (6), Col Grant was:

[V]ery stern, which, you know, doesn't necessarily in my mind equate to be bad, but sometimes her delivery of feedback can make--at least from a very personal perspective, it makes me feel small. (Ex 22:6)

When asked for an example, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled times when she became emotionally upset:

(b) (6) So the most recent [instance] was a PRF, [on a] member who had been passed over, multiple times, and had a directed retirement date. His PRF was due. I produced a PRF that looked almost identical to the previous one that we had submitted, and she pulled me into her office and told me that she had been "hounding" me for certain documents to update and that I didn't have the due date when she asked me for it and that the PRF was unsatisfactory.

IO: Is that true? Was she hounding you?

(b) (6) So, she, she wrote, we [use]--a slip of paper, buck slip....She wrote on there, you know, 'When is this due?' And I gave her that answer, and then she had a couple of notes in the side column about, you know, talking to the MAJCOM-level functional for this member's career field. Nothing about updating the PRF or anything like that. She never, never gave me the guidance that she wanted to update it. So, and honestly, I package those up. I don't furnish the documents for that. I don't draft the PRF. I just get what I get from the member, and then I produce it to her for her edits, and if there's any corrections or anything that need to be made then I make them. (Ex 22:22-23)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) related she was surprised by this, because she hadn't handled a situation where a member had a marked date for retirement, but they were still producing documents for a promotion board. (Ex 22:23) She noted that was the first time she had seen that situation and Col Grant didn't give her any guidance that she wanted it updated. (Ex 22:23) Although it wasn't really in her purview to make the updates, she honestly recognized her error in that situation was not maintaining better situational awareness of the deadline. (Ex 22:23) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) went on to explain that she was able to resolve the dilemma, but testified that after the interaction with Col Grant, she broke down emotionally:

I had to excuse myself to the restroom to...regain my composure. And then I, I got a handle on myself, came back to my desk. Somebody else asked me about it, and I, I broke down again. That time, in front of multiple people. (Ex 22:24)

When asked to further expand on that episode, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) provided more detail about the way Col Grant engaged her and her response to that. She explained it was the forceful counseling behind closed doors with Col Grant that upset her and made her literally crawl under her desk, although there were other people there also asking her about things. (Ex 84:1) She described how Col Grant "got in her face," which she also consistently described to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) shortly after she was under the stress and excitement of the incident. (Ex 84:1; Ex 87:37) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) detailed how Col Grant leaned into her personal space, 1 to 1.5 feet away. (Ex 84:1) She described Col Grant's demeanor as agitated and frustrated, which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could tell by her words and the way she pursed her lips (which exposes facial dimples), made direct eye contact, squinted her eyes, and had a stern eyebrow. (Ex 84:1) After the event in Col Grant's office, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed she did in fact crawl under her desk to collect herself. (Ex 84:1)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony corroborates (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) account of the aftermath of the exchange:

[A]t that very moment she had just come out, had an unpleasant experience with Col Grant. (Ex 87:31)

\*\*\*\*

I was literally standing kind of next to her, behind her desk. She couldn't take it anymore and she just was, like she kind of started crying and got literally under her desk. (Ex 87:31)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued:

I was behind her desk so I actually saw her in that little alcove there. So that's kind of how it played out and she stayed there for, I don't know, a couple minutes, a few minutes. And the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) kind of was baffled. He didn't understand what was going on and then...she [said] 'I need some-- just leave me alone for a minute.' (Ex 87:32)

When asked if it was his sense that the level of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) distress was the result of coming out of the office with Col Grant, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded:

Absolutely. If she hadn't had that interaction. All the rest of the stuff was pretty much par for the course. (Ex 87:33)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reflecting on this incident and what he has witnessed from Col Grant during his time working in the front office, remarked on the topic of Col Grant's lack of self-control:



I would say when [Col Grant] falls short, it's not consistent with what, you know, the expectation for somebody in her, you know, position I think. You know, you're paid a lot and so you should be held to account, held to a high standard, you know, as a result. And sometimes I--you know, when I've heard about these things or I've seen what I've seen, I am surprised, you know, that in that position, you'd be willing to kind of let your agitation or frustration get the best of you.<sup>29</sup> (Ex 87:46)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the time. She also remembered the incident and corroborated the sworn testimony of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

She (b) (6) kind of just went and retreated under her desk for a second. And just asked us, like literally went under her desk, and asked us to give her some time.... Physically, yes. Like crawled under her desk....She wiped her face. Yeah, she wiped her face, but she was just trying to, she was trying to, what she was trying...in my interpretation...just trying to compose herself. (Ex 63:29)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) accompanied (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the restroom afterward:

I do remember her crawling under her desk, yeah.... And she just needed some alone time, so she went under her desk--which, I was like [to others] 'Hey...just leave her alone.' I was telling [them] to just leave her alone. Give her some space. And then, she went to the bathroom and I accompanied her there just to try to calm her down. (Ex 61:31)

When asked what, if anything, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) said to her, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added:

She just felt like she was failing as an (b) (6), not meeting expectation and you know, she gives her life to this job and we're here from--she's here from like 6:45 in the morning to sometimes 7:30 at night. And to feel like you're not doing well and you're giving 12 to 13 hours a day is just--it just kind of kills you. (Ex 61:32)

Col Grant was specifically asked about this incident and for reference was provided the details, as known, for her comment. Col Grant testified about a seemingly different issue she had with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with respect to PRFs. She commented on a separate PRF situation where the results of PRFs were sent to members via e-mail before Col Grant had an opportunity to talk with the members beforehand. She went on to state about that incident:

She left my office, she immediately got on the phone. How do I know that? Because my office door was open, and I could see her and I could hear her getting on the phone. She did not leave my office and go crawl under her desk. There was no yelling. I don't yell. And even if I tried to, you couldn't hear me outside my office if the door was closed.

---

<sup>29</sup> AFI 1-1, para 1.3, Core Values. "Integrity is a character trait. It is the willingness to do what is right...the inner voice; the voice of self-control; the basis for trust..." (Ex 4:4)

I don't know where the narrative comes from that she crawled under her desk and cried. I have never seen that woman crawl under her desk. Not ever. (Ex 39:70)

It was readily apparent this was not the same incident. The IO identified that she appeared to be recalling a different incident and restated the question. Still, Col Grant did not recall this incident. (Ex 39:70) Thus, Col Grant's response to this incident with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for all intents and purposes, is that she did not recall the forceful counseling or (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) response to it.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reflected on her overall experience as a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) working for Col Grant and opined "it feels very disrespectful and like she doesn't have that feeling of dignity for us." (Ex 22:27) When asked about Col Grant's best qualities, traits she might like to emulate, and the positive aspects of working for her, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified:

That's a tough question to answer. I have found more that I do not wish to emulate. You know, she's obviously successful. She's going to put on a star here shortly. I would like to emulate her in that regard, as having a successful career. But I don't, I don't necessarily want to go about achieving that in the same way that she has. (Ex 22:27)

She continued:

I feel like she is very calculating and very careful, uh, about her actions.... She can seem bipolar in her interactions with us in the front office, and then with somebody that walks in for an office call or something. (Ex 22:28)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) pondering her own development and the impact of serving under Col Grant has had on her, and the status of things in the front office, even now, summarized further:

[M]y experience and my opinion about, you know...the way I feel now compared to the way I felt prior to becoming the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), just the, the extra self-doubt and like self-consciousness about the work that I'm capable of producing. And, you know, the second-guessing myself. Even little things so much as like...she'll have her door closed in her office. And it'll be time for the next meeting to start. And I'm on eggshells before I knock on the door because I don't know if she's going to be thankful for the reminder that the meeting she has is about to start or, you know, a few minutes past start time or whether she's going to be, you know, angry with me for knocking on her door and interrupting whatever she has going on. (Ex 22:34)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified similarly when asked about the overall work climate in the office under Col Grant. She corroborated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony that people felt like they were "walking on eggshells," adding it was because Col Grant's expectations are so high. She continued "it's stressful to deal with on a daily basis." (Ex 80:3) When asked whether or not it was a comfortable climate that people wanted to work in, she responded similar to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony:



Oh, no, no, no. That makes it very difficult, and makes for long hours because you're doubting yourself, and double checking yourself. (Ex 80:3)

(b) (6), (b) (7) testified that in the front office, "People walk on eggshells around her," and described Col Grant as "passive aggressive" to her and others. (Ex 73:1) Overall, she described the climate working for Col Grant as, "You felt you could never do anything right. It was wrong, no matter what." (Ex 73:3) (b) (6), (b) (7) also testified she would have to mentally prepare for each day working for Col Grant and would remind herself she was there to support the staff. (Ex 73:3) She believed Col Grant created an unhealthy command climate and has the desire for perfect information. (b) (6), (b) (7) believed when it comes to Col Grant, those two concepts, the desire for perfect perfection and an unhealthy command climate, are directly related. (Ex 73:3)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony is helpful with respect to the command climate established and maintained by Col Grant as she, perhaps more than anyone else in the Wing, had the most daily interaction with her.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony was substantially corroborated and described by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Ex 87; Ex 61; Ex 63) There is little doubt (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) cried and crawled under her desk as a result an unpleasant exchange with Col Grant. For her part, Col Grant did not seem to recall this exchange and recounted a different situation all together. While the exchange may have occurred in a private setting, the resulting impact was witnessed by at least three others including a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), thus adding to the troubled workplace environment.

While witnesses consistently describe (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) reaction afterwards, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) vividly detailed Col Grant's conduct during the forceful counselling in Col Grant's office. (Ex 84:1) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) own words on this episode are perhaps most compelling. She testified, "it feels very disrespectful and like she doesn't have that feeling of dignity for us." (Ex 22:27) This incident serves as yet another example of Col Grant's failure to establish and maintain a healthy command climate.

#### *Behind Closed Doors - The Get Well Card*

Col Grant's treatment of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is informative on the topic of the command climate she created and serves as a useful illustration of her failure to exercise restraint and in turn, failure to tend to the welfare and morale of subordinates.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), testified about an incident with Col Grant where she felt the response, under the circumstances, was disproportionate. She related that her boss at the time, (b) (6), (b) (7) had (b) (6), (b) (7) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) shared a get-well card for him with people in the office to sign. She testified:

I routed the card, gave it to her (b), was basically like, 'Hey, can you get her to sign this, and then give it back to me when you're done, so I can take it over?' ...The card ended up back on my desk. I put in the envelope, took it over. Probably should have QC'd it, and made sure that the signature was on there. But considering the situation, I assumed, which is probably wrong. So, I took the card over, and probably three days later, [Col Grant] came back to me and, like, 'Hey, where's the card? I want to sign it.' I said, 'Ma'am, I already took it over.' And she was, like, 'Can you come in my office for a minute?' And she basically started screaming at me. (Ex 86:6)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified Col Grant closed the door and engaged her:

[Col Grant] was like 'Do you know who I am?' 'Do you know what that makes me look like?' 'That's my, that's my subordinate.' You basically had no right to even route the card, let alone not get my signature. 'What were you thinking? Do you know how that makes me look?' You know, she was just basically saying I was disrespectful. I never got to get a word in edgewise. I kind of just let her yell at me, and took it as it was. (Ex 86:6)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) estimated Col Grant was "a foot, foot-and-a-half away from me.... She just brought me behind the door...." (Ex 86:6) She further related that "[Col Grant] was just really direct about it, and you could tell it was emotional." (Ex 86:7)

While explaining the aftermath, she continued:

I walked out--I actually walked to the bathroom, I was crying. Um, came back, like, pulled myself together and just, kind of tried to let it go....She later pulled me in. We sat down on--there's couches in her office. She basically told me, 'Hey, I think it would be a better idea if you moved back to the other side of the office' ... I originally started up there. They moved me to the front office just so that I could cross-talk with the (b) (6), and the (b) (6), and kind of be in the know. (Ex 86:7)

\*\*\*\*

But then she's, like, 'You know...I was just thinking about it.' She's, like, 'You get too much foot traffic...you need your own office to do--you know, (b) stuff.' She was, like 'Plus, I think it would be better for you to be back there with the (b) (6), (b) (7) and the Airmen. You know, so you can be with your own people, your (b) (6), (b) (7), and, um, get that mentorship,' which....

IO: 'Your own people?' Did you--

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C): Yeah, my, my own people.

IO: Is that--are those the words she used?

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C): Yeah.

IO: What did you think about that?



(b) (6), (b) (7)(C): I thought it was kind of rude. Because we're supposed to be one team and work together. So, like, to thwart [sic] an enlisted/officer is kind of not cool, when the whole reason in the first place I was brought up to the front office was to make my job easier and more effective one.... And then, the fact that it happened the day after she yelled at me over a get-well card, really just seemed like she was trying to, like, get back at me somehow. (Ex 92:7-8)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a subsequent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), testified she was with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediately afterward and she talked about the incident with her. She described (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as being "really upset." (Ex 20:15) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had difficulty talking because "she was upset and she was crying." (Ex 20:15) When asked what Col Grant said, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) told her Col Grant "said like, you know, "How dare you" not, like, "bring the card to me," you know, "That's my (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)" like, um, along those lines. She was just really upset and yelling her at her about [it]." (Ex 20:16)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had reported to him what happened at the time, as he was not there:

What she described to me was that she got yelled at for bringing over a get well card before Colonel Grant could sign it. (Ex 51:12)

\*\*\*\*\*

I know my (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was upset, because she didn't mean to do anything -- the way she described it to me was, she wasn't trying to be malicious or anything like that. (Ex 51:13)

Col Grant was asked to tell her side of the get well card incident with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) during her sworn testimony. She testified:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had gotten a get-well card. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had gone in for (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) on his (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), I think it was. And she went and got a card, and I had asked if they could just leave it for me to sign. And instead of doing that, she brought it over to his house, without letting me sign it. And so I came back, thinking that, 'Hey, I'll sign this because for my (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), that was a big deal.' Those types of things were a big deal to him, and not having my signature on that card as a Wing Commander was going to send him a message that said, my Wing Commander doesn't care. (Ex 39:74)

She continued:

And so when I came back, and I'm like, 'Hey, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), come on in here.' And I asked her to come into my office. I'm like; 'Do you understand why it was that I wanted to make sure that I signed this? I don't know why did you bring it over there before I had a chance to do that? I thought we were going to be taking care of this?' And she said, 'Well, I had time to drop it off, so I just figured I'd drop it off.' (Ex 39:74)

Col Grant quickly summarized, without discussing the particular words of the exchange:

And so yeah, no, I talked to her about that. And then I went and got a different card and I brought it over to (b) (6) at his house, just to say, 'Hey, sorry, I missed the boat on this one, but wanted to make sure that you got this from me.' (Ex 39:74)

When asked if she was aware whether (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left the card with Col Grant's front office staff for her signature, Col Grant realized she was not aware of that and that all she knew was she "didn't get an opportunity to sign it." (Ex 39:75)

When asked about the particulars of the conversation with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Col Grant testified it occurred in her office, but denied the door was closed, stating it was "probably ajar." (Ex 39:75) She denied saying: "Do you know who I am?" or "Do you know what that makes me look like?" or words similar. (Ex 39:75) Col Grant testified, in a very quiet voice:

What I asked her was: 'Do you, do you, do you, understand what it looks like to deliver a card from our front office and to not have my signature on that with the rest of the group? Because what it looks like is I was too busy to sign it; what it looks like is, 'I was too busy to take the time to write a note in there with everybody else to go to my (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)'. And why was that? Because for my (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), those little things were very loud gestures, and I recognized that. And so I was trying to help her understand why it was that that was so important to me. (Ex 39:75)

Likewise, Col Grant denied telling (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) she had no right to even route the card, let alone not get her signature. (Ex 39:76) She also denied getting close to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) face and suggested it may have been closer to 24 inches away from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Grant: I stood a normal distance to have a conversation. She's my height and build.

IO: Would you have gotten as close as maybe a foot away, foot and a half?

Grant: I was at a reasonable distance to have a conversation that wasn't intended for anybody else's audible [sic] other than her. And you know, two feet away is 24 inches, that, if that's the reasonable distance to have a conversation, then that might be reasonable to me. (Ex 39:76)

Col Grant testified she neither yelled nor screamed at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and even denied raising her voice. (Ex 39:76) When asked why her volume would be described on a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 being the loudest, as a 7 or an 8, Col Grant opined she did not have any idea why witnesses would say that, "other than to make it look like it was more egregious than it was as a conversation." (Ex 39:76) She went on to state that is a misrepresentation of the exchange and the exaggeration is with the volume--the exaggeration is with the attribution of yelling or screaming. (Ex 39:77)



She continued:

Again, this is two individuals who are of similar height and similar build, standing, fairly proximate. But I didn't want to have that conversation with her in front of everybody else in the front office, that wasn't the point. It was: 'Come in here so that we can -- What happened? Why? Why? Why did that get delivered?' [She] thought I signed it. I didn't. She told me that she didn't look at it before she delivered it, which is, 'Okay, well, it is what it is, but I need you to understand why that--please, don't have that happen like that again.' It just, it feels awkward because it is, and it's just kind of one of those things that we're trying to make sure that things are gelling here, and they're not. (Ex 39:77)

Col Grant then expressed concerns about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) rank and familiarity with officers:

Quite frankly, it was during a time, I think, when (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) wanted his (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to be sitting in our front office area, and it was not helpful to her to be doing that, because she became too familiar with the CGOs that were working there, such that I was noticing that there was a lack of decorum. And I suggested to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that he place her back in the original area, which is where she started, because the dynamic up there was not helpful. And with her rank and where she was, she had, was better placed with the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that was in the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) staff area rather than being placed up in the front office area, where there was familiarity, such that 'Sirs' and 'Ma'ams' were dropped. And this was kind of--there was joking going on between them. Joking is not a bad thing, and there's a time and a place for it, but it just was, just a little bit too lax for what is appropriate decorum for a front office like that. (Ex 39:78)

When asked if she remembered sitting down with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and telling her, "I think it would be a better idea if you moved back to the other side of the office," Col Grant acknowledged she probably would have had a conversation like that with her after discussing it with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Ex 39:78) She denied telling (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) she should "be with her own people," and claimed that was not how she would have phrased it:

Better to be placed back there because she did have her own office back there. There was a more equitable workspace back there, but really, with her rank it would be better for her to have an opportunity to be working with Airmen, as opposed to being up front with lieutenants. (Ex 39:79)

When asked if the office move was in response to the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) get well card issue, Col Grant stated: "No, not specifically, not specifically to that." (Ex 39:79) "They were independent decisions, just coinciding." (Ex 39:79) When asked if she could see how it would look that way, she stated she could see how people would draw conclusions "based on what information they have." (Ex 39:79)



Col Grant stated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was socializing too much and it was “not the best positioning from a deliberate professional development standpoint,” because the “decorum and courtesies were slipping” and in Col Grant’s view, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would benefit from a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) close by and be less distracting. (Ex 39:79)

Col Grant’s treatment of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is informative on the topic of the command climate she created and serves as another illustration of a lack of judicious attention to the welfare and morale of a subordinate. This incident represents an example of a lack of restraint that resulted in another staff member being brought to tears after being rebuked by Col Grant. When confronted with the exact language she was said to have used, Col Grant objected and presented a more affable version of similar sentiments. Interestingly, Col Grant was concerned about the very thing (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described being chastised over: how that made Col Grant look. Col Grant appeared to be more concerned about how that made her look than the matter at hand or the morale and welfare of her subordinate. The primary aspect of the exchange she believed was an exaggeration was the volume. Col Grant’s version of events is inconsistent with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony and the reaction to it as described by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who testified she was with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) immediately afterward and she was very upset. She reported (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had trouble talking because she was upset and she was crying. Additionally, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also confirmed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) informed him she had been yelled at by Col Grant over the get well card. The irony is not lost that in wanting to be seen as caring for the welfare of a subordinate, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Col Grant failed to tend to the welfare and morale of another subordinate, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Any number of other, more constructive ways to address the concern could have had the desired effect. This is also an example of ineffective two way communication, as Col Grant did not give (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a chance to explain how the oversight happened because Col Grant was so directive in her criticism.

#### *Behind Closed Doors – The SARC’s Experience*

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled being talked to in an unpleasant way by Col Grant behind closed doors. The issue had to do with Col Grant’s belief that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) overstepped her boundaries as the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in assisting a client.

[S]o when she asked if I read the AFI and I said, no, then of course I got the condescending: ‘Well, maybe you should read an AFI before you start advising people on what do to.’ (Ex 88:18)

She explained that Col Grant started the closed door encounter asking (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) “Well do you know why I’m here?” (Ex 88:20) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) assumed it was about a client’s transfer approval by AFPC, but Col Grant reportedly told her she was there because she needed to talk to her “about the way this went,” and with accusatory language, asked: “Well, do you know what you did wrong?” (Ex 88:20)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) related Col Grant then told her she was “out of her lane” and it was at that point that she realized they weren’t having a discussion at all, but that she was “getting [her] butt



chewed” by Col Grant. (Ex 88:21) She detailed she defaulted into a “Yes, Ma’am/No Ma’am” mode, that Col Grant stared into her eyes like an “awkward staring contest,” told her she was serious and made her confirm she understood, before walking out. (Ex 88:21) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified emphatically, “behind closed doors, it was not pleasant.” (Ex 88:21)

Col Grant was asked if she recalled this incident with the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Her version of the exchange was noticeably different. According to Col Grant, her exchange with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could be summarized as correcting the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for talking to a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) client about personnel options, such as separation and going to school, that were within the purview of the Force Support Squadron. (Ex 39:134) She related (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) admitted she was wrong, apologized, and vowed it would never happen again. (Ex 39:134) During the course of this relatively short exchange, Col Grant testified she told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) all of the following: she gave advice in an area outside her expertise, she didn’t ask anybody about it, she was out of her lane, she was not the FSS, she didn’t connect the client with an FSS resource, she took it upon herself to give her advice, and she may have erroneously misled an Airman. (Ex 39:134) According to Col Grant, at that point, they had “lighthearted chatter” and she commented on the nice décor in the office before again confirming she understood and ending the conversation. (Ex 39:134)

Here again, the content of the message is consumed by the delivery method of the messenger. What is most glaring is how two people can describe the exact same conversation so differently. The issue is the way it was conveyed to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Col Grant appeared to think she left (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in as good a mental state after the conversation as she found her at the beginning of the exchange. The (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is a helping agency. Such a confrontational approach, coupled with the widespread knowledge of the command climate in place, left (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with a very different impression than Col Grant. Any number of other more constructive ways to address the concern with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could have had the desired effect without damaging another critical wing relationship. Col Grant’s interaction with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) exemplified Col Grant’s failure to maintain a healthy command climate. While Col Grant may have had apparently valid points to make to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) her method of delivery—which (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described as condescending—did not further teamwork, cohesion, or trust. (Ex 88:18) This interaction and others similar witnessed by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) contributed to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decision to seek and accept employment elsewhere. (Ex 88:27-28)

### *Thrown Staff Packages*

This section addresses two separate instances where Col Grant was said to have thrown staff packages at or toward her staff. The first, “*The ‘Missing’ Staff Package*,” is an incident (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified she witnessed while in the front office. It involved a time Col Grant was reportedly looking for a misplaced staff package that was actually on her desk. Once found, she reportedly threw it towards the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) desk. The second incident, “*The ‘Returned’ Staff Package*,” had to do with Col Grant reportedly slamming a staff package down on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) desk because it did not appear to have been endorsed by all parties on the buck slip.



*The "Missing" Staff Package*

According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Col Grant was looking for a particular staff package, which both (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knew to be on Col Grant's desk. (Ex 61:56) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained it was clear in her memory: "Yeah, it probably just resonates with a few of us up here because it just seemed so, it was just a bad one." (Ex 61:54) She continued:

I was standing next to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at her desk and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the one that relayed to [Col Grant], 'Ma'am, it should be in your inbox.' Col Grant [said] 'No, it's not. I would know what's in my inbox' type of thing. At that point, you know, we know where it is. We both know it's in her inbox. And she's telling us it's not, and there's really nothing you can do at that point. (Ex 61:54-55)

So [Col Grant] turned around, walked into her office, slammed the door.... And about a minute later, 30 seconds, whatever, a short time frame it was, because we were both still standing there. She, like, comes out, door flies open, and she just, like, throws it on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) desk and says 'It must have been with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and then she goes back in, and slams the door. (Ex 61:55)

Clarifying how Col Grant threw the package toward (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) she testified: "[S]he actually like 'Frisbeed' it. Between five and three feet." (Ex 61:59-60)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified substantially the same--that she recalled (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) being in the office and Col Grant coming out of her office asking where the staff package was. She stated she and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were both immediately aware the staff package Col Grant was looking for was on Col Grant's desk, and that they professionally and gently told her, "Ma'am, that folder is on your desk." (Ex 83:1) She confirmed Col Grant said it was not, but then retreated to her office and closed the door. Some 30 seconds later, she emerged from her office with the "missing" staff package, threw the folder approximately 5 feet onto (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) desk, and said, "It must have been with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)," then went back in her office and closed the door. (Ex 83:1)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also testified she felt bad because she was put in that position. (Ex 83:1) She knew for a fact the folder was not anywhere but on Col Grant's desk, "but to tell Col Grant she is wrong about something is hard. Even if done tactfully, because it would not be received with understanding or positively." (Ex 83:1)

Col Grant's response also did not make sense to her because the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) office was not connected to Col Grant's. It would not be possible to go into Col Grant's office and get anything from (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) office. (Ex 83:1)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified she thought Col Grant's response was odd, and recognized the situation could have been handled any number of different ways. (Ex 83:1) If roles were reversed, she said she might have just said, "I apologize," or "Well, let's go look together..." but that was not Col Grant's approach." (Ex 83:1)



Responding to questions about the first thrown staff package incident, the “*Missing Staff Package*,” Col Grant testified as follows:

First of all, I don't throw anything. Second of all, um, I, wouldn't have just gone back into my office and closed the door without at least having a nominal conversation with the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Um, so I honestly don't know where that's coming from. (Ex 39:66)

The IO inquired if Col Grant could help put that into context or help them understand the circumstances when something similar might have happened. Col Grant then recalled more of the particulars (Ex 39:66) She continued, almost answering hypothetically about the way she would have handled that situation, which was in stark contrast to the testimony of both eye witnesses who described the incident with particular clarity and detail:

In the meantime, either the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had walked across the hallway and dropped it in there while I was out, or the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could have slipped it in there after the time that I was looking for it and before the time that I found it, in which case it wouldn't have been there, or maybe it wasn't where I was looking for it. (Ex 39:66)

\*\*\*\*

[I]f it's something that I was looking for, and now, Hey, I got it, now it's here and I've taken a look at it to bring it out and to *place* it on the desk--again, I don't throw things--and to let them know that I've signed it and it's good to go and then to go back into my office, close the door, continue doing what I was doing. (Ex 39:66)

#### *The “Returned” Staff Package*

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also testified she experienced Col Grant throwing or slamming a staff package, with a buck slip not signed off by everyone, down on her (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) desk as well. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified:

[Col Grant] came back and just kind of like, threw it on my desk, saying, you know, ‘Why didn't this person sign it?’ and I was like, explained it to her that they reviewed, and this is, [pointing to the hand written note] you know, their concurrence right here, lower...and she said, ‘We need to do this the same way all the time.’ And that was it, so then I had to go back and fix it. (Ex 61:8)

When asked how Col Grant said this, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) responded: “Rudely. She like forcefully just slammed it down so that, I guess, it got my attention and I turned towards her.” (Ex 61:8)

While being questioned about this second incident, “*The Returned Staff Package*,” Col Grant was asked if she recalled a time when a buck slip wasn't signed off by everyone, when she either threw or forcefully put it down on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) desk. Col Grant testified:

No. I mean, first of all, where I would have placed it is, in her inbox, because that's what's on the edge of her desk. And I would have either done that or handed it to her and asked her just to make sure that things were coordinated so that they had a chance to take a look at it. (Ex 39:67)

When asked if she recalled the corresponding conversation with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about the buck slip not being signed, or (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explaining to her how she knew the reviewer had seen the package despite not having initialed the top because they had written comments lower on the page, Col Grant testified she did not recall. (Ex 39:67)

Two witnesses, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified consistently that Col Grant threw a staff package at or near them on two separate occasions: once at or onto (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) desk after looking for a “missing” staff package that was ultimately found on Col Grant’s desk; and a second time, Col Grant was said to have thrown, or alternatively, forcefully slammed a staff package down on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) desk. Col Grant did not clearly recall either of these incidents, denied throwing anything, and offered only hypothetical accounts of what she believes she would have done in such circumstances.

The key to the “missing” staff package incident seems to be both witnesses knew that Col Grant was mistaken and that the package was not missing at all, but was exactly where Col Grant ultimately found it: on her desk where they said it was. It is understandable how this could have been embarrassing to Col Grant who had already gone on record stating it was not there. Whether frustrated or embarrassed, Col Grant could have handled this situation any number of ways. It appears more likely than not that she responded in a way not befitting a senior leader. Whether she threw, tossed, or “frisbeed,” the folder at or onto (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) desk, witness testimony supported that the incident occurred and it appears, at a minimum, to be another example of ineffective communication and a lapse in professional behavior. Throwing staff packages at people also communicates a lack of respect. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not a complainant or even an overly forthcoming witness. It was apparent she was somewhat reluctant to talk with investigators and she only testified on this matter when directly asked about it. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony supports and corroborates (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony and there is no indication the two would conspire or fail to take their oaths seriously. Such failures as illustrated here, are additional indicators of an unhealthy work environment.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) vivid description of a second, similar incident where she recalled the particulars of exactly how she knew the member had, in fact, seen the package and had written on the routing slip, demonstrates her memory of the event was fairly clear. Likewise, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not a complainant in this case. Col Grant testified she did not recall the incident, even with memory prompts about the particular conversation, answering only in general terms about what she would have likely done in that situation. (Ex 39:66) These incidents serve as additional examples of poor communication skills, a lack of self-control, and disrespect—all contributing to the unhealthy command climate.



Putting a Damper on Promotion Day: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), testified that she “lost respect for Col Grant” when she chastised (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at her own promotion ceremony for supposedly failing to notify Col Grant that the Presiding Official for the ceremony was a Brig Gen. (Ex 70:1) The testimony, however, supports that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) took due care to ensure the Wing and Col Grant were aware of the visit, having informed both Protocol and Col Grant’s (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in advance. (Ex 70:1) Col Grant’s own testimony confirms she knew about the visit ahead of time and that it would have been on her calendar. (Ex 39:141)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated under oath that she still “vividly” recalls the details of her exchange with Col Grant and testified as follows: She was talking with friends when Col Grant approached her from behind. She read her friends’ facial expressions, their “eyes changed” and that gave her the feeling someone important was behind her. (Ex 71:1) She stated she turned to see Col Grant and extended her hand to shake. She recalled the very first words out of Col Grant’s mouth in a stern tone was: “You and I should have had a conversation about this,” (referring to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) officiating). (Ex 71:1)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) name and the date was displayed on the Wing Staff meeting slides for weeks prior to the event so she was completely taken aback as to why Col Grant felt she was uninformed. (Ex 70:1) She further explained that while those words, by themselves, may not be over the top, it was the tone and body language that accompanied Col Grant’s words that were distressing to her. She further described Col Grant’s tone as: “sharp, icy, you could feel the ice behind it, her face narrowed in her eyes, lips and forehead.” (Ex 71:1) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) continued, it was very evident this was a “passive aggressive” tone that signaled to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that she should simply apologize, say it must have been her fault, and try to appease Col Grant. (Ex 71:1)

The incident took place after the formal ceremony during the reception.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled that Col Grant kept her voice down, but was clearly upset. (Ex 70:1) Testifying about the impact, she shared Col Grant’s actions took the joy out of her ceremony and was completely unnecessary. (Ex 70:1) She also noted: “Col Grant could have easily had this talk outside the ceremony so as not to detract from the event.” (Ex 70:1)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) viewed the counseling as both improper and not befitting a senior leader, which is what led her to “lose respect for Col Grant.” (Ex 70:1) When asked why she believed Col Grant chose that point in time to counsel her, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) replied, “Col Grant is the most passive-aggressive person” she has ever encountered. (Ex 70:1) She testified it is just her way of handling things and that incidents like this contributed to the wing’s perception that “everyone walked on eggshells around Col Grant.” (Ex 70:1)

Col Grant vaguely recalled (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) promotion ceremony. (Ex 39:141) When asked if she talked to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) about failing to inform her about the Presiding Official, Col Grant responded:

Oh, no, it was [Brig Gen] Saltzman<sup>30</sup> and I knew that he was there. I stopped by to talk to him to apologize for the fact that I couldn't make it. Because it was scheduled at a time that conflicted. And so, you know, what I--I stopped by the reception area to say hello to him and then also just kind of say [to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)] 'Hey, by the way, you know, um, it, it's awesome that he came here and I'm glad he came here, um, and kind of a heads-up courtesy would have been helpful.' But I'm happy to be able to stop by and say hi to him, and I talked to her family too and, um. And that was it. (Ex 39:141)

When asked where that conversation occurred, Col Grant stated, "It was off to the side after, you know, after her promotion." (Ex 39:141) When asked if it was in the receiving line, she responded, "Well, it was, it was after that.... Because that wouldn't have been appropriate to mention something like that, in the receiving line while all the other guests were around." (Ex 39:141)

Col Grant was asked if that was the first she learned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would be officiating the ceremony:

Grant: Um, no, because the invite would have gone out in his name, so it would have been on my calendar.

IO: Did you just say that you mentioned to her it would have been nice to know?

Grant: Yeah.

IO: I'm confused. So, did you know that he was--

Grant: I did, I did know. But she hadn't mentioned it to me. I found out through the grapevine. It, it, would have been nice because I see her all the time, if she had just mentioned. That's all. (Ex 39:142)

\*\*\*\*

It was just a point-to-point like--and it was in passing, too. It wasn't a big deal. It was just, 'Hey, you know, you're always, you're always welcome to, you know, kind of give a heads-up on things.' (Ex 39:141-142)

Col Grant confirmed it was common at Wing Staff meetings to announce Distinguished Visitors (DVs) coming to visit the base and that her Wing Staff slides may have forecasted that. (Ex 39:142) When asked if she could see how that exchange might have been disappointing or

---

<sup>30</sup> (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has since been frocked to the rank of (b) (6).



deflating to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or put a damper on her promotion celebration, Col Grant responded:

(long pause) Not necessarily. I mean, I didn't get any indication that it, it was an issue, and then just a point of note. (Ex 39:142)

The root cause of this incident appears to be that Col Grant engaged (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at her promotion ceremony, to express her displeasure with not being personally informed, even though she was well aware the Presiding Official was coming to the base. There is little doubt (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) completed the proper coordination, and Col Grant concedes she had knowledge of the visit. She also testified she stopped by after the promotion because it was scheduled at a time that conflicted with her schedule. (Ex 39:141) Despite being fully aware, Col Grant nevertheless decided to take (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) aside and let her know she was displeased because she was not informed enough:

Hey, by the way, you know, um, it, it's awesome that he came here and I'm glad he came here, um, and kind of a heads-up courtesy would have been helpful. (Ex 39:141)

Further, Col Grant stated she recognized it would not have been appropriate to mention something like that in the receiving line while all the other guests were around. Yet, she let (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) know then and there. This incident is illustrative of a larger trend that became apparent during the course of the investigation that at times like this, Col Grant lacked restraint and failed to fully recognize or appreciate the weight of the office of Wing Commander and the resulting impact of her words and delivery on people under her command. On this topic, Col Grant professed she was aware of these concerns:

I don't think of myself as an intimidating person, but I took that as just like any of these comments in here, okay, whether I feel like I'm intimidating or not, isn't necessarily as important as what the person on the receiving end, right, is going to ingest, so that if I can make an adjustment that ends that, then that would be helpful. (Ex 39:27)

Col Grant was asked if she thought the intimidation factor was something inherently connected to the Wing Commander position. She responded:

Potentially, I think in--you know, from where I sit, I, I think that there needs to be heightened sensitivity to the position because--and you know, I've heard general officers say the same thing. I mean, my MAJCOM commander said the same thing, that a whisper becomes like, you know, you make a comment about the fact that, hey, you know, purple is my favorite color...and now your office is painted purple.... (Ex 39:27)

Col Grant continued, professing that she learned this lesson back in December of 2017:

[A]fter that exchange with the Group Commanders in there, what I learned from that is that I just needed to be more careful. I also needed to be more sensitive to my Group Commanders because, you know, uh, they received things that I was saying which could

be identical to the things that my vice would be saying, but somehow it, it was not received positively as it appeared to be when my vice was trying to relay the message. (Ex 39:27)

Col Grant appeared baffled (b) (6), (b) (7) could relay the same information without creating the same fear and intimidation. While this nuance may have escaped her, the difference was apparent to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) who explained the difference this way:

I know when (b) (6), (b) (7) takes a brief, he will ask those same questions, but then he'll stop and try to--try to turn the questioning into like a mentoring session...[H]e notices that they're, you know, they're scared and they don't know any of the questions he's asking and he'll just stop and revert the--revert it into, you know, 'This is why I'm asking it.' Like, 'I'm not trying to put you on the spot,' so maybe if she did that too, it'd be a very different story. (Ex 20:8)

However, despite being warned of this pitfall by her Group Commanders early in her tenure, and professing to have adjusted her approach, this pattern continued and manifested itself in regrettable encounters like the one discussed here with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Contrary to her assertions that she took that feedback and made the necessary course corrections, the weight of evidence indicates otherwise. This vignette is illustrative of Col Grant's inability at times to control the impulse to chastise subordinates unnecessarily or at the wrong time, in a way that detracted from the subordinate's morale, welfare, and trust. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when asked her overall opinion of the 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing's climate health during her time under Col Grant, related she did not consider the climate to be healthy citing Col Grant's pattern of passive-aggressiveness. (Ex 71:1-2)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) : *Dressed Down, Relationship Broken, Chooses 365 Deployment*

Col Grant's (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified he needed to leave the base and deploy because he did not have an appropriate working relationship with Col Grant. (Ex 51:3) He testified about one of the major incidents that brought him to that final decision:

We were in a meeting and all--what really sticks with me is, we were in the meeting. It was the close, I would say, the close staff. So it would have been...Col Grant, the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C),<sup>31</sup> myself, the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), it would have been the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and it

<sup>31</sup> (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified he did not recall this event despite (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stating he made direct eye contact with him after the event in question. (Ex 51:30) AFSPC/IG also interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) during the UEI and confronted him about concerns expressed by squadron commanders and others about the climate created by the Wing Commander and his response to it. In particular, he was asked to comment on the climate, which was described as "the worst seen" and reminded he was partially responsible for the climate within the wing. According to the IG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would not engage. He stated he would rather not comment and shut down." (Ex 12b:3) Likewise, at times during his interview with the IO, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) appeared to be reluctant and guarded.



was--it was almost like a calendar meeting, and I can't recall the very specific discussion. But I had said something and she snapped back at me, in a way I would never expect. And it was a very, ah, sarcastic, pointed, snap at me in front of everybody. Something I've never really had happen in a staff meeting like that, and, to be honest, I just--I shut down. (Ex 51:7)

(b) (6), (b) (7) Col Grant's (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), testified she was at the meeting and recalled Col Grant "cut off" (b) (6), (b) (7). She testified he made an input and Col Grant said: "No. I told you no!" or words similar. She noted Col Grant made (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) appear "not valued." (Ex 73:2)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified consistently with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) observations, "That was probably the biggest piece is what she--the tone she used in front of other people, I didn't think was appropriate." (Ex 51:8) He added: "[I]t's not how I would talk to somebody." (Ex 51:7) And continued: "I would never talk to somebody like that--in a forum like that." (Ex 51:8) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) expressed disbelief: "I just was like, I can't believe she--she's talking to me like that." (Ex 51:8)

When asked what happened next, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified:

After that, she asked me if I had a minute, and we went into her office and, uh, we sat down in her office. She shut the door and she was trying to make small talk with me. I guess she could sense that I was not happy, and my point to her was, you know, 'Ma'am, I really don't want to talk about it. I'd just like to go to my office. I would like to just go to my office. I got some work that I need to get done.' Reality was, I just--I didn't want to talk to her about it at that moment. I was pretty hot and I just wanted to go cool off. And circle back around. And she kept, you know, trying to talk to me, and, you know, and I just kept trying to push it off as, 'Ma'am, I really don't want to talk about it right now. I just, I really would like to go back to my office and get my work done,' and, at that point in time, she got up. She was at the couch in her office. She got up and she said: 'Fine. You can leave.' And I was like, 'Ma'am, don't--please don't be like that.' And she goes, 'No. You've really stepped in it. You can leave now.' (Ex 51:8-9)

\*\*\*\*

And I was like, 'Ma'am? Ma'am?' She's like, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) 'no more talk.' And I left. I left the office. There was a period of where in public, you know, it was cordial, but she really didn't talk to me for a little while. (Ex 51:9)

And then she pulled me into the office and she said, 'Hey, I just want to let you know, we're fine.' Um, ugh, you know, 'You're my (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and I need you,' you know, 'to be my partner and my (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), and we're fine,' and I was like, 'Okay, Ma'am, well, I apologize if I said something to upset you. That was not my intention, but I just did not want to talk about it right then and there.' She goes: 'We're fine.' But, I will be honest with you, I never felt fine after that. (Ex 51:9)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified Col Grant didn't talk to him for about a week. (Ex 51:9)

When asked about her relationship with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Col Grant again resorted to criticizing the witness:

My relationship with him was just fine when I got there as the Wing Commander. Um, but I did recognize and realize that amongst all of the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), he struggled with communicating Commander's intent, and for the most part, those (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), those (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had closed ranks on him. And I had some of them bending my ear about the fact that he didn't get around or he wasn't out talking with them. (Ex 39:81)

\*\*\*\*

And he just didn't understand why those other (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), because there was a lot of 'us and them' language in terms of those guys over there, they just don't get it, or they're just not doing it, or they're just not--whatever the action was. And I just, I didn't see his effectiveness at bringing everybody together in a way that would have been very useful and productive and beneficial. (Ex 39:81)

When asked if there was a particular incident with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that impacted her relationship with him, Col Grant responded: "I can't think of one particular incident." (Ex 39:82)

The IO related to Col Grant that multiple witnesses had indicated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) left because he didn't have a good relationship with her and that there was a particular incident where she and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were in a meeting, likely a strategic calendar meeting with other staff, where he had said something that she either did not like or reportedly reacted negatively toward. Col Grant testified she did not recall a meeting where she reportedly verbally "snapped" at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in a way that would be described as "sarcastic and pointed" in front of the other members there. (Ex 39:82) The IO described in detail the meeting as described by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and what occurred afterward, describing it as "a heated exchange." (Ex 39:82) Likewise, Col Grant testified she did not recall a private meeting in her office with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) afterward. (Ex 39:83)

However, after some additional prompting, Col Grant then started to remember the post-meeting conversation, but not what prompted it:

I could tell you that we had--I don't remember what the issue was. We had a conversation, and it was significant, because I was behind my desk, and he came in to talk to me. And what I told him was, I can't talk to you right now. I need some time. And I can't remember what it was that prompted that, but that was probably the singular most intense engagement that we had as a command team, as a Commander and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (Ex 39:84)

\*\*\*\*



But the intense conversation piece, because I do remember there was something, but I was behind my desk and he came into my office to talk to me, and it was due to a disconnect. But for the life of me, I cannot remember what it is. (Ex 39:84)

Col Grant was asked if at some point after the intense conversation, she stopped by and stated to (b) (6), (b) (7) “Hey, I just want you to know, we're fine.” (Ex 39:84) She testified in relevant part:

No. I would have--because I do remember telling him, I can't talk to you right now. I need a minute. But we had a follow-up conversation in my office after that. It wouldn't have been me just stopping by his office popping my head in and saying, ‘Hey, we're fine now.’ Because the necessity for me to have closed-loop communication to make sure that we have an understanding and that we depart with an understanding is, that is how I generally resolve. I don't--it doesn't just dissipate and everybody kind of goes on their thing. There is a definitive close-out conversation so that, hey, we're going to talk through; do you understand...I don't recall having a drive-by popping my head into his office, saying, ‘Hey, we're fine.’ (Ex 39:85)

On one hand, Col Grant described this heated exchange as “the singular most intense engagement that we had as a command team, as a Commander and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ....” (Ex 39:84) Yet on the other hand, she couldn't remember what precipitated it or the particular points of the exchange. An incident like this, one that helped (b) (6), (b) (7) decide to take another 365 day deployment, is not one that would likely be overlooked or forgotten. Applying the *Military Judges' Benchbook* framework for making credibility determinations, the IO found that (b) (6), (b) (7) and (b) (6), (b) (7) testimony on this matter was more credible than that of Col Grant.

The greater weight of testimony supports there was a heated conversation between Col Grant and (b) (6), (b) (7) precipitated by a meeting in which Col Grant verbally cut him off. This detail is corroborated by a third witness, (b) (6), (b) (7) who recalled Col Grant cut off (b) (6), (b) (7) and made him appear, in her words, devalued. It is difficult to fathom that Col Grant did not recall the meeting and only vaguely remembers the exchange afterward in her office. It is further difficult to understand why she would be the one that needed to take some time. Nothing in the record supports Col Grant needing time to cool off as she was not the object of the coarse treatment. Col Grant then contradicted that sentiment citing her need for closed loop communication and her interest in reaching closure then and there. This portion of the testimony support's (b) (6), (b) (7) version of events more closely than Col Grant's. Similar to the incidents described above, Col Grant's interaction with (b) (6), (b) (7) a heated exchange where witnesses described she snapped at him--caused him to accept a deployment to get away from her and serves as another example of Col Grant's inability to maintain a healthy command climate among her staff.

*Mission Impact of a Culture of Fear*



(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) as the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), was responsible for ensuring access to space and cyberspace through the Satellite Control Network and providing information to warfighters through a global broadcast service. In this capacity, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified to being surprised and concerned when he discovered a potential capability issue related to poor performance on a communications contract that had not been brought to the Wing Commander's attention for nearly a year. (Ex 28:57-58)

I was concerned as to...was that evidence of, again where the climate was, where the leadership was a year prior and into last summer of not bringing things to the Wing Commander. (Ex 28:58)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further testified even he, as a Group Commander, was leery of giving Col Grant the bad news. Stating he "was a little...anxious bringing this issue to her, more so because of how long it had been an issue. And was still, you know, still learning, still peeling back a pretty rotten onion." (Ex 28:60)

He testified that may have been symptomatic and consistent with communication failures noted in the DEOCS survey:

I think that could be an example of what's in the 18 DEOCS comments that said, there were Squadron Commanders and Group Commanders that were reluctant or fearful of bringing information to the Wing Commander. But it definitely seems to be one where, uh, you've got to be kidding me that, that this didn't make it to the Wing Commander last summer. (Ex 28:61-62)

Col Grant's account of this situation was inconsistent with that of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). It is possible that may be because she had fewer details of the background or knowledge of how long the situation lingered. Col Grant initially stated she did not know what the issue referred to. (Ex 39:111) She then continued to explain that it was not a fear of up channeling issue and placed the blame for the issue with the government employee responsible for overseeing contractor performance—that his dereliction was the cause. (Ex 39:112) While that may be how the situation developed, the concern here is not about the root cause, but about why the information about the status of the equipment necessary to perform the mission didn't get reported to her until (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) learned of it. This communications contract issue is useful as an illustration of the potential mission impact that can result in an unhealthy climate which lacks trust and effective communication.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) GS-12, 50 SW/XP, was recommended by Col Grant as a witness the IO should interview. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described that Col Grant struggled to reach people, her communication was not effective, she seemed uncomfortable in groups, and, in turn, people did not feel comfortable around her or raising issues to her because they would be made to feel like they were put on the spot. (Ex 78:1) During his testimony, he mentioned he was appointed by Col Grant to conduct a Commander-Directed Investigation (CDI) on a civilian employee. During the course of his investigation, he uncovered other areas that he felt should be



investigated. However, instead of bringing these matters to her attention, he acknowledged that rather than endure the unpleasant experience of going back to Col Grant to explain to her more should be investigated, he avoided that encounter and simply added it to his report. In his words, he did not want to get “raked over the coals” by Col Grant. (Ex 78:3)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed at times he would withhold information from Col Grant when he sensed it would not be well received and waited for another time or different venue to address it. (Ex 27:44) Similarly, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed because of the treatment she would receive from Col Grant, she would try to avoid interacting with her. (Ex 26:38) A 2019 DEOCS survey response touches on this topic as well:

People will not voice opinions or talk for fear of public humiliation, intimidation, or to have their statement restated by the Wing CC to ‘clarify’ what they really meant. This puts leaders on the spot to either argue or correct her in public or say nothing and take a seat. (Ex 36:149)

These examples serve as additional data points that staff members feared interacting with Col Grant, resulting in the kinds of ineffective communication and lack of trust in leadership that are symptomatic of a larger unhealthy command climate.

*DEOCS Surveys: Consistent Sight Pictures, Additional Data Points*

Defense Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS) Reports are required by the National Defense Authorization Act, and governed by AF/A1 Implementing Instructions, 21 Oct 15. (Ex 97) The 50 SW climate was surveyed twice during Col Grant’s tenure as Wing Commander. The first was completed on 12 Apr 18 (DEOCS #1803430) and the second on 15 May 19 (DEOCS#1903568). (Ex 35; Ex 36)

While DEOCS surveys alone are not necessarily dispositive on the topic of a healthy or unhealthy climate, they are tools specifically designed to analyze climate and identify trends that contribute to the overall health of the work conditions within a given Air Force organization. These tools and the issues they indicate, when taken together with outside IG observations in a UEI, and further overlaid with comprehensive witness testimony, can help illuminate a useful backdrop and bring sight picture clarity when evaluating trends and patterns in the examination of the overall health of a work environment.

Mr. Sanders, HAF/A1Q, EEO Program Manager, oversees DEOCS surveys for the Air Force, and has reviewed a wide variety of climate surveys since 2001. Mr. Sanders was asked for his opinion of the results of the 2018 and 2019 Schriever DEOCS surveys for the 50 SW. In short, he testified the surveys are very concerning and indicate there is a problem. (Ex 55:1) He also commented that the only reports he has ever seen that were worse than Schriever’s were in cases where there was a removal of the commander, or the qualitative statistics at the front of the report also indicated a lot of areas “in the red.” (Ex 55:2)

In reading the written comments, Mr. Sanders noted many of the areas of concern addressed by many of the witnesses interviewed for this allegation. Mr. Sanders noted areas of concern such as: lack of communication from leadership, lack of “up and down” communication, a disconnect between people executing the mission day to day and leadership, no empowerment, micromanagement, the existence of a “fear factor,” a push to be innovative that was coupled with a fear of being “shot down,” and “no cohesion, no trust, no accountability.” (Ex 55:1) (b) (6), (b) (7) review touched on many of the requirements identified in AFI 1-1 and 1-2. Namely, effective two-way vertical and lateral communication, judicious attention to the welfare and morale of subordinates, and fostering teamwork, cohesion and trust. (Ex 4:8; Ex 5:3)

A summary review of the 2018 DEOCS survey reveals (83) negative comments, which can be attributed to wing leadership, some of which directly name Col Grant. The unfavorable written survey responses break down as follows: culture of fear (26); low morale (12); micromanagement (25); poor communication (11); lack of respect (4); observations of people leaving to get away/poor leadership (5). (Ex 35)

A review of the 2019 DEOCS survey showed (73) negative comments: climate (23); fear/morale/poor communication/bad climate (21); toxic/hostile (9); not approachable/critical in public/suicide/treating people like children/micromanagement/poor leadership (18); comments specifically about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) depression (3). (Ex 36)

There were positive comments periodically in the surveys as well. For example: “Colonel Grant does an awesome job in assuring we understand Wing mission, vision and priorities.” (Ex 35:31) However, on balance, the overall nature of the qualitative, written, portions of the surveys were, as the HAF/A1 DEOCS/EO program expert described, “very concerning” and indicated overall “a culture of fear warranting a deeper look.” (Ex 55:1)

Col Grant spent a significant amount of time commenting on survey responses during the subject interview and the IO provided ample opportunity to do so. Some of Col Grant’s comments to specific DEOCS written entries, or to the same topic, are included after the survey entries below. As it would have been impractical to go through every single comment in the surveys, the IO covered a variety of topic areas addressed in the surveys and afforded Col Grant the opportunity to comment. The IO also provided additional copies of both surveys electronically in advance of the interview, provided hard copies during the interview, and reminded Col Grant and her defense counsel Col Grant was on notice of the entire DEOCS survey report for both 2018 and 2019. (Ex 39:156)

Before delving into specific areas, Col Grant was asked what she thought the big picture takeaways were from the 2018 DEOCS survey. At first, she pointed to processes, areas that



were lower than Air Force averages, fatigue, and new administrative processes. (Ex 39:11) She then pivoted to a discussion of an EPR and OPR backlog inherited from her predecessor.<sup>32</sup> (Ex 39:11)

Col Grant also commented generally on some of the written comments in the surveys, claiming she was previously unaware of some of the concerns listed, despite having received frank feedback from her Group Commanders just four months prior:

[T]here were pointed comments in there about, about things that, that I did as a leader that, um, were not necessarily, I wasn't, I wasn't aware of them. I wasn't aware that I was, I was doing things for example, um, I, as a closed-loop communicator, I typically, uh, ask questions and I ask questions to understand and I ask questions to clarify, um, questions that I ask in order to understand allows me to better understand either impact to mission or help, help whoever I'm talking to, uh, understand uh, me, uh, and can oftentimes clear up any miscommunication, but, but the verbal cueing that I do or did, because I don't do it anymore, is, um, I would say after somebody talked to me or if they were briefing or giving a status, okay, so what you mean to say is the following. Because for me, that was my way of rephrasing, so what you mean to say is this is an issue because, and you need more resources because, and if they said, 'Uh yes Ma'am that's what I mean.' Okay. Great. Because that means I have it now. If that's not what you mean, that's an on-ramp to clarify. (Ex 39:11)

\*\*\*\*

[W]hen I read that in the DEOCS that that came across as being condescending or pejorative, um, for me that was, oh, okay well I'm not going to do that anymore, not using that term anymore. Uh, and I never did, haven't since then. (Ex 39:11-12)

Multiple witnesses described Col Grant as someone who does not take bad news or feedback well. (Ex 12b:4; Ex 22:17; Ex 26:13; Ex 28:19; Ex 63:18; Ex 85:15) When commenting on the surveys, Col Grant, however, professed the opposite:

I take the DEOCS Survey feedback to heart and, and I am, I am, uh, I'm a feedback solicitor because feedback is the only way that I get information and identification of problems that, that I can go and fix. If I don't get feedback on something, I can't try to fix something I don't know needs fixing, so. (Ex 39:12)

The following survey comments are reproduced here, in part, so that without reading the entire volume of written responses in Exhibits 35 and 36, the reader may gain an appreciation for the depth and breadth of discontent expressed by members of the 50 SW during Col Grant's time in command.

---

<sup>32</sup> Multiple witnesses identified a tension between Col Grant and her predecessor, Brig Gen Burt. Col Grant has followed Brig Gen Burt previously as a Squadron Commander, and again as a Wing Commander. (Ex 63:22)

2018

- Everyone is too scared of the Wing Commander to move forward w/ initiatives. (Ex 35:41)
- This wing is toxic and people are afraid to voice concerns of how bad it is out of fear that wing leadership will come after them. (Ex 35:100)
- Everyone is afraid Col Grant is going to kill them if they get cross with her so no one speaks or contributes to anything. The only way to survive her is to avoid her. The entire Wing is living on eggshells every day. (Ex 35:125)
- Wing leadership has tremendous knowledge, but it's overshadowed by the passive-aggressive nature of wing leadership leaving personnel walking on eggshells, and afraid to talk to wing leadership. (Ex 35:126)

Other survey comments on the topic of fear include:

- There is a culture of fear and micromanagement in the 50 SW that prohibits CGOs from bringing up ideas or solutions to Wg leadership. Many of these ideas could lead to more effective and efficient use of resources. (Ex 36:144)
- Recommend Wing leadership address the culture of fear they have created. THEN, focus on wg mission, vision, and priorities. Wing leadership seems like they enjoy destroying morale of their Group and Squadron commanders. Additionally, recommend spending more time ensuring civilian personnel are appropriately trained, staffed, and recognized. It seems as if more time is spent on a late SrA EPR than the entirety of the DPMAP program – this is NOT the fault of (b) (6), (b) nor his staff who are all fantastic. This is the fault of military leadership at the Wing level who have not made civilian development or appraisals a priority. (Ex 35:36)

Col Grant was asked to comment on the first part of this survey response, specifically, the substantive part of the comment as it relates to a culture of fear, and its impact on people's morale. Col Grant chose to respond to the entire comment, focusing on the civilian employee evaluation piece and the fact that she was without a Director of Staff when she first arrived. She eventually came back to the question about culture of fear and explained she discussed finding out where the fear was coming from with her Group Commanders, Vice Commander and Command Chief. (Ex 39:24-25) She believed a previous discussion with squadron commanders helped her understand that in part,<sup>33</sup> but knew it would be important when establishing the wing mission, vision, and goals, to carry the message to the lowest level. (Ex 39:24)

---

<sup>33</sup> This is a reference to Col Grant's belief, based on a second or third source, that she had two Group Commanders turning people against her, using her name as a mechanism to get things done, saying she would fire them. Col Grant confirmed that while talking to squadron commanders, she mentioned having fired a squadron commander in the past while she was a Group Commander. (Ex 39:16)



Col Grant continued she was trying to find “mechanisms and avenues” to have more “touchpoints” with people so as the Wing Commander, more subordinate commanders and personnel could see “the human side,” and presumably be less fearful of her. (Ex 39:24)

She related she became aware that in public forums, she could control her phrasing and was aware people were uncomfortable when they weren’t able to answer her questions. (Ex 39:25) She believed the solution to this was having the briefers be better prepared and adjusting the number of questions she asked. (Ex 39:25)

Col Grant noted she recently learned the practice of diplomatically addressing an issue in a less public “off ramp” or “sidebar” if a briefer was struggling:

[T]hen an off-ramp, which this was a suggestion by one of my group commanders, I think it was my MSG Commander, quite frankly, who said, ‘You know, Ma’am, I get that you’re, you’re intellectually curious, you ask questions to get information, but, but there might be a better way to get after that in, in, maybe a sidebar conversation might be more useful after the meeting.’ And I said, ‘That’s really good advice.’<sup>34</sup> (Ex 39:25)

To listen to Col Grant explain this, one would think she made all of the adjustments necessary to turn opinions around and dismantle beliefs, real or perceived, that people were afraid of her. While this may sound like a good start, the evidence gained through exhaustive witness interviews does not bear this perspective out.

The 2019 survey includes several locally developed questions that would appear to be designed to solicit less pointed answers with respect to wing leadership. For example, the survey question “What inspires you to do your job?” (Ex 36:144) However, several survey takers were not dissuaded from expressing their views on how Col Grant treated people by these types of questions. Below are a sampling of some of those answers:

Survey Question: What inspires you to do your job?

A: My customers/users. Definitely not my senior leadership. (Ex 36:123)

\*\*\*\*

A: Nothing. I feel beat down and unmotivated to come to work every day. There is a rare gem every now and then of fun and rewarding parts of my work, but overall, working in the 50 SW has been the worst, most unrewarding job I've ever been in! I honestly don't know how Col Grant was selected for Brig General??? The handwriting is on the wall that she is a horrible, unsympathetic leader, who lacks complete emotion and empathy. My Sq/CC looks completely exhausted and beat down after every engagement he has with the

---

<sup>34</sup> While the IO did not assess Col Grant was being disingenuous at this point, taken at face value, it remains curious that a senior leader at this level would not previously have been aware of such diplomatic techniques when taking a briefing.

Wg/CC. Schriever is truly a prison sentence in many ways, and I can't wait to get out of here. Most of my angst seems to stem from the front office rules and tone that Col Grant sets. (Ex 36: 132)

\*\*\*\*

A: Not Col Grant!!! (Ex 36:133)

On the topic of the design of survey questions, Col Grant was asked to respond to the survey response comment about the questions themselves, that there were fewer questions focused on Wing leadership and more questions on other areas. Her response was that she pretty much had a good handle on what needed to be fixed last time and was more interested in some of the other areas to round out the feedback.<sup>35</sup> (Ex 39:149)

There was a positive comment found in this section:

Col Grant and Chief Alexander...because they care and have so much hope to offer everyone. Also seeing and understanding how what I do fits into the big picture as a whole. (Ex 36:122)

Col Grant was given the opportunity to comment on the following comment from the 2019 survey and was asked if she was aware members still feel this way in certain segments of the Wing:

Working in the 50 SW is like walking on eggshells. Overall, my personal resiliency, morale, and work-life balance/separation has been at the lowest point EVER while assigned to this Wing. The organizational climate is nothing short of toxic starting from the top and impacting every level below. (Ex 36:135)

Col Grant responded:

Well, the question am I aware that there, there are people who still feel this way? Yes, I am aware. Um, have, have, have I made, and has my leadership team made adjustments to, to change that? Yes, we have. Have those adjustments been recognized, um, by a majority of people at the Wing? I think the answer is yes. Um, and, and, uh, while I value every single person who took the time to write in here, and I acknowledge the fact that there are some people who still hold that feeling and that opinion, um, I don't think that we're ever gonna get to a 100 percent turn the corner, realistically. But my goal is to ensure that the majority of the people who drive the overwhelming [sic] culture across the Wing, uh, are not in this camp. (Ex 39:165-166)

---

<sup>35</sup> In comparing the 2018 and 2019 DEOCS results, Mr. Sanders, HAF/A1Q noted he considered the questions in the 2019 survey "soft" and stayed away from the issues that were brought up by unit members in the earlier report. He opined "This is very disappointing as it was a great opportunity to implement action plans with changes and then determine if individuals felt that there was any improvement." (Ex 102:1)



The IO pointed out to Col Grant that people who had been successful and productive in the past reported feeling like they never measured up or somehow weren't good enough, working for her. Col Grant was asked if she had heard these sentiments before. She testified she had not.

IO: Has anyone taken you aside or told you that?

Grant: No.

IO: Has Chief Alexander had some honest discussions with you about people skills?

Grant: He has had some discussions with me relative to, 'Hey, we need to see more of the Jen Grant side and less of the formal um, Col Grant piece.' And um, and, and I appreciate that because I had, during my first year of command been soliciting feedback from my Public Affairs director and also from the vice too about, okay, it, it's important for me because I care about people. I care about the people side of our business.... (Ex 39:129)

Col Grant was asked for her overall assessment of the most recent 2019 DEOCS survey and what it indicated about the current wing climate at Schriever. Col Grant gave a very optimistic view of the findings, but she incorrectly asserted there were no references to people walking on eggshells or fear and intimidation, and relying on what her EO had told her, stated there were only twenty negative comments.<sup>36</sup>

Yeah, in terms of the comments, but I can tell you that I have read the whole thing. Um, by comparison to the first one, this, this is a marked improvement both on uh, numerics and also by the way on the qualitative comments that are in here with rare exceptions.... (Ex 39:143)

Mr. Sanders, HAF/A1Q, who opined there was a theme throughout the 2019 report of lack of communication from leadership, morale issues, and lack of trust, noted: "As best as I can tell; nothing has changed in the area of effective leadership, management, and communication." (Ex 102:1)

When asked about the volume of complaints in the survey about micromanagement, Col Grant opined that climate issues had improved over the last year and blamed two of her previous Operations Group Commanders, Col Doran and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (Ex 39:41) She then stated she heard (b) (6), (b) (7) say the term "walking on eggshells" one time and believed "that's his term." (Ex 39:41) She went on to conclude after (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) change of command, "Nobody over there is talking about walking on eggshells anymore." (Ex 39:42) She professed the 2019 survey contained no references to: walking on eggshells, fear, and intimidation, and that there were a preponderance of positive comments. (Ex 39:143)

The IO countered this assessment by pointing out that there were numerous comments still addressing the general topics of culture of fear, low morale, walking on eggshells, not being

---

<sup>36</sup> A review of the 2019 DEOCS survey reveals over 70 negative comments. (Ex 36)

approachable, not being able to speak at meetings, passive-aggressive tendencies, lack of trust, toxic leadership, stress, and micromanagement, and asked Col Grant for her response to these negative comments. (Ex 39:150) Col Grant responded that she believed, based on input from her EO, the majority of these negative comments were from the Operations Group.<sup>37</sup>

The depth and severity of an unhealthy command climate can be difficult to identify and measure. However, the Air Force has long recognized the importance of both establishing and maintaining a healthy command on mission accomplishment and had the foresight to provide a number of tools to help identify and correct those environments that pose risks to people carrying out that mission.

Air Force Instructions 1-1, 1-2, and the Air Force Core Values are fundamental guideposts for everyone to understand what is expected in terms of caring for Airmen. In some cases, the existence of an unhealthy command climate is readily apparent due to the extreme nature of the unacceptable conduct of a senior leader. Conduct that is extreme in nature, shows overt cruelty, or shocks the conscience, is relatively simple to identify and evaluate. Such conduct has historically been measured against the dignity and respect provisions of AFI 1-2. In such cases, depending on the severity, sometimes only a few instances could provide a firm basis to find the existence of an unhealthy command climate. However, in addition to a requirement to treat people with basic dignity and respect, commanders have the responsibility to maintain effective communication processes, including two-way vertical communication. They are likewise obligated to pay attention to the welfare and morale of their subordinates, while fostering teamwork, cohesion, and trust. The Air Force Core Values, which are incorporated into AFI 1-1, reminds us that *Integrity* is more than an AFI checklist item, but a character trait, a moral compass--the inner voice of self-control.

While the 50 SW effectively performed the mission, the preponderance of the evidence supports mission accomplishment came at a cost to the people under her command. The SECDEF reminded all military personnel and DoD employees to “always treat everyone with dignity and respect” in a 19 Aug 19 ethics memorandum, “*Reaffirming Our Commitment to Ethical Conduct.*” (Ex 98:1) Long before then, our former CSAF, General (ret) Welsh, in a 2013 memo to all general officers and SES members entitled “Preparing Tomorrow’s Air Force Senior Leaders” wrote:

Over the years, I suspect there have been cases where we only asked ‘Are they getting the job done?’ Was it won by their hard work, was it because they built a great team, or was it at the expense of their people? (Ex 99:2)

General Welsh went on to warn of the perils of self-centered, toxic leadership and some associative behaviors such as: shooting the messenger, not listening to staff or subordinates, loss

---

<sup>37</sup> Col Grant explained she could tell from which Group responses came from based on each Group registering under a different Group login. (Ex 39:144)



of self-control, and belittling subordinates in public or private, just to name a few. (Ex 99:2) Often times, when senior leaders are found to have established or maintained an unhealthy command climate, people invariably wonder: How did this happen? How did this progress so long before being identified?

There is another brand of unhealthy command climate that is not as easily identified as those that shock the conscience or as easily generate attention. It is not typically marked by a few extreme acts, but rather, more numerous, systemic and broad reaching subtle acts and omissions that collectively impact the health of an organization over time. In such environments, subordinates often endure difficult circumstances under the belief nothing will be done, or that filing a complaint will not be taken seriously because no single instance, by itself, seems “over the top.” This kind of atmosphere can be hard to describe and subordinates often choose to bide their time until the member or the leader moves on. Others that are able, like civilians, choose to quit, retire, or seek employment elsewhere. This lesser recognized, but equally troublesome climate is more like a boiled frog than “shock and awe.” It is said that a frog will instantly recognize being placed in hot water, but will not notice being placed in cool water where the temperature slowly but steadily increases, until it is too late. In the end, the result is the same. This latter form of unhealthy command climate requires a high volume of evidence and overlapping patterns of behavior to uncover the depth and breadth of its pervasiveness.

Many of the witnesses on Col Grant’s proposed witness list, despite having some positive things to say about her and personally finding ways to succeed, acknowledged some of Col Grant’s unhealthy practices and the difficulty others faced. For example, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Col Grant’s Civil Engineer Commander, who Col Grant indicated would vouch for her command intent and commonality of her leadership style, testified he could see how others might consider her tone, word choice, body language, and facial expressions as “condescending.” (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described her communication styles as “OCD demanding” and described his time with her during a power supply interruption that was, in his words, “a living hell.” (Ex 64:1)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is the current Vice Commander at the 50 SW. He worked directly for Col Grant from January to June, 2019 and as such, has a unique vantage point. On his time under Col Grant he testified he initially noted her leadership inconsistencies and micromanagement. (Ex 115:4) He continued:

She liked making the decisions, and definitely from an O-6 perspective, I think, in the Wing we weren’t really O-6s. Kind of high power O-5s. You just—[they weren’t] our decisions to make. (Ex 115:8)

As diplomatically as he could, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described Col Grant as “certainly not the best leader I have worked for” and testified ultimately, Col Grant did not establish and maintain a healthy command climate. (Ex 115:4, 25) He concluded:

I think Jen Grant is an exceptional Space Operator. I think leadership is maybe not her forte, or building a culture where people really want to belong. (Ex 115:17)

## CONCLUSION.

The weight of evidence submitted and gathered in support of this allegation is substantial. In addition to the testimony of more than 60 witnesses, the record contains insights gleaned from the interview or survey of well over 1,000 people, which included IG to Airmen interviews, pre-inspection surveys, and (2) wing-wide DEOCS climate surveys.

Though stated in a number of ways, the sentiment expressed by members of Col Grant's staff who worked most closely with her, from nearly every Group Commander to staff agency chiefs, to front office military members and civilian secretaries, support Col Grant created a systemic and pervasive work climate that was decidedly unhealthy. Witnesses, particularly Col Grant's immediate staff, credibly described the environment as one in which Col Grant failed in her responsibilities to pay attention to the welfare and morale of her subordinates, and failed to cultivate a climate of teamwork, cohesion, and trust. Further, witnesses described failures in effective two-way communication and instances of a lack of self-control when engaging subordinates.

By way of review, a preponderance of witness testimony analyzed in this allegation demonstrated Col Grant's actions had a palpable negative impact on those around her.

### *Failure to Pay Attention to the Welfare and Morale of Subordinates*

AFI 1-2, *Commander's Responsibilities*, reminds commanders at all times to lead by personal example and pay judicious attention to the welfare and morale of their subordinates. Here, Col Grant repeatedly violated this standard as exemplified by just a few of the many examples detailed previously:

- Berated her executive officer, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) over the processing of a PRF to the point of an emotional event marked by the officer crawling under her desk and crying.
- Berated the Command Chief's Assistant, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to the point of tears over Col Grant not being given the chance to sign a get well card.
- Publicly cut off her own Command Chief, (b) (6), (b) (7) in a meeting and then privately told him he had "stepped in it," and refused to talk to him. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) volunteered for a one-year deployment, his second in recent years, because he did not have the appropriate relationship with Col Grant and did not feel it was healthy for him to stay there.
- Privately told her Ops Group Commander, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) she was the worst O-6 she's worked with and publicly undermined her in front of the AFSPC/IG and others.



- One squadron commander, (b) (6), (b) (7) described his time under Col Grant's command as the worst year of his life and reported crying at work over the difficulties he experienced serving under her.
- At the expense of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) morale, Col Grant took (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) aside during her promotion reception and lectured her for failing to personally inform her a Brig Gen was the presiding official, even though it had been properly coordinated and Col Grant was fully aware.
- Failed to check on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) her Chief of Protocol, who was working on a DV visit while recovering from surgery, which helped solidify (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) decision to retire.
- Called (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the former acting Chief of Protocol, while she was in mental health treatment for suicidal ideations, and criticized her decision to list an enlisted member on her safety plan. Testimony and evidence indicated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was distraught by this and other more public interactions with Col Grant. Like (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) related her last year was the worst year of her life, feeling personally and professionally defeated.

Though not necessarily individually, these and all of the other examples examined in the analysis of this allegation demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Col Grant failed to lead by personal example at all times and to pay judicious attention to the welfare and morale of her subordinates.

#### *Failure to Foster Teamwork, Cohesion, and Trust*

AFI 1-2 also requires commanders to establish and maintain a healthy command climate which fosters good order and discipline, teamwork, cohesion and trust. Focusing on Col Grant's failure to foster teamwork, cohesion, and trust, failures in this area were manifested by a climate recognized by the AFSPC/IG team as the worst culture/climate seen in 20 years. A recurring theme emerged indicating people were afraid of Col Grant. Fear of public humiliation or embarrassment are fundamentally incompatible with trust. The UEI report itself emphasizes "Wing leaders must foster a culture of trust." Results from the 2018 DEOCS survey reinforce this notion as pointed out by the AF/AIQ DEOCS expert who noted a lack of cohesion and trust under Col Grant. Additionally, Col Grant repeatedly violated this portion of AFI 1-2 as evidenced by some of the following examples:

- Undermined a briefer during the UEI, commenting to the members at the table in front of IG inspectors, "He doesn't know what he's talking about."
- When a Group Commander tried to off ramp the issue, offering to dig deeper into the issue and get back to her, Col Grant responded in front of the audience and

inspectors, “What you’re saying is you don’t know.” When questioned about this, Col Grant invoked her right to remain silent.

- The investigation revealed a trend of people quitting their jobs because of Col Grant. Senior leaders testified people simply don’t enjoy working for her. Ten people quit, retired, or deployed including such key positions as: (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- Witness testimony taken after Col Grant relinquished command shows a stark contrast, noting trust has been restored up and down the chain of command.

Such examples collectively highlight the depth and breadth of the erosion of any healthy sense of teamwork, cohesion, and trust and further contribute to the preponderance of evidence which indicates Col Grant failed to establish and maintain a healthy command climate as required by AFI 1-2.

#### *Lack of Effective Communication*

AFI 1-2 also requires effective communication processes and requires two way vertical and lateral communication, which includes among other things, developing trust and encouraging feedback. The Air Force Core Values cites *Integrity* as the moral compass and voice of self-control that also form a basis of trust. Likewise, AFI 1-2 consistently notes a healthy command climate ensures members are treated with dignity and respect. A lack of effective communication by Col Grant was evidenced as Col Grant was found to have:

- Refused to talk directly with the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) leaving him to try to glean her intent through the (b) (6) to try to complete the mission. This repeated lack of accessibility frustrated the plans process and eventually led to his (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). In describing his experience working for Col Grant, he noted subtle cues that had cumulatively impacted him including sarcasm, feelings of being demeaned, and being judged negatively. He testified his (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) were “absolutely” a result of his interactions with Col Grant and the command climate at Schriever. He added he was suffering from feelings of helplessness to perform his job and illustrated a time when he was trying to complete the Wing’s Strategic Plan, which was taking longer than expected without clear commander’s intent. He described being questioned about it by Col Grant, publicly at a Wing Staff meeting, in a tone and manner that came across as if to say, “What are you, an idiot?” Col Grant was asked about this meeting and about (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) access to her. She once again elected to remain silent and did not provide a response.



In addition to not giving needed guidance and direction, the AFSPC/IG noted Col Grant was not getting information she needed because people were afraid of her, an observation corroborated by two Group Commanders. Likewise, the 2018 DEOCS results indicated a “lack of up and down communication.” One of the biggest hindrances to open communication stemmed from Col Grant:

- Publicly drilling briefers and rephrasing what a briefier said, changing the content, and restating it back to them in public, by saying “What I think you meant was...,” leaving the person on the spot to either agree with her and sit down or face further public scrutiny and embarrassment. As witnesses described, Col Grant would make briefings feel like graded events and drill briefers down to the level of detail where “she would make people feel stupid.”
- Berating (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) briefers to the point where the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had to intervene. This type of behavior occurred throughout her first year in command and had a considerable impact on people’s willingness to speak up or give candid feedback.
- A (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described meetings chaired by Col Grant as “a dictatorship,” and recalled a time Col Grant made someone “feel like shit” in front of a group of people. She added meetings did not feel open because people were afraid to speak for fear of the repercussions from Col Grant, making them feel embarrassed in public and noted this was “not a one off” or isolated incident, but a regular pattern.
- Col Grant’s (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified about how Col Grant communicated. He stated if you don’t think the same as Col Grant does, you were wrong and she questioned why you thought that way or took a certain action. After recounting a time he tried to inform her about an ambulance speeding onto the base, he was dismissed, ridiculed, asked to move his desk away from hers, and told to look for an assignment elsewhere. Col Grant was afforded the opportunity to respond to this issue. On advice of counsel, she invoked her right to remain silent and elected not to comment.
- At least twice Col Grant threw (frisbee-ed or forcefully slammed down) staff packages at or toward staff members, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)
- The Staff Judge Advocate described times when Col Grant would publicly dress down commanders, wanting people in the room to know the person was “F-ing up,” dismissing the notion that she was simply analytical and pulling a thread for more detail.

Such examples, taken together with the other aspects examined above, demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Col Grant failed to maintain effective communication as required by the standard. Despite Col Grant professing to be a “closed loop” communicator,



witnesses repeatedly described experiences such as these that were decidedly one way in nature, with little tolerance for feedback. Such examples also highlight an underlying lack of self-control when engaging subordinates, further contributing to an unhealthy command climate.

While Col Grant espoused a narrative that part of the unhealthy climate was initially confined to the Ops Groups and was perpetuated by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) the bulk of evidence did not support this theory. First, while other leaders in the Wing may have done a better job filtering the negativity streaming from the Wing Commander to their people, the fact remains that in a healthy command climate Group Commanders and key leaders don't have to filter the Wing Commander. Second, it was telling that every single Group Commander interviewed (5 in all) confirmed Col Grant's unhealthy command practices and the climate that followed, whether directed at them or not. Third, the idea that the unhealthy climate was contained to the Ops Groups does little to explain the vast array of examples of unhealthy practices received from members of the Mission Support Group, many of the Wing Staff Agencies, and a number of Col Grant's own personal staff.

Likewise, Col Grant's assertion that she made the necessary course corrections and took feedback to heart to start to turn things around is unpersuasive. The standard set forth in AFI 1-2 requires commanders to establish and maintain a healthy command climate. Witness testimony and survey results indicate the command climate was worse during the first year than the second. However, it is equally apparent that Col Grant was the one responsible for establishing the climate to begin with. There was no evidence to suggest she inherited an unhealthy command climate upon assuming command. Col Grant testified that prior to her taking command, the Wing had not underperformed or performed poorly. It is telling that none of these concerns about an unhealthy climate were expressed before she took command, and anecdotal evidence taken 1 to 2 months after her departure describe the command climate as a marked improvement, as different as "night and day." Interestingly, this is the same sentiment expressed by one of the witnesses that experienced Col Grant's reign as a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).


The AFSPC/IG noted significant concerns with the conditions at Schriever under Col Grant. Of note, the IG identified, as did the Investigation Team, a pervasive fear of the Wing Commander that infringed on people's willingness to report bad news, mission impact information, or even interact with her in public or private forums. While there were some exceptions to this hesitation, such exceptions were far and few between. Many of the witnesses on Col Grant's proposed witness list, despite personally finding ways to succeed, acknowledged some of Col Grant's unhealthy practices and the difficulty others faced. Despite offering some positive aspects when given the opportunity, one witness, a command experienced Colonel, acknowledged a time working for Col Grant that was a "living hell," while Col Grant's (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) conceded that despite being an exceptional space operator, leadership and building a culture where people want to belong were not her strengths.



The investigation revealed compelling evidence of an unhealthy command climate from: nearly all [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED] and the [REDACTED] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [REDACTED]. Additionally, the AFSPC/IG provided valuable insight on unhealthy command practices uncovered during IG team's week long UEI inspection, when more than 300 witnesses were interviewed. Finally, two separate DEOCS surveys, one during Col Grant's first year in command and the other near the end of her tenure, consistently describe a toxic work environment and identify Col Grant as the primary source of that decidedly unhealthy command climate.

Recalling the Wing Organizational chart, a visual depiction shows a substantial portion of Col Grant's key staff experienced personally or recognized the indications of an unhealthy command climate. Areas in red indicate the key staff positions that testified about some elements of an unhealthy command climate. Areas in green indicate people that testified they generally did not observe such indicators:

(see next page)



After careful review, observations gained by the AFSPC/IG team and two DEOCS surveys closely align with the sworn testimony of a strong majority (85%) of the witnesses that recalled relevant facts and were willing to testify, in pointing to an unhealthy command climate at the 50 SW during Col Grant's tenure.

Therefore, by a preponderance of evidence, based on the findings of fact and sworn testimony, the allegation that between June 2017 and February 2019, Colonel Jennifer Grant failed to establish and maintain a healthy command climate, in violation of AFI 1-2, *Commander's Responsibilities*, 8 May 2014, is **SUBSTANTIATED**.

*This is a protected document. It will not be released (in whole or in part), reproduced, or given additional dissemination (in whole or in part) outside of the inspector general channels without prior approval of The Inspector General (SAF/IG) or designee.*



**ALLEGATION 2:** That between on or about 4 September 2018 and 9 October 2018, during 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing hosted events, Col Grant failed to treat Air Force (b) (6), (b) (7) with dignity and respect, in violation of AFI 1-1, *Air Force Standards*, 7 August 2012, Incorporating Change 1, 12 November 2014.

Allegation 2 has two parts. The first is that on or about 4 Sep 18, Col Grant allegedly failed to treat (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), with dignity and respect at a Town Hall meeting in response to a question about spouse access to health equipment in a restricted area. The second part of the allegation concerns whether Col Grant failed to treat (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), also a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), with dignity and respect at a Community Action Board (CAB) meeting on 9 Oct 18.

## STANDARDS.

Air Force Instruction 1-1, *Air Force Standards*, 7 Aug 12, Incorporating Change 1, 12 Nov 14, implements AF-PD 1, Air Force Culture, and serves as a reminder on the importance of the Air Force mission and inherent responsibility to the Nation that requires its members to adhere to higher standards than those expected in civilian life.

2.1 Overview. The Air Force has a very important national defense mission; and you, as a member of the Air Force, have serious responsibilities for carrying out that mission. You are responsible for following orders, performing specific daily tasks related to your duties, and living up to the high standards of the Air Force. Maintaining good order and discipline is paramount for mission accomplishment. **Our core values demand that Airmen treat others with genuine dignity, fairness, and respect at all times.** Each Airman is entitled to fair, scrupulous, and unbiased treatment, and each Airman has the obligation to care for, teach, and lead others. We must also maintain loyalty to the Air Force's core values and standards and maintain professionalism and respect for others regardless of race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, disability, or sexual orientation. This respect for others not only involves **personal interaction**, but also extends to communications and interactions in social media and cyberspace. You must never **degrade the public's trust and confidence in the United States Air Force and in you.** (Ex 4:12) (emphasis added)

DoDI 5500.07-R, *The Joint Ethics Regulation (JER)*, para 12-401 states:

f. **Caring.** Compassion is an essential element of good government. **Courtesy and kindness**, both to those we serve and to those we work with, help to ensure that individuals are not treated solely as a means to an end. Caring for others is the counterbalance against the temptation to pursue the mission at any cost. (emphasis added)

g. **Respect.** To treat people with dignity, to honor privacy and to allow self-determination are critical in a government of diverse people. **Lack of respect leads to a breakdown of**

**loyalty** and honesty within a government and brings chaos to the international community. (emphasis added)

The complainant for both parts of this allegation cited AFI 36-2909, *Professional and Unprofessional Relationships*, 27 Apr 18 as an applicable standard. While this instruction is the primary source document governing professional and unprofessional relationships in the Air Force, it is not the applicable source document here.<sup>38</sup> As unprofessional relationships are not part of the allegations examined in this investigation, this standard will not be applied. (Ex 100)

The formal complainant for this allegation is (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), an Air (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (Ex 13:2) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also stated in her complaint that Col Grant “maltreated” her, again citing AFI 36-2909. AFI 36-2909, para 5.1.3 does address maltreatment, (which is different than the UCMJ provision, Article 93, “Cruelty and Maltreatment”) but it is only mentioned in the form of retaliation under the same instruction. Maltreatment, as contemplated by AFI 36-2909, thus deals with treatment by peers or by other persons, that, when viewed objectively under all the circumstances, is cruel, abusive or otherwise unnecessary for any lawful purpose, that is done with the intent to discourage reporting of a criminal offense or otherwise discourage the due administration of justice...” (Ex 100:22) This form of maltreatment pertains to retaliation for the reporting of a sex-related offense or sexual harassment. This is not the matter addressed in this allegation, and likewise, this standard is inapplicable to the investigation. (Ex 100:22-23)

PART I - *The Town Hall Meeting* – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

**FINDINGS OF FACT.**

- On or about 4 Sep 18, the 50 SW held a Town Hall meeting. The issue in controversy on at the meeting was spouse access to a “Bod Pod” in the Health and Wellness area, which is a device that precisely measures a person’s body fat content. That meeting was hosted by the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Col Grant was present to give opening remarks and respond to questions. (Ex 23:4)

Also on or about 4 Sep 18 at the Town Hall meeting:

- During the question and answer period, one of the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) from the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), if the Bod Pod could be made available to spouses who did not

---

<sup>38</sup> While some of the language in the section cited by complainant speaks generally to “professionalism,” this is not typically the AFI that is most on point or one that is commonly used to analyze, conceptually, the treatment of people with dignity and respect. For that, we turn to AFI 1-1, cited above, which will be the primary framework by which this allegation is analyzed.



have personal access to a restricted area, where the Bod Pod was located. (Ex 39:193; Ex 79:1)

- People without restricted area badges required an escort to enter the facility to use the Bod Pod device. During the 4 Sep 18 Town Hall meeting, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) if she (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) would personally escort spouses inside the restricted area for this purpose. (Ex 39:194; Ex 79:1)
- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) explained that she was the only one working at the facility and she would not be able to leave her post to escort people into and out of the area to use the Bod Pod. (Ex 79:1)
- (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) persisted and asked, in a number of ways, if (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could nevertheless perform this service. (Ex 79:1)
- At some point after several rounds of the conversation going back and forth with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) seemingly refusing to accept no for an answer, Col Grant stepped in and responded to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) supporting (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) position, and offering a solution that in the near future the device was going to be moved outside the restricted area and therefore, would be more accessible to the Schriever community. (Ex 79:1; Ex 39:196)

#### ANALYSIS.

On 4 Sep 18, the 50 FSS hosted a “Town Hall meeting,” an opportunity to communicate and inform the base population of events and services available at Schriever. The issue in controversy at the meeting was spouse access to a “Bod Pod,” which is a device that precisely measures a person’s body fat content. The Bod Pod in question was located in a fitness facility that was inside a restricted area, and was thus, not available to dependents unless escorted by someone authorized to be in that restricted area. The central issue was a question from a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), about whether (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could escort dependents inside the restricted area to be able to use the Bod Pod. (Ex 79:1; Ex 39:195) The IO contacted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to get her perspective, but on 14 May 19, she refused to testify or talk with investigators. (Ex 31:1)

According to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) Col Grant treated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) badly at this Town Hall meeting. She asserted:

...a fellow (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) [(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)] was ‘cut at her knees,’ (her words) with harsh remarks at our last Town Hall. (Ex 23:4; Ex 13:56)

It is important to note (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not present at the Town Hall and did not



personally witness what happened. (Ex 13:56) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) another (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was present at the Town Hall and offered the following testimony:

(b) (6), (b) (7) one of the spouses was asking again, a clarifying question, and before she could finish, Col Grant kind of jumped in on her and, you know, basically told her that it was going to be the way it was going to be and that was it. (Ex 89:8)

(b) (6), (b) (7) added that she and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had talked about it afterwards and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) expressed that she was upset and felt disrespected. (Ex 89:9)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). As such, he was responsible for the Town Hall program and served as the facilitator that event. (b) (6), (b) (7) testified (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at least two questions trying to get (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to provide easier access to the Bod Pod for spouses. (Ex 75:1) The first question had to do with whether spouses could have access, which they could if escorted by their spouse (or someone with a restricted area badge) because the Bod Pod was in a restricted area. (Ex 75:1) The second question was whether (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) could come and escort her or a group of spouses at a time into the area to use the device. The answer to that question was no, because (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was the only employee in that section and she could not leave to perform escort duties. (b) (6), (b) (7) and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed escorting spouses is not part of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) duty description. (Ex 75:1; Ex 79:1)

After a couple of rounds of questions, (b) (6), (b) (7) related Col Grant interjected and explained to (b) (6), (b) (7) the Bod Pod would be moved out of the restricted area in the future and that for the time being, spouses could use the device, but would have to be escorted by someone else with a badge, not (b) (6), (b) (7) (Ex:75:1) When asked if this was the right answer, (b) (6), (b) (7) acknowledged fundamentally, it was. However, he noted it was Col Grant's delivery that left something to be desired. (Ex 75:1) He stated Col Grant said the Bod Pod was for active duty personnel and would remain in the restricted area until it could be moved out. (b) (6), (b) (7) testified Col Grant then stopped further questions on the topic saying "no more questions on that." (Ex 75:1)

When questioned about the interaction that took place between herself and (b) (6), (b) (7) at the 4 Sep 18 Town Hall Meeting, Col Grant described the exchange this way:

I allowed the flow of the conversation to go where, you know, to go... And then, our (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), pretty much brand-new...was the one who talked about the Bod Pod.

(b) (6), (b) (7) got up to talk about, 'Hey, this is kind of, you know, what we have in terms of services.' It is inside the restricted area, so it's not readily accessible to spouses and families yet...[S]o, in an interest to make the Bod Pod and the nutritionist and everything accessible to spouses and families, we had earmarked the space inside that building to



pull out the Bod Pod and everything out of the restricted area....Pretty much after the first of the year timeframe was what we anticipated the schedule being to do that. (Ex 39:195)

Col Grant testified she told the (b) (6), the Wing was making arrangements to make the Bod Pod available and spouses could use the Bod Pod, but they needed to have an escort. She also clarified that (b) (6), was not available to be the escort as they were minimally manned in the HAWC and she was needed to do her job. Col Grant reiterated that she asked the spouses to be patient until they are able to put the Bod Pod in an accessible location. (Ex 39:196; Ex 79:2)

(b) (6), corroborated that after several rounds of the conversation going back and forth, with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), seemingly refusing to accept “no” for an answer, Col Grant stepped in and responded to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) supporting (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) position, and offering a solution in the near future, that the device was going to be moved outside the restricted area. (Ex 72:2) She mentioned that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) seemed upset and that she persisted in continuing to ask about the matter even after the meeting. (Ex 79:2) (b) (6), testified she thanked Col Grant for stepping in after (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was “badgering” her and described Col Grant’s response not as disrespectful, but as “firm” and “authoritative.” (Ex 79-2)

Col Grant related that she knew (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) fairly well at that point, there was a relationship there, and that the (b) (6), had been over to her house. Their (b) (6), had been in (b) (6), together and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) knew Col Grant’s (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), well. Based on this relationship, Col Grant testified she felt comfortable telling (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) there was a plan on the way forward and to be patient. Col Grant also stated that (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) seemed satisfied with her response and that since then, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) has been to her home without any follow up concerns voiced. (Ex 39:197)

Col Grant testified she would be surprised to learn that witnesses reported (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was upset by that exchange<sup>39</sup> and that some people thought her response was terse, disrespectful, or unkind.<sup>40</sup> (Ex 39:199)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was present at the Town Hall meeting in question and could not recall the words Col Grant said. (Ex 29:8) He commented more generally that he did not view this interaction as Col Grant intentionally belittling the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). However, he did feel as though she was “a little condescending,” though stressed he did not think it was intentional. (Ex 29:6)

<sup>39</sup> (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) AD (b) (6), of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) called the IO to advise that (b) (6), would not be testifying. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was placed under oath and asked if he was aware if (b) (6), was upset after the Town Hall meeting exchange involving Col Grant. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not at the town hall meeting, but stated he had heard the response was terse and testified (b) (6), was upset about it for a “day or so.” (Ex 34:2)

<sup>40</sup> Col Grant testified “[N]umber one, it wasn’t terse. It offered a fairly well-developed explanation of what the plan was in terms of pulling the Bod Pod out and also offered an alternative solution to, you know, what (b) (6), and I would do because we were in the same boat. It’s just a way to economize the time and, and respect the fact that I have a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) whose job is not to go out and escort people in large groups and bring them in, but is to be able to be there to service whoever is coming in at a particular time to, to take care of things.” (Ex 39:199-200)



(b) (6), (b) (7) described Col Grant's words as abrupt, but when asked if he considered the response to be a failure to treat (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with dignity and respect, he diplomatically stated he would not go that far; however, it was "not the way he would have responded." (Ex 75:2)

### CONCLUSION – PART I.

As to the Town Hall meeting, in examining the verbal exchange, a few important details from testimony, and the absence of testimony, are telling. Although it was not clear in the original complaint, the exchange in question was not just between two people, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Col Grant. Rather, as the testimony revealed, the exchange was between three people:

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and Col Grant. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), trying to field a difficult question from a persistent (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). It appears that only after several attempts to diplomatically answer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) question did Col Grant intervene on (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) behalf.

The complainant who brought this issue to the IG, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was not at the Town Hall at the time, but asserted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was "cut at her knees" by Col Grant, words she attributes to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). At worst, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described how Col Grant "jumped in" to the conversation and "basically told (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) it was going to be the way it was going to be." She described Col Grant's words as "scolding." While the words "no," or "not right now" are terms of limitation, in context they do not reasonably appear to be harsh, disrespectful, or undignified. Col Grant testified she allowed conversation to flow and was not initially part of the discussion. It appears she only intervened after several attempts by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to explain the limitations, with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) persisting in looking for ways to get to yes, right then and there. Also, while the short-term answer to the question about whether the spouses could have access to the "Bod Pod" was "not yet," the final, longer-term answer was in fact, yes. Spouses would soon get access when the device was moved out of the restricted area, as it remains today.<sup>41</sup> While this answer may not have been the one hoped for, it certainly wasn't bad news or a firm denial. Absent a preponderance of evidence to the contrary, a firm or even terse statement to explain the way forward, made in support of a junior employee, would not violate the standard.

Additionally, the recipient of this alleged unfair treatment, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) refused to testify or participate in the process. It is noted there are a wide variety reasons why people would elect not to participate in an administrative IG investigation and dependent spouses are not required to talk to the IG. As Col Grant was (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) commander, the IO inquired to see if (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) or (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) feared reprisal, but (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) is a private person that would rather not talk about it. Without delving deeper into (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) motives, what remains is the fact that when given the opportunity to tell her side of the story, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

<sup>41</sup> Col Grant testified (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) later related to her that after the Bod Pod was removed from the restricted area, no one came to use it. (Ex 39:199)



declined to speak on the issue. What is left is the testimony of others and the perspective of Col Grant.

Air Force Instruction 1-1, *Air Force Standards* serves as a reminder of the importance of the Air Force mission and inherent responsibility to the Nation that requires its members to adhere to higher standards than those expected in civilian life. This standard also reminds us the Core Values demand that Airmen treat others with genuine dignity, fairness, and respect at all times.

Col Grant's response in the incident involving (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) may not have been ideal. While the delivery of her comment, in support of an employee struggling in a public forum may have been firm, the evidence received does not support that on 4 Sep 18, she treated (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in a disrespectful or undignified manner.

It is not inconsequential that according to the testimony provided, there were several exchanges between (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and the civilian employee, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) seemingly refusing to accept no for an answer. Under different circumstances or if done with greater skill, that may have been precisely what one would expect from a senior officer under the circumstances.

While it may not be surprising (b) (6), (b) (7) viewed Col Grant's comment to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in a negative light, it is also reasonable to view the remarks as a corrective measure under a commander's prerogative in support of a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in need. Unfortunately, we do not know what (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) thinks about the matter because she declined the opportunity to tell us. A preponderance of the evidence DOES NOT support a finding concerning (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that on 4 Sep 18, Col Grant failed to treat her with dignity and respect. While Col Grant could have handled that situation differently, her acts or omissions at the Town Hall Meeting, in and of themselves, did not amount to clear violations of her responsibilities under AFI 1-1.

PART II - *The Community Action Board Meeting* – (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

**FINDINGS OF FACT.**

- On or about 9 Oct 18, the 50 SW held a quarterly CAB meeting, chaired by Col Grant. (Ex 15:1; Ex 16:1)

Also on or about 9 Oct 18, during the 50 SW quarterly CAB meeting:

- Unit Commanders, staff, and Key Spouses were present, including (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for the 50th Force Support Squadron. (Ex 13:24; Ex 16:1)

- At the conclusion of the CAB meeting, Col Grant solicited questions or final comments during the “around the room” (question and answer portion) of the meeting. (Ex 13:31; Ex 23:2; Ex 39:183-184)
- During this “around the room” portion of the meeting, (b) (6), (b) (7) stood up, made a comment and asked Col Grant a question. (Ex 39:184; Ex 13:32)
- This exchange between Col Grant and (b) (6), (b) (7) resulted in (b) (6), (b) (7) and another (b) (6), (b) (7), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) feeling as though Col Grant was disrespectful to (b) (6), (b) (7) (Ex 13:36; Ex 89:4)

### ANALYSIS.

On 9 Oct 18, the 50 SW held its quarterly Community Action Board (CAB) meeting, chaired by Col Grant. (Ex 15:1; Ex 16:1) Commanders, staff, and Key Spouses were present, including (b) (6), (b) (7), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for the 50 FSS. (Ex 13:24; Ex 16:1) It does not appear there was anything discussed substantively during the main portion of the meeting that was controversial or a point of contention. It is widely acknowledged by witnesses, as well as Col Grant, that at the conclusion of the CAB meeting, Col Grant solicited questions or final comments during the “around the room” (question and answer) portion of the meeting. (Ex 23:2; Ex 13:31; Ex 39:184) According to the complainant, (b) (6), (b) (7) it was during this “around the room” portion that Col Grant publicly humiliated her with “verbal abuse, yelling, scolding, [in a personal attack.” (Ex 23:1)

In her written complaint, (b) (6), (b) (7) believed Col Grant’s disrespect started by not acknowledging the Key Spouses at the beginning of the meeting. (Ex 23:2) (b) (6), (b) (7) testified that at the end of the meeting, she raised her hand, noting it was “everyone’s last opportunity to ask questions and give her updates.” (Ex 23:2) She wrote:

My statement was only informative, to update [Col Grant], that some key spouses had recently met with their First Shirts to discuss how we, as the Schriever community, identify and help those in need for the then upcoming holiday season. I was new at the time. As was the previous [Mission Support Group First Sergeant]. I was aware that we do a lot for (b) (6), (b) (7) (where [Col Grant’s] (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) ) but not the base. (Ex 23:2)

During her sworn testimony, (b) (6), (b) (7) addressed her concerns about the (b) (6), (b) (7) by stating she noticed a lot of the 50 SW resources go to those schools, but it appeared the Wing wasn’t focused on its own people and she wanted to ensure that Schriever families were also being attended to and weren’t forgotten. (Ex 13:32) (b) (6), (b) (7) stated she raised her own voice while speaking to Col Grant. (Ex 13:36)



(b) (6), (b) (7) testified:

I do recall Col Grant, her voice rose in terms of the volume, and she's like, 'Well, I sure hope you're talking to your First Sergeant.' And then, she kind of turned towards the other squadron commanders.... 'Are your Key Spouses meeting with your First Sergeants?' And you know, they all--I think it was more of a rhetorical question, because she didn't wait for any of them to respond. And then she turns back around, and she said, 'It doesn't matter if you're new or not,' and oh, gosh. It was like I was a little kid. She was, she was yelling. She was scolding. I got so red in the face. (Ex 13:36) (emphasis added)

When pressed about whether Col Grant was yelling or not and what she meant by that, (b) (6), (b) (7) responded:

So I guess that's more of a--of a more subjective term...because everybody has their own definition. To me, I took it as yelling. That's how I interpreted what she said. Now, I know the difference between screaming--she was not screaming, but she was yelling, if that makes any sense at all. To me, screaming is the most extreme. Yelling is right underneath that, where the least--your voice is raised, your body language and everything is anger, just anger, is what, is what that was. (Ex 13:81-82)

(b) (6), (b) (7) described Col Grant's response as demeaning. (Ex 13:82) She clarified:

There was no foul language, no. But you know, words, words can hurt, nonetheless, and that's exactly what happened. And I felt as if--she was talking to me as if I didn't know what I was talking about, like I was stupid. (Ex 13:82)

When asked if she was certain Col Grant was addressing her personally, (b) (6), (b) (7) responded:

Absolutely. There was no doubt whatsoever, especially when she's jabbing her finger at me....There was nobody else she was looking at, not even the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). Right at me. (Ex 13:83)

Recalling the (b) (6), (b) (7) had only been at Schriever for a short time, two or three months at that point, (b) (6), (b) (7) explained this experience was a turning point for her:

[U]p until that point, things were going well. I was, you know, fine talking with her, interactions and whatnot, and talking with (b) (6), (b) (7), going over to her house. But that day changed everything for me. I lost all respect for her. (Ex 13:65)

As a result of her experience, (b) (6), (b) (7) decided not to attend CAB meetings anymore due to the lack of respect she felt from Col Grant toward herself and (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (Ex 23:4) She commented on this impact during her sworn testimony as well:

Since the CAB meeting, I have done my best to avoid her, because I just, like I said, I have lost respect for her and I don't feel the need to go up and say hello or be cordial. She has stopped doing that to me as well. (Ex 13:74)

Another (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) present at the CAB, (b) (6), (b) (7) testified she recalled (b) (6), (b) (7) asked a question about getting involved more with the First Sergeants to help Airmen. She explained Col Grant came back and was trying to clarify what (b) (6), (b) (7) was asking, but she came across as kind of scolding her and added she felt (b) (6), (b) (7) was disrespected. (Ex 89:4) She testified: “[Col Grant] did not respond to (b) (6), (b) (7) with the respect that I would expect.” (Ex 89:12)

When asked if she recalled what Col Grant said, like (b) (6), (b) (7) (b) (6), (b) (7) did not remember precisely what Col Grant said, but relayed what she felt Col Grant was communicating along the lines of:

‘Well, aren’t you already engaged with the [First Sergeants] in your units?’ Kind of: ‘Shouldn’t you already know the answer to that question if you’re engaged the way you should be with your [First Sergeant] as a (b) (6), (b) (7)?’ (Ex 89:5)

When asked about Col Grant’s body language, (b) (6), (b) (7) testified she didn’t look at her face, but remembered Col Grant seemed to be “slightly leaned forward,” leaning on the armrest. (Ex 89:5) Overall, (b) (6), (b) (7) said she would consider the experience “humiliating or embarrassing” if it had been directed at her and added it was “kind of like she was scolding a child sort of tone of voice.” (Ex 89:7-8)

Col Grant was asked to describe her exchange with (b) (6), (b) (7) in her own words. She stated she asked everyone in the room if they had anything to add and the (b) (6), (b) (7), including (b) (6), (b) (7) all indicated they did not. (Ex 39:184) However, she stated she could tell (b) (6), (b) (7) “looked like she wanted to say something.” (Ex 39:184) After being given a second opportunity by Col Grant, (b) (6), (b) (7) indicated she did have something to say while the other spouses looked down at their feet. (Ex 39:184)

Col Grant contended (b) (6), (b) (7) comment was not that they were working with First Sergeants to help Airmen and families for Thanksgiving and Christmas, but rather, a proclamation that she (b) (6), (b) (7) didn’t know what was happening on the base. (Ex 39:184) She stated (b) (6), (b) (7) stood up, came up to the table<sup>42</sup> and she said, “I don’t know what’s going on, on this base and I, I need you to brief me on what’s going on, on this base.” (Ex 39:184)

---

<sup>42</sup> During Col Grant’s interview, she stated (b) (6), (b) (7) left her seat and approached the head table, even getting up and demonstrating at one point. (Ex 39:185) No other witness confirmed this. (b) (6), (b) (7) the (b) (6), (b) (7) (b) (6), (b) (7), recalled where he was sitting during the meeting, remembered watching the exchange with (b) (6), (b) (7) and testified (b) (6), (b) (7) stood up at her seat, but did not approach the head table. (Ex 118:39)



Col Grant testified she was confused because she didn't understand what (b) (6), (b) (7) meant and noted (b) (6), (b) (7) put his head in his hands.<sup>43</sup>

Col Grant stated:

I said, 'I don't understand. What do you mean by, "you don't know what's going on, on this base?"' (b) (6), (b) (7) said:] 'Well, I don't. Every other base I've been to, I always know what's going on and I just don't know what's going on, on this base. And I need somebody to brief me.' (Ex 39:184)

Col Grant testified (b) (6), (b) (7) stated she had engaged with the First Sergeant. (Ex 39:185) She continued, "I said, 'Okay, um, is there, is there a question related to what's going on, on the base that you are most interested in?'"<sup>44</sup>

Col Grant related she was sitting there, "trying to connect the dots," to try to understand "what the disconnect is," and how to fix it. (Ex 39:185)

I said, 'Okay, so, has [the First Sergeant] let you know, you know, what's going on, on the base?' (b) (6), (b) (7) said] 'Well, I'm interested in the, um, you know, how, how the spouses can help out with the, you know, Thanksgiving things.' So the topic did come up, but that wasn't initially how it was framed. (Ex 39:185)

Col Grant continued that it caught her "off guard" and felt it was an unusual demeanor and statement. (Ex 39:186) She then described how the exchange supposedly came to a conclusion:

So, (b) (6), (b) (7) said:] 'Yes, I've talked to the First Sergeant.' 'Okay, did he let you know what the opportunities were at Thanksgiving and Christmas?' (b) (6), (b) (7) said:] 'Yes, he did.' 'Okay, well that's great. I mean, does that, does that address what you were trying to get after?' (b) (6), (b) (7) said:] 'Yeah, I guess it does.' Then she sat down. And I said, 'Okay, well thank you, and thank you for coming...' (Ex 39:186)

Col Grant recalled what she was thinking and doing at that point:

And, gosh, I'm glad we, you know, if there are any other questions, I mean, I'm going to have my (b) (6) kind of stay after and, and maybe if there's additional things that we need to talk about, we can. Um, and I looked at him (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and he said he would, you know, kind of circle back. Um, and then I was watching (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and, and he

<sup>43</sup> (b) (6), (b) (7) corroborated (b) (6), (b) (7) reaction, although (b) (6), (b) (7) who was sitting next to (b) (6), (b) (7) did not. (Ex 66:1; Ex 118:38)

<sup>44</sup> Col Grant's tone at this point of her testimony came across as condescending to the IO. When Col Grant said "Okay," her voice inflection had the connotation that it was obvious she was reasonable and that the person on the receiving end was in the wrong. The same was true when Col Grant described the way she pushed back on the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), when he called Col Grant and tried to give her some friendly feedback about things being "too tight" at the 50 SW. (Ex 39:43)

looked very uncomfortable over there. And, and so we, we ended the meeting. I adjourned the meeting. (Ex 39:186)

Col Grant claimed after the meeting, she walked over and thanked the spouses for coming. (Ex 39:186) She also testified she asked (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to stop by her office afterward to discuss what had happened:

I said, 'Okay, was that just me?' So mind you, this is my (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), right? He was my sounding board when I had my sit-down with my O-6s, kind of a good litmus test for 'Hey, you know, talk to me about what you saw.' He goes, 'No, Ma'am, that was, that was, that was odd.'<sup>45</sup> (Ex 39:187)

Col Grant was confronted about the contradiction in her testimony. The IO pointed out that on the one hand, witnesses felt her response to (b) (6), (b) (7) was inappropriate, demeaning, and made people uncomfortable, but from what she described, those impressions didn't seem to fully match up with her testimony. (Ex 39:188)

Col Grant agreed the testimony did not match up and opined different people in the room may have different perspectives, adding that not everyone felt her response was inappropriate and demeaning. (Ex 39:188) She reasoned if there were people in the room who saw her as demeaning and hostile, regardless of what she was doing, then it would not be surprising that they would feel that way about the incident with (b) (6), (b) (7) (Ex 39:188) Col Grant was asked if she was having a bad day that day. She stated she was not. (Ex 39:188)

IO: [W]itnesses have fairly consistently testified that they can tell generally when you're quote, "having a bad day," because they can read the expression on your face and hear the tone of your voice. They relate that they observed pursed lips, narrowed eyes, furrowed brow, intense eye contact, and at the same time describe the words, pace and tone of your voice as condescending as if you're talking to a child. I think we touched on that issue previously.

Grant: Mm-hmm.

IO: Understanding that those maybe subconscious, body language aspects, do you remember any of that or did anyone that you turn to for trust and advice point that out to you, or tell you afterward, any of those things?

Grant: No, no. In fact, I, like I said, I, I asked the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), um, I also asked my (b) (6), you know, is that, you know, I'm very sensitive, uh, to how I come across and, and, uh, none, none, none of that feedback was provided. And typically, in situations where, you know, if I ask, like "Hey, uh, that, that was awkward. I mean, did I, did I contribute to any of that?" Um, and ask my (b) (6) that, and he said no. Um, I asked the (b) (6)

---

<sup>45</sup> (b) (6), stated he talked to Col Grant after the meeting and confirmed to her that it was not just her, the exchange with (b) (6), (b) (7) was odd, but offered to intervene and be the one to talk to (b) (6), (b) (7) about it. (Ex 66:1)



(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) when we were talking about the incident itself and, he said no.<sup>46</sup> Um, and so, I, I don't, I don't have another explanation for you other than, uh, tonal references or non-verbal queuing or body language is a fairly subjective observation. (Ex 39:188)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified that during the first 6 months to a year of her command, Col Grant would bring her "bad days" into meetings and that if she was having a bad day and someone in the meeting was not prepared or did not have the "right sight picture," her facial expressions (clenched teeth, forced smile) would come out and she would be harsher in her conversation with the individual than if she was having a good day. (Ex 96:1) This happened often enough according to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that people tended to only engage with her during a meeting if they thought she was having a "good day" and the "bad days" seemed to happen a couple of times a week on average. (Ex 96:1)

Col Grant was asked if during this exchange she leaned forward in her chair. She stated she may have leaned forward in her chair because if she's listening "acutely," or for understanding, she does lean forward. (Ex 39:189) She stated she was very sorry that were people who felt that way and that, "the engagement, uh, potentially could have left her feeling that way. Definitely not the intent." (Ex 39:189) Col Grant explained her intent was to resolve what she perceived to be a disconnect and misunderstanding. (Ex 39:189)

Col Grant was asked if she pointed her finger at (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). She responded: "No, I don't think so, no," and explained normally if she was leaning forward, she was leaning forward to listen. She stated she generally sits with her hands crossed, and added: "pointing is not, it's not polite."<sup>47</sup> (Ex 39:189)

When asked to clarify, she testified:

Pointing, pointing is not polite,<sup>48</sup> even if you're trying to make a, even if you're trying to make a point. No, no pun intended. It's --But, but, but no, I, I, there, there would really be no reason to point at anybody because she was standing right next to me. She walked up to the table. (Ex 39:189)

Col Grant was asked if she said: "Well, I sure hope you're talking to your First Sergeant" or words to that effect, with emphasis on the word "hope." She responded with emphasis:

---

<sup>46</sup> (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) confirmed the exchange was odd. He did not assure Col Grant she did not contribute to it. (Ex 66:1)

<sup>47</sup> Col Grant's tone at this point in her testimony was noticeably soft and demure—almost inaudible. She was asked to restate her response.

<sup>48</sup> During the subject interview, the Investigation Team noticed Col Grant pointing her finger. The IO wrote in the margin of the questions when Col Grant pointed her finger at the IO after a question about whether or not she told her Group Commanders the results of the 2018 DEOCS survey were their fault. Likewise, AFSPC/IG also noted that Col Grant "points accusingly with her finger" in briefings and during the extensive IG out briefs. (Ex 12b:2)

No. That, that, 'Have you talked to your First Sergeant? Have you, have you connected with your First Sergeant?' Because I was, I was legitimately trying to figure out what, what's broken here. (Ex 39:189)

When asked, Col Grant testified (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) did not go over and apologize on her behalf. (Ex 39:191) She stated she asked him to stop over and make sure the (b) (6), (b) (7) were connected with the First Sergeant and that the transaction and the information that (b) (6), (b) (7) needed was being provided. (Ex 39:191)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) <sup>49</sup> Col Grant's (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the time, was present at the CAB meeting and testified similarly that (b) (6), (b) (7) wanted to be "briefed on the things that were going on across the base." (Ex 52:15) He also testified Col Grant recommended she connect with her (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) to get the information. (Ex 52:15) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) further testified:

I remember it's almost like, then the (b) (6) was...like, insisting, right? And this is, is I'm coming out of I want to say a bit of a fog there,<sup>50</sup> but just thinking about it, it's like the (b) (6), (b) (7) was (b) (6), (b) (7) Like, she was still, you know, asking. It was about, I'd say about three times or, like she kept asking. It's almost like the Wing Commander is saying 'Hey, do this.' And like, she was still asking questions and...really seemed like she was pushing on the Wing Commander, so to speak.

I think she said words like, you know, 'Hey, well, you know, I, in other bases where I was from, I used to get these briefings,' whatever, and you know, I think after a few times...Col Grant was saying, 'Hey you need to really, you know, at the squadron, work with your First Sergeant. Get in touch with your First Sergeant.' And that, that was a little bit odd to me, but the spouse pushed back at her a few times in that meeting, and that was a little strange to me. It, it got to a point to where, you know, that meeting, it, it, you know, a little strange, probably a little awkward, I would say.... (Ex 52:16)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was asked, between a (b) (6), (b) (7) and the Wing Commander, which of the two should have the wherewithal to keep things on a civil plane, he answered the Wing Commander bears the responsibility, though he added he did not believe there was anything uncivil in the meeting. (Ex 52:23)

Other witnesses helped provide insight into what they observed and how they felt Col Grant handled herself and the situation at large.

<sup>49</sup> (b) (6), (b) (7) came across as fiercely loyal to Col Grant and, at times, appeared to be advocating her position for her. It was not uncommon for a single question to result in a deluge of extraneous information. AFSPC/IG also noted concerns with this witness, noting he exercised "no independent thought" and "amplified Col Grant's behavior, good and bad, and was contributing to the problems identified w/r/t climate." (Ex 12b:4)

<sup>50</sup>At certain times, (b) (6), (b) (7) professed to have an unclear memory of the event.



(b) (6), (b) (7) is the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and witnessed Col Grant engage (b) (6), (b) (7) at the CAB meeting. She testified:

Sitting there, listening to the exchange, just made me uncomfortable.... And it was just very silent in the room.... And I'm thinking I just want this conversation to stop. (Ex 19:9)

She continued:

I felt badly for (b) (6), (b) (7) only because it felt like she was on the spot, trying to explain what she was saying...and to me, if you're brand new, you shouldn't have to explain what you're saying to a Wing Commander when you're just trying to figure out what, you know, the flow...her role, you know? (Ex 19:10)

(b) (6), (b) (7) pointed out the compounded significance of a (b) (6), (b) (7) in that situation: "I've seen Colonel Grant in many different situations, and I've never seen that before. Not with (b) (6), (b) (7)." (Ex 19:10)

She explained further:

Because a volunteer is somebody who's doing that--who's volunteering, so you want to--in my opinion, to foster that, you know? You want to grow people who are willing to volunteer and help out. [Y]ou want to do your best to make them feel welcome, especially somebody new. (Ex 19:14)

When asked if Col Grant failed to treat (b) (6), (b) (7) with dignity and respect that day, (b) (6), (b) (7) testified:

(b) (6), (b) (7): I'm sure (b) (6), (b) (7) wishes it would've stopped. I would've felt that way if I were in (b) (6), (b) (7) shoes. I probably would've felt the same way. I wouldn't understand where this was coming from and why. (Ex 19:35)

IO: That she was not being treated with dignity and respect?

(b) (6), (b) (7): Yeah, because--yeah, because like I said, you're a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), trying to get the pulse of, you know, wanting to do something, and then just the conversation going a little off to where I was feeling like, 'Yikes.' (Ex 19:35)

(b) (6), (b) (7) a seasoned (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), had a very upbeat attitude and fairly positive opinion of Col Grant. He stated that Col Grant was not talking down to (b) (6), (b) (7) but he could see the issue, especially given (b) (6), (b) (7) "unfamiliarity with Col Grant's manner." (Ex 118:31) He added there was "give or take...if there was no give by Col Grant, there [was] probably just as much by (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)" (Ex 118:31) (b) (6), (b) (7) was asked if there was anything about Col Grant's delivery that (b) (6), (b) (7) might not have been prepared for. He responded:

Yeah. I would say she was definitely not prepared for it. And for someone in her shoes, I mean, I could see why she would be not prepared for receiving communication like that. (Ex 118:33)

(b) (6), (b) (7) is the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at Schriever.<sup>51</sup> She was present at the CAB meeting and testified about what she observed that day:

I do remember that. Kind of feeling on edge a little bit about that. When that situation happened...because it just felt like--I felt bad for (b) (6), (b) (7) .... I just remember feeling uncomfortable and feeling bad. (Ex 32:25)

(b) (6), (b) (7) described the way Col Grant talked to (b) (6), (b) (7) stating: “[I]t felt a little bit condescending...almost like she was correcting her...feeling like she was getting corrected as a volunteer.” (Ex 32:26) She stated she could see how someone in that situation would feel attacked, embarrassed, humiliated, and unappreciated by Col Grant’s condescending tone. (Ex 32:26-27) When asked if she would want her (b) (6), (b) (7) talked to that way by the Wing Commander, (b) (6), (b) (7) testified she would not and went on to testify that she did not feel Col Grant treated (b) (6), (b) (7) with courtesy and kindness, or with dignity and respect. (Ex 32:29,32)

In discussing how a Wing Commander should have responded to a (b) (6), (b) (7) in that situation, (b) (6), (b) (7) testified:

I think at that level you--and I would hope this for, like, everyone in the organization, but at that level you have to be diplomatic and kind of rise above--raise above those situations and, um, kind of take the high road as it were. (Ex 32:32)

When asked if Col Grant did so in that instance, (b) (6), (b) (7) responded: “No. I mean, in that instance I think the back and forth just kept going until Col Grant was right and then that was the end of it.” (Ex 32:32) Having moved on to a new job, in large part because of Col Grant, (b) (6), (b) (7) reflected on her experience at Schriever and related how people were made to feel in similar public situations:

It’s not the same at Peterson as it was at Schriever under Col Grant, where Col Grant would make briefings feel like “graded events” and drill briefers down to the level of detail where she would make people feel stupid.<sup>52</sup> (Ex 33:1)

(b) (6), (b) (7) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), was present at the 9 Oct 18 CAB meeting. He testified he recalled (b) (6), (b) (7) standing up at the end of the meeting, but did not recall anything about the exchange that was out of sorts, was awkward, involved yelling, or anything along those lines. (Ex 105:1) Similarly, the IO interviewed (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

<sup>51</sup> (b) (6), (b) (7) testified Col Grant was a “big part” of her decision to leave her job at Schriever as the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). She took a lateral position at Peterson AFB, CO. (Ex 33:1)

<sup>52</sup> (b) (6), (b) (7) testified Col Grant made her feel stupid. (Ex 13:82)



and at Col Grant's request, the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)<sup>53</sup> Neither witness recalled what happened at the 9 Oct 18 meeting.

(b) (6), (b) (7) was present at that 9 Oct 18 CAB meeting. While she did not recall the particulars of this incident with Col Grant and (b) (6), (b) (7) she did have some positive things to say about Col Grant. She thought the climate was good, she felt welcomed and included, and that Col Grant was a very strong leader who made her expectations clear and had an open door policy. (Ex 123:4-5) However, (b) (6), (b) (7) also testified she could definitely see how Col Grant's words to others could be viewed as condescending. (Ex 123:13) (b) (6), (b) (7) testified she had a similar experience at a meeting, where Col Grant went on a "rant" about doing a better job advertising when the Medical Group was going to be open. Although (b) (6), (b) (7) knew it had been announced and discussed previously, she testified she just listened and "took it" from Col Grant. (Ex 123:15) She stated Col Grant could have handled that situation differently by taking her aside one-on-one, or by taking it up with the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) and recalled being on the receiving end "felt like a really long time." (Ex 123:16)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), of (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), characterized Col Grant's response to (b) (6), (b) (7) as "not where [Col Grant] should have been." (Ex 14:10) When asked what he meant by that, if he would characterize that as disrespectful, he stated he was "uncomfortable and would not have done it that way." (Ex 14:10) He went on to describe Col Grant's response as "quite pointed," and she became "visibly curt." (Ex 14:8-9) He continued: "I did not feel that was appropriate...we were all very uncomfortable with the way that response was being delivered." (Ex 14:9) He also noted the importance of maintaining positive relationships with spouses:

I would not use that same tone with a (b) (6), (b) (7) who's a (b) (6), ... who may not know me as well, first of all. [S]econd...they're serving in a different role. They are there to help and assist...in taking care of my people. So I need to take care of them. (Ex 14:22)

(b) (6), (b) (7) the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), was present at the meeting and recalled Col Grant's response being very "terse." (Ex 21:6) He continued: "The tenor of it was...it was almost like you could imagine a black cloud being kind of pulled over the room." (Ex 21:6) (b) (6), (b) (7) further described what it was like:

[T]he feeling, so, this is consistent with how Col Grant sometimes will react in meetings. And it's hard to really put a term to it, but if something doesn't go the way that she, necessarily wants it to go she becomes very...it's like a feeling comes over the room, like you could almost suck the air out of the room. Where she becomes very quiet, very terse, her lips become pursed and it's almost like she's angry, like, visibly upset or angry about it. And so, you know, everybody consequently reacts to that. (Ex 21:6-7)

---

<sup>53</sup> (b) (6), (b) (7) volunteered Col Grant was also (b) (6), (b) (7). She is a (b) (6), (b) (7) by trade. (Ex 123:23)



\*\*\*\*

Her face changes. Her entire demeanor changes. And everybody's, like... Okay, we're in a bad place right now. This is not good." And so everybody just shuts up. And so, that happens a lot.... If she's got concerns or there's something that she's really interested in knowing more about, the demeanor of the room changes and it's, like, like everybody just wants to not get shot.... (Ex 21:18-19)

(b) (6), (b) (7) testified the way Col Grant treated (b) (6), (b) (7) at the meeting was disrespectful. (Ex: 21:19)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified similarly, that he left the meeting feeling "a little uncomfortable with the comment by Col Grant and that her response was a little condescending toward (b) (6), (b) (7) (Ex 29:6-7)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recalled the meeting, which stood out in his mind then and it still does today (nearly one year later). He remembered in particular Col Grant's response to (b) (6), (b) (7) being uncomfortable for everyone to hear, especially because it was to a (b) (6), someone that was there voluntarily, trying to make a difference. (Ex 107:1) Col Grant's response, to him, came off as "high and right" and "not on target, not where it was supposed to be, overly intense, and misguided." (Ex 107:1) He recalled it was "so out of place to have a sharp response like that." (Ex 107:1) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted while people who had experienced life under Col Grant, particularly military members, may have been familiar with Col Grant's reactions in meetings, this was somewhat out of character inasmuch as it was directed not at a military member, but at an outside person, in this case, a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (Ex 107:1)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified further that what he observed that day from Col Grant was not respectful to a key spouse, (b) (6), (b) (7). He noted (b) (6), (b) (7) don't have to be there, they are (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), adding:

Had it been my (b) (6), I would have been so pissed off I couldn't see straight. (Ex 107:1)

He stated the way Col Grant treated (b) (6), (b) (7) was not the way he has seen any senior leader engage with a (b) (6), or someone external to the Wing. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) added: "It's not how you act "when company's over." (Ex 107:1)

(b) (6), (b) (7) testified Col Grant did not yell during the meeting, but Col Grant's response, just as at the previous Town Hall meeting, was "abrupt." (Ex: 103:1) When asked if he considered the response to be a failure to treat a (b) (6), (b) (7) with dignity and respect, he stated he would not go that far, but more diplomatically phrased it as "not the way I would have responded." (Ex 103:1)

At Col Grant's request, the IO contacted (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7) was the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) for two years under Col Grant and was present at the



CAB meeting. (Ex 16:2) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified he recalled the CAB meeting in question, and remembered at the end of the meeting, (b) (6), (b) (7) made a statement that had something to do with caring for Airmen. (Ex 106:1) Col Grant's response stood out in his memory as at first offering a potential solution, to work with her First Sergeant, but it was the tone she took with (b) (6), (b) (7) that he recalled the most. (Ex 106:1) He could see how that would make someone shut down and indicated to him Col Grant was not open and receptive to what was being offered. (Ex 106:1) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted particularly the inappropriateness of talking to a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) that way and considered Col Grant's response to be disrespectful and lacking in courtesy and kindness. (Ex 106:1) He added they both could have handled the situation better, but acknowledged it was the Wing Commander, not a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), who had the ultimate responsibility in that situation. When asked how he would have responded if his (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had been talked to that way, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified he would have "had issues with it." (Ex 106:1) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated he knew Col Grant cared about everyone, but didn't think she was always able to show that. (Ex 116:2) He continued:

...the way that she would respond sometimes, it may have appeared that maybe she didn't care or that she was being disrespectful. But I don't think that was her intent. I think that was just based on potentially her personality. (Ex 116:2)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), was also present at the 9 Oct 18 CAB meeting and while she did not recall the specifics of the situation with (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) she did attend the CAB meetings regularly and testified about what they were like from her perspective. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) described the CAB meetings chaired by Col Grant as "a dictatorship," where whatever she said went. (Ex 122:7) She recalled a time at a different meeting, where:

Col Grant totally made a guy feel like shit in front of a whole group of people. (Ex 122:9)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) expressed disappointment with Col Grant's approach, because the CAB meetings should be the least intimidating meeting where people feel free to communicate new ideas and initiatives to better serve the community. (Ex 122:21) She stated CAB meetings did not feel open because people were afraid to speak for fear of the repercussions from Col Grant, making them feel embarrassed in public. (Ex 122:34) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated this was "not a one off" or isolated incident, but a regular pattern that regular attenders were well aware of. She could see how someone new to the meeting might not realize this until having been exposed to the way these meetings were conducted by Col Grant. (Ex 122:36) She considers Col Grant to be "a terrible leader," and when asked if she considered the climate in CAB meetings or more generally at Schriever to be healthy, she testified: "No. Not at all." (Ex 122:15)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was also present at the meeting and his perspective was insightful, as Col Grant identified him as a witness on her behalf. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified:

---

<sup>54</sup> The 21<sup>st</sup> Medical Group from Peterson AFB supports Schriever AFB, which does not have its own Medical Group.



I think Colonel Grant was wrong with how she handled that one. I think it came from--it was kind of a throwback to the old Col Grant from 2017 just for a two minute period there, and, I think-my recollection is when she walked in the room, I think she--you could tell she was having a bad day. (Ex 27:35-36)

He explained (b) (6), (b) (7) likely believed that her incorrect information was correct and therefore, pushed back at Col Grant, at which point Col Grant got a bit more forceful with her response, stating “[n]o, that, this piece is not accurate. This is the right way.” (Ex 27:37) When asked if Col Grant treated (b) (6), (b) (7) whether her information was correct or not, with courtesy and kindness, (b) (6), (b) (7) testified, “probably not.” (Ex 27:38)

(b) (6), (b) (7) testified Col Grant’s reaction to (b) (6), (b) (7) was consistent with what many in the room, but not (b) (6), (b) (7) had seen previously: the body language, the tone, the clenched teeth. (Ex 66:1) On the topic of handling this event differently, (b) (6), (b) (7) was asked, between a (b) (6), (b) (7) and a Wing Commander, who should be expected to keep a conversation like that civil. He responded: “The Wing Commander, no doubt.” (Ex 27:41)

On balance, (b) (6), (b) (7) did not think Col Grant was disrespectful in terms of attacking (b) (6), (b) (7) personally, but viewed the exchange as Col Grant attacking the incorrect information. (Ex 27:37) It is noted, while this distinction between attacking information and attacking a person may have been clear to an experienced colonel, it may not have been so clear to a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). (b) (6), (b) (7) also gave a balanced view of (b) (6), (b) (7) that she has very strong opinions, and he was careful to not overstate or paint her as perfectly innocent. (Ex 27:39) Likewise, he noted she had challenges working with other (b) (6), (b) (7) as well. (Ex 27:39) Col Grant was quick to mention this aspect of (b) (6), (b) (7) during her testimony and (b) (6), (b) (7) herself confirmed she has had some difficulty with the other spouses in base housing. (Ex 13:27)<sup>55</sup>

All things considered, when asked if there could have been a better way to handle the situation, (b) (6), (b) (7) responded, “Col Grant needed to be the person that controlled that conversation and did it the right way, not the spouse.” (Ex 27:41)

According to (b) (6), (b) (7) Col Grant publically humiliated her with verbal abuse, yelling, scolding, in a personal attack. There are a number of different accounts of how Col Grant reacted to (b) (6), (b) (7) comment and/or question at the end of the meeting.

---

<sup>55</sup> (b) (6), (b) (7) may have experienced difficulty getting along with others as a (b) (6), (b) (7). A rather unusual entry appears in the 2019 DEOCS survey (long after the meeting in question) about a 50 FSS commander’s call stating (b) (6), (b) (7) announced there were individuals who did not want her there and “proceeded to address these people and threaten them, causing a very chilling effect.” The full DEOCS survey quote, which Col Grant read into the record during her interview, appears at Exhibit 36:179. (b) (6), (b) (7) confirmed he talked to (b) (6), (b) (7) about it and emphasized (b) (6), (b) (7) was the commander. (Ex 66:2)



(b) (6), (b) (7) began her written complaint, on AF Form 102, asserting that Col Grant's failure to acknowledge the (b) (6), (b) (7) at the beginning of the meeting was disrespectful. While ideally, (b) (6), (b) (7) and guests at every meeting would be so recognized, overlooking this detail does not, by itself, reasonably amount to cognizable disrespect.

The record supports that (b) (6), (b) (7) began her question to Col Grant with a comment about support for the local school. (b) (6), (b) (7) explained her intent was to inform Col Grant that they were engaged and looking to get involved. The content of her comment, evidenced by her own testimony, as well as the testimony of another (b) (6), (b) (7) in attendance, (b) (6), (b) (7) indicates her remarks may have been somewhat charged with an insinuation, if not a statement, that the base was taking care of the school Col Grant's (b) (6), (b) (7) attended, but not Airmen. Whether intended or not, (b) (6), (b) (7) recalled it seemed like a "jab" by (b) (6), (b) (7) (Ex 66:1) Although when asked, Col Grant testified she was not irritated by (b) (6), (b) (7) Even if the remark was deemed provocative in some way, that would not obviate the need to treat (b) (6), (b) (7) with courtesy, kindness, dignity, or respect, especially in such a setting. Likewise, even if (b) (6), (b) (7) did have a heightened sense of self, or had some difficulty getting along with other spouses at times, as (b) (6), (b) (7) suggests, that also does not in any way excuse Col Grant's response in that setting. As (b) (6), (b) (7) pointed out, a wing commander in that position should have been diplomatic, risen above, and taken the high road. It was Col Grant, above all others, who should have controlled the conversation the right way, not the (b) (6), (b) (7), as (b) (6), (b) (7) aptly stated.

As Col Grant noted, she invited (b) (6), (b) (7) to ask a question, even after she first declined. As (b) (6), (b) (7) testified, the exchange "kept going until Col Grant was right and then that was the end of it." Even Col Grant's own version of her response is laced with accusatory language: "What do you mean by 'you don't know what's going on,' on this base?" Also, her explanation of the way the conversation supposedly resolved itself with (b) (6), (b) (7) seemingly realizing she already had the answer to her own question, and concluding with Col Grant thanking the spouses, was unsupported by any other witness testimony. According to Col Grant, she responded:

Okay, well that's great. I mean, does that, does that address what you were trying to get after? Yeah, I guess it does. Then she sat down. And I said, okay, well thank you and thank you for coming.... (Ex 39:186)

If the exchange ended the way Col Grant contends it did, it would appear unlikely (b) (6), (b) (7) would have even filed a complaint.

Col Grant recognized the situation was awkward, but took no responsibility for creating it. Instead, she relied on (b) (6), (b) (7) confirmation that the exchange was odd, to arrive at the conclusion that she was not responsible. Despite denying she was having a bad day and claiming to be very sensitive to how she come across, Col Grant testified she would turn to her (b) (6), (b) (7) for feedback:



And typically, in situations where, you know, if I ask, like, 'Hey, uh, that, that was awkward. I mean, did I, did I contribute to any of that?' Um, and ask my (b) that, and he said, 'No.' (Ex 39:188)

Instead of providing Col Grant the frank feedback she needed to hear, for his part (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) appears to have provided the affirmation sought, and during his testimony, repeatedly emphasized his view that it simply seemed odd to him that a spouse would keep coming back at Col Grant. His testimony is replete with references to (b) (6), (b) (7) pushing back on Col Grant as it was ultimately his sworn testimony that there was nothing that lacked dignity or respect, a view shared only by Col Grant.

Col Grant offered perhaps a glimpse at what she may have been thinking and feeling at the time when she testified about being surprised:

Because I'm having a spouse come to me, sitting at the head of the table, as the Wing Commander, making a proclamation that she needs me to brief her on what's going on, on the Wing, and I was caught off-guard. And I didn't quite know how to respond other than just to try to figure out, what, what is it that you want to know? What is it that you need to connect with to do that? Happy to do it, but that's the first time I ever had a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) come up or seen it anywhere, even at any other place that I've been in command. To, to, to speak like that, to, to a Wing Commander in terms of hey, you need to brief me. And it just, it was surprising. (Ex 39:187)

While claiming previously she was not irritated, this statement points to a different conclusion--that in reality, she was not sincerely "happy to do it," (be the one to connect the spouse with the right people or resources), and may have reacted defensively.

While (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) question or statement may not have followed the heavily established norms of such meetings chaired by Col Grant and may have posed a challenge, the preponderance of the evidence supports Col Grant was taken aback by the situation and reverted to some of her more familiar, less professional and less respectful communication habits. When asked if he could see how a spouse or a volunteer might feel embarrassed or humiliated by Col Grant's response, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified, "Yes. Absolutely." He noted people in the room recognized it from experience, but (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) had probably not yet experienced that. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) also noted people who had experienced life under Col Grant, particularly military members, may have been familiar with her reactions in meetings like this, but it seemed especially out of character to be directed at an outside person or spouse. Col Grant's reaction to a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) in this situation was consistent with the way she would regularly speak to military members or civilian employees earlier in her command tour, including the body language, tone, clenched teeth, etc.



**CONCLUSION – PART II.**

A preponderance of the evidence supports that on or about 9 Oct 18, Col Grant failed to treat (b) (6), (b) (7) a (b) (6), (b) (7), with dignity and respect at the Community Action Board meeting. Witnesses present testified they felt uncomfortable and just wanted it to stop. They also felt bad for (b) (6), (b) (7) and recognized that because this was her first such meeting, she would not have realized how Col Grant was known to react in such situations. Witnesses described Col Grant’s condescending tone and could see how a (b) (6), in (b) (6), (b) (7) shoes would feel attacked, embarrassed, humiliated, and unappreciated. Multiple witnesses described Col Grant’s behavior as disrespectful and lacking in dignity and respect. (b) (6), called Col Grant’s response “wrong,” and like others, recognized a Wing Commander should have been able to handle that situation the right way. Squadron commanders described Col Grant’s treatment of (b) (6), (b) (7) as uncomfortable, not appropriate, and disrespectful. Staff members recounted the feeling in the room as like a black cloud, a feeling like the air was sucked out of the room, and everybody wanting to not get “shot” by Col Grant. Multiple witnesses testified they would be angry or would have a problem with it if Col Grant talked to their spouse the way she talked to (b) (6), (b) (7). A regular attendee noted CAB meetings under Col Grant generally felt this way and the 9 Oct 18 CAB meeting was not unique, or a “one off,” but a pattern. She compared these meetings to those in a dictatorship, where people were fearful and did not want to voice issues or ideas for fear of being embarrassed publicly by Col Grant.

While this situation may have posed a challenge, Air Force members at all levels are expected to handle themselves appropriately under circumstances such as this. AFI 1-1 and the Air Force Core Values demand that all Airmen treat others with genuine dignity, fairness, and respect at all times. Any number of alternatives were available to handle this situation in a way that would have preserved the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relationship while treating the military (b) (6), with dignity and respect in front of her peers, wing leadership, and her (b) (6), (b) (7). Fundamentally, as a Wing Commander, Col Grant should have taken due care to ensure, even under challenging conditions, volunteer (b) (6), are not disrespected in this way, and in turn, dissuaded from participating or volunteering as was the result here. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) recognized this in the aftermath of the exchange between Col Grant and (b) (6), (b) (7). The very thing he feared might happen if he didn’t go talk to her afterwards, that a spouse in that position might say to themselves, “forget this,” is precisely what happened as (b) (6), (b) (7) has not attended another meeting since this experience.

Col Grant’s treatment of a volunteer (b) (6), (b) (7) in this situation was also consistent with her regular treatment of military members and civilian employees, which supported the findings in Allegation 1 and helped undermine the overall command climate during Col Grant’s reign as the Wing Commander at the 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing.

Accordingly, by a preponderance of evidence, based on the findings of fact and sworn testimony, the allegation, as amended, that on or about 9 October 2018, during a 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing hosted event, Col Grant failed to treat an Air Force (b) (6), (b) (7) with dignity and respect,



in violation of AFI 1-1, *Air Force Standards*, 7 August 2012, Incorporating Change 1, 12 November 2014, is **SUBSTANTIATED**.

**ALLEGATION 3:** That in or around February 2018, Col Grant wrongfully accepted a gift, two Barnes & Noble gift cards valued at \$50.00, from a subordinate employee receiving less pay than herself, in violation of DoD 5500.7-R, *Joint Ethics Regulation*, 17 November 2011.

Col Grant requested her (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) be interviewed on the topic of how Col Grant reacted when mistakes were made. (Ex 93:2) Col Grant suggested inquiring about the pace of front office operations, how Col Grant handled stress, and specifically about an accidental (fraudulent) charge of \$250 on Col Grant's credit card in an attempt to get expedited processing for an official business passport from an official looking but fraudulent website. (Ex 93:2) In looking into the matter, information surfaced that all but \$50 was refunded, but (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified she felt bad about the incident and provided Col Grant with a gift, in the form of two Barnes & Noble gift cards, with a total value of \$50.00. (Ex 80:2) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified Col Grant acknowledged "she really wasn't allowed to take it." (Ex 80:2) However, despite there being ethics rules prohibiting the acceptance of such a gift, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testified Col Grant nevertheless accepted the cards as gifts to her (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) back in February of 2018. (Ex 80:2; Ex 108:2)

Recognizing if true, this would be a violation of law or regulation, the IO contacted Col Grant through her Area Defense Counsel (ADC) on 6 Sept 19 to afford her the opportunity to comment on this matter. At that time, Col Grant was reminded of her Article 31 rights. (Ex 112:2) On advice on counsel, Col Grant invoked her right to remain silent on 16 Sep 19 and elected not to respond. (Ex 113:1) On 30 Sep 19, Col Grant was given notice this issue was being added to the investigation as a formal allegation and again given the opportunity to respond. On 4 Oct 19, through her defense counsel, Col Grant elected to exercise her rights and formally declined to comment. (Ex 126:1)

## **STANDARDS.**

The Joint Ethics Regulation (JER) provides a source of standards of ethical conduct and ethics guidance for DoD employees, based on Federal law, 5 CFR § 2635.302.

Gifts from employees receiving less pay. Except as provided in this subpart, an employee may not, directly or indirectly, accept a gift from an employee receiving less pay than himself unless:

- (1) The two employees are not in a subordinate-official superior relationship; and
- (2) There is a personal relationship between the two employees that would justify the gift.

### 5 CFR § 2635.303 Definitions:

---

112

*This is a protected document. It will not be released (in whole or in part), reproduced, or given additional dissemination (in whole or in part) outside of the inspector general channels without prior approval of The Inspector General (SAF/IG) or designee.*



For purposes of this subpart, the following definitions shall apply:

(b) *Indirectly*, for purposes of § 2635.302(b), has the meaning set forth in §2635.203(f). For purposes of § 2635.302(a), it includes a gift:

(1) Given with the employee's knowledge and acquiescence by his parent, sibling, spouse, child, or dependent relative

AFI 1-1, Air Force Standards

2.3.3. Federal Regulations (5 C.F.R. 2635.302, *et seq.*) provide guidance on gifts between employees:

2.3.3.1. Employees may generally not accept gifts from subordinates or employees that make less pay than themselves.

#### **ANALYSIS.**

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) was interviewed on 8 Aug 19 and provided sworn testimony that it is not easy to work for Col Grant. (Ex 80:1) When asked about what she observed from others working in that environment, she shared: “[T]he front office was all frustrated with her,” and added, “she’s tough, doesn’t take no for an answer, or wrong work or mistakes.” (Ex 80:1)

When asked if she ever made errors, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) stated she did. She testified that she “screwed up,” trying to get Col Grant an expedited government passport. (Ex 80:2) She related the passport experts on base referred her to a website, but she mistakenly went to the wrong site and was “phished” while attempting to comply with Col Grant’s request, using Col Grant’s credit card. (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) noted Col Grant was not happy, but never yelled at her about it. (Ex 80:2) But when asked how Col Grant responds when people make mistakes, she testified:

Her emotions are displayed on her sleeve sometimes and I don’t think she realizes that. You get a look, you know, for lack of a better way to say it, an evil look. (Ex 80:2)

When asked if she also observed disapproving looks, body language, tone, she responded: “Yeah, she had what I called the mom tone, like you screwed up again.” (Ex 80:2)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) related several times that she “felt so bad” about the passport/credit card incident. (Ex 80:2) It was this feeling that caused her to buy the gift cards originally for Col Grant and to ultimately give them for the benefit of her (b) (6), (b) (7)(C). She testified:

I know it’s an ethics thing. But, I felt really bad, it was my total screw up, and so I gave her kids the Barnes & Noble gift cards. (Ex 80:2)

When asked about the acceptance of these gift cards by Col Grant's (b) (6), (b) (6), (b) (b) (7)(C), nervously stated she believed they were accepted, concluding: "I never got them back. So I assume she did." (Ex 80:2-3)

A records check by the 50 SW legal office for any request for an ethics opinion or legal review of the gift offer/acceptance in question between 2017 and 2019 revealed no such advice was ever given or requested. (Ex 109:1)

On 19 Sep 19, (b) (6), (b) (b) (7)(C) was contacted and asked if Col Grant ever paid her for the two Barnes and Noble gift cards. (Ex 108:2) She responded the same day, "yes." When asked when Col Grant paid her for the cards, in a 19 Sep 19 e-mail, she stated: "They are in the mail as we speak." (Ex 108:1) On 20 Sep 19, (b) (6), (b) (b) (7)(C) confirmed receiving two gift cards in the mail from Col Grant, which would have been 14 days after Col Grant was notified SAF/IGS was looking into this issue. (Ex 114:1)

From the evidence gathered, there does not appear to be any exception to the bright line prohibition against accepting a gift from a lesser paid employee under the JER or 5 CFR § 2635. Col Grant and (b) (6), (b) (b) (7)(C) were in a subordinate-official superior relationship and (b) (6), (b) (b) (7)(C) a (b) (6), (b) (7)(C), received less pay than Col Grant. There is no evidence of a personal relationship between the two that would permit such gift-giving. A gift given to the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) of a superior, is imputed to the superior. Allowing gifts to be transferred to her (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) instead of herself was not a lawful option.

### CONCLUSION.

Whether Col Grant paid for, returned, or replaced in kind \$50.00 worth of gift cards, over a year and a half after originally constructively accepting the gift, and only after being questioned about it by the IG, does not remove the fact that the preponderance of evidence clearly demonstrates on or about February 2018, Col Grant wrongfully accepted a gift, in the form of \$50 worth of gift cards, from (b) (6), (b) (b) (7)(C) her (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) at the time and lesser paid employee, in violation of DoD 5500.7-R, *Joint Ethics Regulation*, 17 Nov 11.

Accordingly, by a preponderance of evidence, based on the findings of fact and sworn testimony, the allegation that in or around February 2018, Col Grant wrongfully accepted a gift, two Barnes & Noble gift cards valued at \$50.00, from a subordinate employee receiving less pay than herself, in violation of DoD 5500.7-R, *Joint Ethics Regulation*, 17 November 2011, is **SUBSTANTIATED.**



## V. SUMMARY.

**ALLEGATION 1:** That between June 2017 and February 2019, Colonel Jennifer Grant failed to establish and maintain a healthy command climate, in violation of AFI 1-2, *Commander's Responsibilities*, 8 May 2014, is **SUBSTANTIATED**.

- The preponderance of the evidence supports Col Grant failed to establish and maintain a healthy command climate. Though stated in a number of ways, the sentiment expressed by members of Col Grant's staff, from Group Commanders to staff agency chiefs, to front office military members and civilian secretaries demonstrates a systemic and pervasive work climate that was decidedly unhealthy. The weight of evidence submitted and gathered in support of this allegation is substantial. In addition to more than 60 witness interviews, the record contains insights gleaned from the interview or survey of over 1,000 people, which includes IG to Airmen interviews, pre-inspection surveys, and two wing-wide DEOCS climate surveys. Witnesses interviewed, particularly Col Grant's immediate staff, credibly described the environment as one in which Col Grant failed in her responsibilities to pay attention to the welfare and morale of her subordinates, and failed to cultivate a climate of teamwork, cohesion, and trust.

**ALLEGATION 2** (As amended): That on or about 9 October 2018, during a 50<sup>th</sup> Space Wing hosted event, Col Grant failed to treat an Air Force (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with dignity and respect, in violation of AFI 1-1, *Air Force Standards*, 7 August 2012, Incorporating Change 1, 12 November 2014, is **SUBSTANTIATED**.

- The preponderance of the evidence supports that on or about 9 Oct 18, Col Grant failed fail to treat (b) (6), (b) (7) a Key Spouse, with dignity and respect at the Community Action Board meeting. Witnesses credibly described Col Grant's condescending tone and testified Col Grant's behavior was disrespectful and lacking in dignity and respect. While this situation may have posed a challenge, Air Force members at all levels are expected to handle themselves appropriately under circumstances such as this. AFI 1-1 and the Air Force Core Values demand that all Airmen treat others with genuine dignity, fairness, and respect at all times. Any number of alternatives were available to handle this situation in a way that would have preserved the volunteer (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) relationship while treating the (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) with dignity and respect in front of her peers, wing leadership, and her (b) (6), (b) (7). Fundamentally, as a Wing Commander, Col Grant should have taken due care to ensure, even under challenging conditions, to ensure volunteer (b) (6), (b) (7) are not disrespected in this way, and in turn, dissuaded from participating or volunteering.

**ALLEGATION 3:** That in or around February 2018, Col Grant wrongfully accepted a gift, two Barnes & Noble gift cards valued at \$50.00, from a subordinate employee receiving less pay than herself, in violation of DoD 5500.7-R, *Joint Ethics Regulation*, 17 November 2011, is **SUBSTANTIATED**.


- A preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that despite being in position where she knew or should have known of the ethics regulations concerned, Col Grant nevertheless accepted gift cards for the benefit of her (b) (6), from a lesser paid employee in violation of the Joint Ethics Regulation.

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

(b) (6), (b) (7)(C), USAF

Investigating Officer  
Senior Official Inquiries

I have reviewed this Report of Investigation and the accompanying legal review and I concur with their findings.



SAMI D. SAID  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
The Inspector General



LIST OF EXHIBITS

	<b>Exhibit</b>
AFI 90-301.....	1
Col Grant biography .....	2
50 <sup>th</sup> Space Wing Factsheet.....	3
AFI 1-1.....	4
AFI 1-2.....	5
DoDI 1020.03 .....	6
Military Judges Benchbook excerpt .....	7
Joint Ethics Regulation.....	8
DEOCS Consolidated Report, Schriever, April 2018.....	9
Army War College paper on Toxic Leadership (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).....	10
Subject Notification Memo (S8666P) .....	11
(b) (6), (b) (7) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) post UEI e-mail.....	12a
(b) (6), (b) (7) MFR, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) post UEI.....	12b
(b) (6), (b) (7) (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) post UEI portion of e-mail sent to (b) (6), (b) (7)(C).....	12c
(b) (6), (b) (7) testimony .....	13
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) sworn testimony.....	14
2018 4 <sup>th</sup> quarter CAB meeting minutes-signed .....	15
2018 4 <sup>th</sup> quarter CAB meeting sign in sheet.....	16
2018 4 <sup>th</sup> quarter CAB meeting slides.....	17
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony.....	18
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony .....	19
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony .....	20
(b) (6), (b) (7) testimony .....	21
(b) (6), (b) (7) testimony .....	22
IG Complaint, (b) (6), (b) (7) AF 102 IG complaint form.....	23
Subject Notification Updated Allegations Letter.....	24
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony .....	25
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony.....	26
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony .....	27
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony.....	28
Lt Col Gallagher, testimony.....	29
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony.....	30

(b) (6), (b) e-mail ..... 31  
(b) (6), (b) (7) testimony ..... 32  
(b) (6), (b) (7) MFR..... 33  
(b) (6), (b) (7) MFR..... 34  
2018 50 SW DEOCS Report ..... 35  
2019 50 SW DEOCS Report ..... 36  
50 SW UEI Report - 2019..... 37  
12 Jul 18 50 SW CC Call Slides/DEOCS Outbrief ..... 38  
Subject Interview: Col Jennifer Grant - S8666P ..... 39  
IG Complaint, (b) (6), (b) (7)(C) AF 102 IG complaint form ..... 40  
IG Appointment Memo - (b) (6), 8 Mar 19 ..... 41  
Complainant Notification - (b) (6), (b) (7) ..... 42  
Selection for Promotion Announcement, Col Grant, Nov 2018..... 43  
(b) (6), (b) (7) MFR ..... 44  
G-Series Orders, Col Grant, 50 SW..... 45  
AFSPCGM 2018-13-01 - 30 Aug 18..... 46  
AFI 36-2706 Equal Opportunity Program ..... 47  
(b) (6), (b) On Line Obituary..... 48  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony ..... 49  
News story, 50 SW Change of Command 24 Jun 19..... 50  
(b) (6), (b) (7) testimony..... 51  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony ..... 52  
AFSPC IG e-mail, number of people interviewed/surveyed ..... 53  
2017 50 SW DEOCS Report ..... 54  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) MFR..... 55  
(b) (6), (b) 21 Jun 19 MFR Safety Plan..... 56  
(b) (6), (b) 31 Jul 19 MFR Night and Day ..... 57  
(b) (6), (b) 16 Aug 19 e-mail Climate Change ..... 58  
(b) (6), (b) (7) testimony ..... 59  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) MFR..... 60  
(b) (6), (b) testimony..... 61  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony ..... 62  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) testimony ..... 63  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) MFR..... 64  
(b) (6), (b) MFR ..... 65  
(b) (6), (b) MFR CAB meeting ..... 66  
(b) (6), (b) MFR ..... 67  
(b) (6), (b) MFR ..... 68  
(b) (6), (b) (7) MFR ..... 69  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) MFR I ..... 70  
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C) MFR II..... 71

*This is a protected document. It will not be released (in whole or in part), reproduced, or given additional dissemination (in whole or in part) outside of the inspector general channels without prior approval of The Inspector General (SAF/IG) or designee.*



(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	, MFR.....	72
(b) (6), (b) (7)	MFR.....	73
(b) (6), (b) (7)	MFR.....	74
(b) (6), (b) (7)	MFR.....	75
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	MFR.....	76
(b) (6), (b) (7)	MFR.....	77
(b) (6), (b) (7)	MFR.....	78
(b) (6), (b) (7)	MFR.....	79
(b) (6), (b) (7)	MFR.....	80
(b) (6), (b) (7)	MFR.....	81
(b) (6), (b) (7)	, MFR.....	82
(b) (6), (b) (7)	21 Jun 19 MFR.....	83
(b) (6), (b) (7)	10 Jun 19 MFR.....	84
	Lt Col Amsden, testimony.....	85
	Space Not Used.....	86
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	testimony.....	87
(b) (6), (b) (7)	testimony.....	88
(b) (6), (b) (7)	, testimony.....	89
(b) (6), (b) (7)	testimony.....	90
(b) (6), (b) (7)	MFR.....	91
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	testimony.....	92
	Subject proposed witness list.....	93
	Subject proposed witness list II.....	94
(b) (6), (b) (7)	text messages.....	95
(b) (6), (b) (7)	on: fear in meetings.....	96
	AF DEOCS Implementing Instructions.....	97
	SECDEF Ethics Message 19 Aug 19.....	98
	CSAF to Sr. Leaders Memo, "Preparing Tomorrow's Air Force Senior Leaders.....	99
	AFI 36-2909 Unprofessional Relationships.....	100
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	MFR.....	101
	AF AIQ Review of 2019 DEOCS.....	102
(b) (6), (b) (7)	MFR II 9 Sep 19.....	103
(b) (6), (b) (7)	MFR 9 Sep 19 - CAB.....	104
(b) (6), (b) (7)	MFR.....	105
(b) (6), (b) (7)	MFR.....	106
(b) (6), (b) (7)(C)	MFR II.....	107
(b) (6), (b) (7)	19 Sep 19 e-mail: gift cards.....	108
	50 SW/JA Ethics Opinion File check: gift cards.....	109
	50 SW Org Chart.....	110
(b) (6), (b) (7)	19 Sep 19 e-mail: gift cards.....	111
	6 Sep 19 e-mail to ADC/Subject, follow up questions.....	112
	16 Sep 19 response to questions.....	113
(b) (6), (b) (7)	20 Sep 19 e-mail re: gift cards.....	114

*This is a protected document. It will not be released (in whole or in part), reproduced, or given additional dissemination (in whole or in part) outside of the inspector general channels without prior approval of The Inspector General (SAF/IG) or designee.*

(b) (6), (b) testimony ..... 115  
(b) (6), (b) (7) testimony..... 116  
Mrs. Lenn, MFR ..... 117  
(b) (6), (b) (7) testimony..... 118  
AFSPC IG UEI Survey Data ..... 119  
30 Sep 19 Updated Allegation Letter, Allegation 3..... 120  
Air Force Guide for Suicide Risk Assessment, Management, and Treatment ..... 121  
(b) (6), (b) testimony..... 122  
(b) (6), (b) (7) testimony..... 123  
(b) (6), (b) (7) MFR ..... 124  
(b) (6), (b) (7) MFR ..... 125  
Col Grant response to Allegation 3, 4 Oct 19..... 126

*This is a protected document. It will not be released (in whole or in part), reproduced, or given additional dissemination (in whole or in part) outside of the inspector general channels without prior approval of The Inspector General (SAF/IG) or designee.*